Distancing Russia from China. Was the summit in Alaska Trump's first step towards this goal?

Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images

On 15 August 2025, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spent three hours discussing the end of Russia's war against Ukraine, economic projects and the future security architecture. There were no specific agreements or announcements of a ceasefire – the meeting between the two presidents in Alaska was more of a prelude to lengthy negotiations that could define new rules of the game. 

The Alaska summit reflects Washington's attempt to rebuild the global balance of power: to pull Russia away from China, which is the main rival of the US, and to focus all resources on it. China is a key third party in this game. Without an understanding of it, the picture of change will be incomplete. 

‘Reverse Nixon’ and American hegemony

In the 1970s, US President Richard Nixon established special diplomatic relations with China in order to exploit the tension between Beijing and Moscow and weaken the USSR. Fifty years later, the administration of another US president, Donald Trump, is proposing a mirror manoeuvre: establishing a tactical partnership with Russia to restrict China. They call this manoeuvre the ‘Reverse Nixon’. 

But there is a huge difference between the context then and now. In the 1970s, the PRC and the USSR were practically on the verge of war: there were armed clashes, the ideological division was deep, and economic ties were insignificant. Nixon's visit to Beijing opened up access to American technology and markets and helped China to rapidly modernise its economy. 

However, the effect was short-lived: by the 1980s, Moscow and Beijing had restored relations, and today their cooperation is reaching record levels. Russian-Chinese trade exceeded $240 billion in 2024 and continues to grow, while US trade with Russia amounted to only about $52 billion.

RUSI analysts state that attempts to pressure Russia while simultaneously seeking compromises with it only strengthen the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The Kremlin is using the escalation with the West to demand more support from China, while Beijing is strengthening the anti-American front. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also emphasises that, unlike in the 1970s, the current level of interaction between Russia and China is unprecedentedly high, there is no ideological conflict, and economic interdependence is deep, so it would be naive to expect a ‘big break-up’.

The Alaska Summit and prospects for cooperation

The Alaska summit took place without the participation of Ukraine or the European Union, which allowed Washington and Moscow to discuss direct economic cooperation. The main lever of the US is a set of proposals – from energy projects to the lifting of certain sanctions – which, from the point of view of the Trump administration, could spark the interest of the Russian elite and make Putin more cooperative.

For example, according to Reuters, the Trump administration discussed ideas to involve Russian nuclear icebreakers in the development of Arctic LNG projects in Alaska. Russia has the world's only fleet of nuclear icebreakers, which play a central role in ensuring year-round navigation of the Northern Sea Route, a strategic route for global energy and trade flows. 

Other options mentioned included the possible return of the American company Exxon Mobil to the Sakhalin-1 project and the supply of equipment for Russian gas liquefaction plants.

The US also offered Russia to purchase American technology and replace Chinese components with it. There were also rumors that Trump was ready to raise the issue of joint development of Arctic rare earth deposits and lifting the ban on the export of parts for the repair of Russian aircraft, most of which are on the verge of emergency due to sanctions. 

These proposals have not been officially confirmed, but they show that the Trump administration is ready to negotiate with Moscow mainly in a bilateral format, skipping its European allies. 

Consequently, the Kremlin tried to appeal to Trump's pragmatic interests. Putin said that the potential for economic cooperation between the US and Russia is enormous: the parties can develop trade, energy, digital technologies, space and the Arctic. Russian diplomats emphasised that they included heads of energy and financial agencies in the delegation precisely to discuss how to potentially ‘make a deal’.

A wake-up call for China

For China, the summit in Alaska is a wake-up call. Beijing is closely watching to see if Washington will be able to pull Moscow away from China and change the balance of power in the US-China-Russia triangle. 

Chinese officials and analysts admit that improved US-Russia relations could reduce Moscow's dependence on Beijing. At the same time, China has a significant interest in prolonging the war between Russia and Ukraine, as this diverts Western resources and forces Moscow to accept unfavourable trade terms with Beijing. Beijing believes that continued hostilities keep Russia 'in orbit' and prevent Washington from focusing entirely on the Indo-Pacific region.

Russia's dependence on China has been growing since 2022. Bilateral trade exceeded $240 billion in 2024. Beijing is actively buying Russian energy resources, supplying technology and becoming Moscow's main creditor. China has leverage over Russia thanks to its import volumes and monopoly position in the field of high-tech equipment. However, there has been no economic pressure applied against Russia yet. Beijing seeks to avoid open conflict with the US and does not want to find itself caught between Washington and Moscow. Some Chinese commentators warn that a peaceful settlement would be beneficial because it would promote trade between Russia and China, while others advise staying away from a possible ‘hot potato’ – Putin's proposal to involve China in Ukraine's security guarantees. 

