Reserves of Artillery of the Moscow Occupation Forces and its Immediate Prospects

*“Moscovia” is the correct and historical name of the Russian Federation.

This time, our colleague “Bulgarin” joined our collaboration of Resurgam, Military Prophet and Mortis Aeterna channels, and together we have prepared a study on the state of the enemy's cannon and rocket artillery based on satellite imagery as of mid-2024.

We would like to thank Covert Cabal and Highmarsed for their previous researches and their work, which now allows us to make a comparative analysis.

Our estimates differ because they leave open the question of the evaluation criteria of “what is considered suitable.” The problem of classification is the quality of the images — but, as the study has shown, the differences are not significant in the end — and, most importantly, the result of the study allows us to follow tendencies.

In our opinion, it is the desire to follow these tendencies that is the main goal of this study - apart from, of course, an attempt to count “enemy guns”.

Our calculations were “conservative” according to the same criteria we used in our previous study of the enemy's tank fleet available at storage bases and armored personnel carriers: if in doubt, we always took the most negative version of the calculation as the main one.

We tried to provide visual evidence to the maximum extent possible, but we do not have the right to publish all the images in the public domain.

We covered the following points in the study:

Calculation of self-propelled and towed artillery as of mid-2024. Classification of self-propelled artillery by type. Exhaustion rates. General trends.
Calculation of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Classification by type. Exhaustion rates. Condition of systems at the main recovery sites (factories).
Analysis of the potential for artillery production from scratch. Figures from other studies. General trends.
Potential of the North Korean and Iranian arsenals that could be involved into the war in Ukraine.

SAU.

Our calculation showed that, as of May 2024, there were between 3047 and 3337 units of self-propelled artillery systems in storage bases and arsenals that could potentially be restored.

This is less than in 2021, when the number of almost 4,400 units of self-propelled artillery systems suitable for restoration was recorded, but it is more than Covert Cabal and Highmarsed counted in 2023, when they received a figure of 2,876 units.

Why in 2024 compared to 2023, the number of did the number of self-propelled artillery systems at arsenals and storage bases increase rather than decrease? The answer lies in two aspects:

Firstly, in order to make the calculation as conservative as possible (we counted in the worst case scenario when in doubt), even artillery with the barrel removed was counted as “suitable for restoration”.
Secondly, there is another interesting detail that provides an answer to the question “why did it increase?” and it can probably be interpreted as “positive.” But more details about this are in the main text.

Towed artillery

Our count showed that towed artillery continued its path to exhaustion. We counted 5453 or 5139* units of towed artillery at all major bases and arsenals as of mid-2024.

We provide two figures, as the first is the number of towed/trailed artillery units we counted in total, and the second is the figure adjusted to account for the difference in systems we identified as “barrel-less”.

In any case, this is significantly less than in 2021, when towed artillery numbered only a very optimistic estimate (downward) of 14,111 units. And it is less than the number counted by Covert Cabal and Highmarsed in 2023, which came to 6,786 units. But our calculation also has several peculiarities, as discussed further in the text.

MLRS

Our estimates show that approximately 112 systems of 122 mm caliber and 132 systems of 220 mm caliber remain in the largest storage sites for this type of weapon, which is 17.7% and 31% accordingly to the number of these systems as of 2021.

The main conclusion: It is not the number of remaining artillery systems that should be looked at, but their quality. Why: Despite the phenomenal exhaustion of the world's largest artillery stockpile, it will still remain “tangible” for warfare over the next 3 years, although the “point of no return” of the enemy's artillery capabilities as a result of their reduction should begin to be felt at the end of 2025. But this is a process, not an exact final date.

Given the possibility of activation of the “worst-case” scenario, i.e., supplies from third countries, Moscovia's artillery arsenal with the resources it currently has should not be critically drained in the coming years. But this is purely about “quantity”.

But quantity does not mean quality. The degradation of the artillery component of Moscow's occupation forces should be - and is gradually becoming — the result of the long and painstaking work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In fact, we are talking about the fact that the massive transition of the occupation army to less effective artillery produced in 1930–50 is a relatively foreseeable outcome for the next 2025. The further reduction of the “self-propelled” component in the artillery component, the decline in the quality of the barrels, and the age of the systems that are beginning to be deconserved will bring the degradation of the entire artillery component of Muscovia closer.

Degradation is bound to lead to:

The loss of maneuverability, when the percentage of self-propelled artillery systems in the occupation army will continue to decrease;

Reduced quality of counter-battery combat (range/accuracy);

Increased enemy losses among artillerymen due to a higher risk of losing a counter-battery duel for the reasons mentioned above;

Increased consumption of ammunition to hit the target due to the type/condition/quality of artillery and due to the reduced life of the barrels.

While the likelihood that Iran or the North Korea will supply artillery to Moscovia is subjectively mediocre, the likelihood that these countries will supply the “latest” artillery is extremely low due to a number of factors. Therefore, the supply of artillery from these countries may affect the “quantity” rather than the “quality” indicator.

We cannot agree with the opinion that we will see 100% depletion of artillery stocks from storage bases in Moscovia within at least the next 3 years. However, we can claim that the quality of this artillery will be steadily declining until the state of use of World War II artillery systems is realized.

For example: among the 5139 towed artillery pieces that still remain in arsenals and storage bases in Moscovia, about 2000 pieces are samples of systems manufactured in 1940-50 (M-30 and D-1 guns).

