Drug trafficking, border security, and sovereign internet: what was discussed and decided at the CSTO meeting in Kyrgyzstan?

Photo: CSTO

What did they discuss?

Terrorism, extremism, illegal drug trafficking

Terrorism and extremism are discussed every time, and illegal drug trafficking is a particularly relevant issue at the moment, especially in Central Asia (CA). CA countries do not have the resources to control this problem on their own and rely on the resources that the Kremlin is willing to provide.

With regard to drug trafficking in the CSTO countries, a preliminary search of articles allowed us to identify concerns over the past month about the growth of cross-border drug trafficking linked to the activities of groups operating in northern Afghanistan (separate from the Taliban). 

The Taliban has taken a tough position on reducing drug trafficking from the country and the cultivation of narcotic plants in general. Therefore, since trafficking has been partially blocked (especially domestic consumption), the flow of drugs has been redirected to the least controlled northern regions of Afghanistan and further to the countries of Central Asia and Moscovia. Central Asian countries view the warm relations between the Kremlin and the Taliban as an opportunity to draw the attention of the Afghan authorities to the problem.

Transnational crime and cybercrime

Moscovia has made this block crucial as a method of discrediting Ukraine. Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Moscovia Alexei Shevtsov noted that Ukrainian special services, with the support of the West, have intensified cyber attacks against the Kremlin and the CSTO countries.

According to him, in 2024 alone, the number of computer crimes in Moscovia increased by 13%, exceeding 765 thousand cases. 

The main message conveyed by the Moscow delegation was that ‘the problem of Ukraine is a problem for all’ because the CSTO countries are also under attack! To counter such threats, the Kremlin called for more active use of the Advisory Coordination Centre for Responding to Computer Incidents: "The expansion of computer crime in Russia is largely due to the intensification of the activities of the Ukrainian special services. In particular, under the supervision of the Security Service of Ukraine and with the participation of Western experts, more than 1,000 call centres engaged in money extortion have been set up on Ukrainian territory. They are becoming increasingly active against other countries, including CSTO member states."

According to Shevtsov, cyber centres in Germany, Great Britain, Finland, Estonia and Latvia are operating against Moscovia under the patronage of Western special services.

‘In 2024, the number of computer crimes increased by 13% and exceeded 765,000. They were mainly aimed at committing fraud against Russian citizens and creating channels for the distribution of drugs,’ he added.

Border security

This was another important topic discussed at the meeting. Yusuf Rakhmon, Secretary of the Security Council of Tajikistan, spoke about the implementation of the first phase of the CSTO Intergovernmental Target Programme on strengthening the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan (this issue is closely related to the first point on drug trafficking). 

Moscovia is trying to build friendly relations with the Taliban, but despite this, it is trying to strengthen its borders, including through third countries. However, in our opinion, this is primarily due to the large-scale trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan. 

What was the essence of the first stage of border security? This stage focused on inventorying and assessing the current state of the border. It also included creating plans for the construction of new border facilities and the reconstruction of existing ones. The supply of technical equipment, such as video surveillance systems, drones, and communications equipment, is also planned.

It is obvious that by using the risk of ‘drug trafficking from Afghanistan’, Moscovia is deepening its own presence through ‘security services’. Something similar to how Moscovia provides ‘security services’ to African governments. 

Therefore, at a deeper level: Moscovia is interested in drug trafficking (controlled drug trafficking) in Central Asian countries, because this increases the demand for ‘Kremlin services’, but this drug trafficking must be controlled to such an extent that drugs do not reach Moscovia from Central Asia, or if they do, then only through controlled transit.

Plan for the development of military cooperation

In addition to the aforementioned, the participants discussed military-political coordination. The result was a series of signed documents, including the Plan for the Development of Military Cooperation for 2026-2030. This document will determine how the CSTO countries will jointly prepare for possible challenges in the future.

The document is partially confidential, so the details of its content are not publicly disclosed. 

The main information is limited to general statements about goals and directions. 

• Conducting regular joint military exercises.

• Modernisation of weapons and technical equipment of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces.

• Strengthening coordination between the intelligence services of member countries.

• Development of a cybersecurity system and response to information threats.

The day before: Electronic warfare

On 18 June, on the eve of the main meeting , a meeting of the working group on electronic warfare (EW) was also held in Cholpon-Ata. It was chaired by Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin, commander of the Moscovia Armed Forces electronic warfare troops, while Kyrgyzstan was represented by First Deputy Minister of Defence Major General Erlis Terdikbaev.

The meeting focused on how modern wars are increasingly dependent on technologies. CSTO Joint Staff Chief Andrei Serdukov stressed that the experience of Russian campaigns has shown that drones controlled via radio channels or satellites have become a serious threat. To counter them, it is necessary to develop electronic warfare systems. The participants discussed how to improve the CSTO regulatory framework in this area and shared their experience in the use of electronic warfare.