Either way, Beijing views Trump's strategy through the prism of competition for influence in Eurasia. If the US lifts sanction pressure and gives Russia access to American technology, China risks losing an exclusive partner and weakening its position in Eurasia.

Russia's position

For Russia, excessive dependence on Beijing has become almost an existential issue. Sanctions after 2022 deprived the Kremlin of access to Western markets, and China became the main source of foreign currency earnings and technology. 

Part of the Russian establishment fears that Moscow is becoming a junior partner that has to agree to Chinese demands. Therefore, Trump's attempts to open up economic cooperation with the US look attractive to Putin: they offer a chance to reduce Chinese influence, gain access to Western technology and earn money from joint projects in the Arctic.

But most of the Russian political class understands that the prospects for a ‘turn to the West’ are limited. Shared strategic interests with China – countering the West, abandoning the dollar in mutual payments and cooperation in the military-industrial sector – make a break unlikely. 

Analysts note that, even if Moscow agrees to certain concessions to Washington, it will use this as a bargaining bowl of rice in negotiations with Beijing rather than as an indication of a genuine change of course. Essentially, the Kremlin is attempting to find a balance by increasing its own autonomy.

Sceptics in the US

There are many critics of the ‘Reverse Nixon’ idea in the US. Not everyone in the ruling party is ready to make concessions to Putin, especially at the expense of Ukrainian interests. Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski called Putin a war criminal and stressed that any agreement must be concluded with the participation of the Ukrainian president and on Ukrainian terms. She doubts that the summit will bring peace, but supports gradual progress. 

Many Republicans and Democrats believe that the idea of pulling Russia away from China is doomed because it requires concessions that contradict fundamental principles: support for Ukraine and unity with European allies. Heritage Foundation analysts warn that even if engagement helps reduce Moscow's dependence on Beijing, it will not lead to a strategic rift, but may simply strengthen Putin's position.

Ukraine and new dividing lines

Ukraine has found itself at the centre of a global game. If the US eases sanction pressure and offers Russia economic incentives, Kyiv risks coming under diplomatic pressure. During the summit, Putin allegedly offered to withdraw Ukrainian troops from Donbas in exchange for a ceasefire. This is unacceptable to Ukraine. However, prolonged pressure and the prospect of economic benefits may force the West to push Kyiv to make concessions.

The US may offer Russia a combination of conditions, including opening the American market to Russian companies, but these scenarios will depend on Moscow's willingness to make concessions on the front lines and on China's position. However, any agreements behind Ukraine's back undermine its sovereignty and send a signal to Beijing that borders can be changed by force.

Geopolitical balance The United States is betting on a reorientation of global policy from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region. If the Trump administration achieves at least partial neutrality with Russia, it will be able to free up resources to compete with Beijing. 

But the strengthening of the Russian-Chinese partnership, the rapid development of bilateral trade, and the personal relationship between Xi Jinping and Putin indicate that a break in the ‘axis of autocracies’ is unlikely to happen. In the worst case, Washington's efforts could have the opposite effect: Kremlin and Beijing will unite even more against the US, demanding concessions from the West on various fronts.

The risks for Europe are obvious. If the US shifts its attention to China and reduces its presence in Europe, EU countries will have to ensure their own security and support Ukraine on their own. European leaders are already preparing for this: according to  Politico, Brussels sees the summit as “Trump management” and is ready to tighten sanctions against Russia if the talks fail. Beijing views the negotiations through the prism of its own interests, seeking to keep Russia in its orbit and prevent the US from focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. Washington may offer business deals and temporary preferences, but it is unlikely to be able to compensate for the advantages that Russia gains from cooperation with China. 

For Ukraine, the greatest danger lies in the fact that the major powers will negotiate without its participation. While the conflict continues, Kyiv must strengthen its alliances with Europe and the US so as not to become 'a bargaining bowl of rice' in geopolitical bargaining. 

All in all, China is not a peripheral player or a shadow in this game — it is the central beneficiary and, at the same time, the main trigger for the entire American strategy, and every step in Trump's relations with Putin is actually assessed through the prism of what Beijing gains or loses. Only awareness of this reality can help Ukraine and Europe protect their interests.