Dancing on hot coals: Fico temporarily loses parliamentary majority

*Muscovy — the historically correct name of the Muscovite Empire and the Russian Federation.

You have probably seen Fico's recent statements on Muscovite television channels about his intention to visit Moscow. Contrary to Brussels's official position, these actions are likely signs that Fico's government is approaching a critical point.

• In recent months, Danko's SNS party has been conducting a "stress test" of Fico's government in its struggle for power with the party of another Fico ally, President Pellegrini. But this is only the first level of the problem.

• The second level is that within the SNS party split, and three deputies, led by Rudolf Huliak, effectively left the party and the coalition.

The point is that 76 votes are needed for the coalition and voting. Fico's coalition had 79 deputies. Minus 3 Huliak deputies — this leaves 76, and one deputy from Hlas is on prolonged medical leave. Therefore, there are only 75 votes in parliament, which is already insufficient.

Now, Fico's coalition has effectively lost its majority, and two days ago, the Dennik publication reported: "For two days, Fico's coalition has had no majority, Huliak's group refused to vote and blocked the work of parliament."

As far as we know, Huliak's group of rebels is not against remaining in the coalition, but as a separate political entity from their former SNS party and Danko. If Fico agrees to this, he will cement the split within SNS. The party already has significant problems with its rating, which does not exceed 3%. This undermines the internal position of party leader Danko. And Danko's inadequacy has already twice destroyed Fico's coalitions in the past.

This situation is further worsened by the fact that in the event of potential re-elections, Fico's party currently has around 15-18%, while Fico's trust rating is only 32.2% compared to 39.9% for his main opponent Šimečka from the pro-European party "Progressive Slovakia".

Moreover, Fico's other coalition partner Pellegrini is now the leader of public trust with 51%, which in the case of early elections could transform into his absolute victory. And this already tempts Pellegrini and his Hlas party, in case of major problems that threaten the rating of the pro-presidential party, to quickly abandon Fico's ship if it is clearly sinking. Especially since Pellegrini has experience leaving Fico during troubles in the past (referring to criminal cases against Fico and Pellegrini's exit from Fico's Smer party at the time).

The sharp drop in Fico's support is caused by the fact that instead of the "populist paradise" he promised his voters, mostly from poor rural areas and the eastern regions of the country, the harsh reality of the "budget crisis" has arrived. Because of this, Fico pleased his voters with an increase in VAT from 20% to 23%, a special tax on bank transactions, and new measures that will hit the wallet of the average Slovak.

The budget problem and the need for significant funds forced Fico to break promises to another significant segment of his voters, who hoped that Fico would completely stop support for Ukraine following Orbán's example. To this voter, Fico promised to create a "second Hungary concerning Ukraine," but in practice, Fico has no desire to go into conflict with the EU or abandon the practice of selling weapons to Ukraine, which fills Slovakia's budget. Because of this, despite his pro-Moscow rhetoric, Fico maintains a "pragmatic partnership" between Ukraine and Slovakia.

But now Fico faces a choice:

Either risk accepting the rebels from Danko's party, or not do so and have problems with the majority. Both options effectively increase the risk of a "coalition crisis" and early elections.

Therefore, Fico decides to visit Putin for several reasons:

1. Moscow's elites influence over SNS and Danko. Therefore, one of Fico's topics may be a request to influence Danko so that, in a fit of nerves, he does not destroy the coalition after Fico decides to accept the rebels from Danko's party to maintain an absolute majority, not a nominal one.

2. The risk of early elections still remains, and Fico must demonstrate to his pro-Moscow electorate that he is friends with Putin. Especially against the backdrop of accusations that the prime minister "sold out to Brussels" on the issue of supporting Ukraine.

3. Receiving payment from Putin for the presence of a "Moscow-loyal government in Europe," which Fico's government undoubtedly is. This payment includes discounts on energy resources, a long-standing mechanism used by Moscow to expand its influence, including through political corruption.

 Financial bonuses from Moscow will potentially allow Fico to reduce the economic and budget crises and postpone a series of unpopular decisions.

The conclusion is simple — Fico's visit to Moscow is a clear sign of trouble in the prime minister's government life.