This rhetoric underscores the Kremlin's intention to deepen the evasion of sanctions through third countries by ‘outlining risks’ and ‘motivating technological cooperation.’ 

The goal is to reach a state (not under ‘pressure from the Kremlin,’ but voluntarily) where Central Asian countries would agree to cooperation that involves both joint production for the benefit of the Kremlin and assistance in evading sanctions.

On the same day in Tajikistan: ‘Unbreakable Brotherhood’ and ‘Barrier’

In parallel with the events in Kyrgyzstan, on 17-19 June, staff negotiations were held in Tajikistan on the preparation of two major CSTO training exercises planned for autumn 2025:

• "Unbreakable Brotherhood-2025" - an annual peacekeeping exercise under the auspices of the CSTO, which this year will take place at the Fakhrabad training ground in Tajikistan. Its main goal is to practise the actions of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in a crisis region.

According to the training scenario, an internal conflict arises in a certain hypothetical country, against which a peacekeeping mission with a CSTO mandate is deployed. Units from different countries will perform tasks related to protecting facilities, patrolling, escorting humanitarian cargoes and ensuring cooperation with the local administration and population. The exercises will also include elements of information security, combating fake news and anti-propaganda.

• "Barrier-2025" - a special military exercise dedicated to countering radiological, chemical and biological threats. The focus is on responding to simulated emergencies involving the release of hazardous substances, epidemics, or terrorist attacks using chemical or biological weapons. Participants will practise evacuating the population, decontamination, establishing protective zones, and organising medical care. 

Representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moscovia, Tajikistan, and the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre took part in the negotiations. They agreed on training scenarios and contingent compositions and conducted reconnaissance of the area.

It should be noted that representatives of Armenia were absent from these meetings.

Armenia: what about its participation in the CSTO?

Now let's return to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Literally in parallel with the CSTO, the situation with Yerevan's non-payment of its contribution to the CSTO was discussed on the sidelines of the SPIEF. The decision on Armenia will be considered after 31 December 2025, but it remains unclear what direction the consideration will take.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Moscovia Alexander Pankin says that Yerevan should soberly assess its capabilities to ensure security without participating in the CSTO.

Sovereign Internet

Particular attention is paid to cybercrime, especially the ‘Ukrainian trace’ and its ‘Western curators’ in the rhetoric of the Moscow delegation - this is not only a security issue, but also the basis for creating its own analogue of a sovereign internet, just as in China or North Korea. 

For a more competitive and large-scale launch, the Kremlin aims to involve countries from its ‘sphere of influence’ — the Central Asian countries. This will increase the Kremlin's overall influence in the region and the ability to create an information bubble around these countries. In return, the Kremlin motivates local regimes to ensure their stability by offering them the opportunity to control the local population through a controlled ‘sovereign internet’. 

Since other Central Asian regimes are considering the Kremlin’s proposal, which also involves increasing their dependence on the Kremlin, Moscovia is actively outlining and exaggerating the threats from Ukraine and the West to Central Asian countries as a motivating factor. 

Overall, Moscovia is trying to consolidate CSTO members against a common “enemy” by threatening them with “terrible Ukraine and the West”. This may indicate the Kremlin’s desire:

• to strengthen the legitimacy of its information and cyber control in the region;

• to minimise “political losses” from Armenia’s withdrawal from joint bodies;

• justify its own measures of digital control over the population and encourage third countries;

General expectations: strengthening regional regulation of cyberspace under the auspices of the CSTO and new restrictions for citizens of CSTO countries on the Internet. 

Expectations: Armenia

The problems with Armenia are quite illustrative. For the Kremlin, it is a strategic necessity to either solve this problem or shift its attention elsewhere. The CSTO has shown, using Armenia as an example, that the organisation cannot be relied upon even if you are a member. 

An interesting point is that although the Kremlin is threatening Yerevan, they are delaying a decision until the end of the year. This may indicate a desire to avoid a split, at least formally. Or perhaps events are unfolding in Armenia with the participation of Kremlin agents aimed at overthrowing Pashinyan's government.

But overall, all this creates a precedent that undermines Moscow's asset in the region, which is the CSTO.

In the context of the war in Ukraine and sanctions-induced isolation, Moscovia desperately needs allies, but the most important thing for the Kremlin is to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space. The CSTO remains, perhaps, the only real instrument of Moscow's ‘soft power’ in the region. 

This is why it:

• invests in formal military-political cooperation,

• constructs the image of a ‘common enemy,’

• and promotes the idea of a shared destiny in the face of ‘great danger.’

This is a relatively successful strategy: the Kremlin ‘manages’ risks in the region and “sells” a proposal for ‘security’ against these same risks.