Self-propelled artillery (SAU)

Self-propelled artillery at arsenals and storage bases:

Detail of “other” (small) bases in our count:

Self-propelled artillery (SPA) at arsenals and storage bases by type:
Now to the specifics of the calculation.

The most interesting question may be: why is there more equipment at storage bases and arsenals compared to 2023? The answer may lie both in the methodology of our calculation and in the fact that satellite images do not allow us to look into garages and hangars.

But the primary reason for this is that our collaboration has identified the following: The Russians have begun to massively move damaged and destroyed artillery systems to large storage bases and arsenals. This means that the calculation now takes into account not only “what was in storage” but also what had been in service, but after being damaged or destroyed was dragged to the bases for restoration or cannibalization.

This indicates that the existing factory repair capabilities cannot cope with the needs, and therefore Moscow is forced to use more rapid, but also more extensive means of repair, namely, to pull damaged equipment to arsenal thousands of kilometers from the front line, assess the condition and decide on the spot “whether to repair this unit by cannibalizing others or disassemble it for spare parts to repair future similarly damaged systems.” The number of areas with dismantled self-propelled artillery systems for spare parts, such as barrels and engines, stored in the open air has increased significantly.

Here are a few photos, for example: damaged self-propelled artillery systems in winter camouflage in spring photos, burned and disassembled hulls.

New mini-repair shops have appeared at the storage bases:

Restored and freshly painted self-propelled artillery systems next to one of the workshops at the storage base:

SAU with signs of combat damage:

Damaged SAU that have been disassambled:

SAU in winter camouflage:

Small and medium-sized arsenals are basically exhausted and, most likely, all usable equipment is being moved to large bases, which now serve as large centers for the restoration and repair of damaged vehicles. Additional hangars/workshops are being built at these bases and space is being cleared for sumps and storage of spare parts obtained through cannibalization.

Equipment from both the front and smaller bases is being moved to large bases. For example, 12 units of 2S7 Pion and 27 units of 2S4 Tulip, which were not previously stored there, were brought to the 80th arsenal. Probably, some of them were pulled back for repair from the frontline, and the other part — from other bases as candidates for “donation”.

Spare parts from dismantled Pion vehicles:
At almost all bases, the accumulation areas of “cannibalization waste” have increased significantly.

It was.

Now it is.
In the future, it will be extremely difficult to determine the approximate amount of damaged/destroyed self-propelled artillery at storage bases and arsenals using satellite images because the equipment from the front and the equipment at storage bases have been relocated. If in 2023 this practice was not yet widespread, now the inflow of damaged equipment from the front to arsenals has become systemic in the context of almost all large bases.

Another aspect is that the Russians are experiencing a gradual exhaustion of stocks, so even from damaged and destroyed self-propelled artillery systems they are taking off everything they can. For example, the cannibalization of 2C1 Gvozdika and 2C2 Acacia has become a widespread phenomenon at the 120th Arsenal.

The 120th arsenal has also been turned into a repair hub. Mass cannibalization of 2C1 and 2C3:
The largest percentage of cannibalization in relation to the number of systems in service is observed in relation to the 2S7 Pion. It is likely that all the systems remaining in storage will be used as “donors” rather than to saturate new units or replace losses, as the hundred units that remain are quickly disassembled into spare parts that are stored in open air.

The timeframe for exhaustion is difficult to determine. As for self-propelled artillery, it will be possible to say more precisely in 2025, since the bottleneck is not in the number of systems, but in the speed of their recovery. The accumulation and increase in the percentage of systems that have been withdrawn from the front in unusual places like arsenals will be evidence that the recovery capabilities of the factories do not keep up with the rate of losses — even with the transformation of large arsenals into repair and restoration shops. This, in turn, will strengthen the tendency to replace the lack of self-propelled artillery with more primitive artillery, such as towed artillery, which is much faster to restore. In fact, this is already gradually happening.

For example, towed howitzers were spotted in one permanent dislocation point of tank regiment X, although the tank regiment was supposed to be equipped with 2 batteries of SAU according to the staffing schedule. That is, units that should have been equipped with self-propelled artillery are equipped with towed artillery, which is faster to restore but has lower efficiency and quality indicators.

These units should have been equipped with self-propelled artillery, not towed artillery or mortars:
As of now, we are inclined to believe that systems such as “Pion”, “Msta-S”, “Tulip”, “Hyacinth-S” should experience a critical lack of recovery capabilities in about 1.5-2 years, depending on the intensity of hostilities - but this is a rather relative estimate, not an exact date to mark on the calendar, as too many factors affect the potential of such predictions. Instead, the simpler and more primitive Gvozdykas and Acacias are found in large numbers in arsenals and are therefore theoretically available for loss recovery. These systems make up almost 2/3 of all stockpiles in storage.

Therefore, in the context of the SAU, we will see “depletion to zero” to the extent that high-quality and long-range components will be massively replaced by more primitive models, such as Gvozdika and Acacia, which will provide quantity, not quality, by the end of 2025. And even this “quantity” will be limited not by the availability of these systems in storage, but by Moscovia's ability to restore them. That is why it is more likely that the percentage of available self-propelled artillery will decrease not only in terms of quality, but also in terms of fatter substitution rate by simpler towed artillery.

Towed artillery

*This is probably the number of artillery systems that were cannibalized, but we cannot say for sure due to the quality of the image. Therefore, we conservatively count these systems as “available” because there may be an error in the assessment, or according to another criterion, with certain capabilities (supply of barrels), this unit can be restored, even if it is currently without a barrel.

It is worth noting that the photo of the largest storage site for trailed artillery “Shuchye” dates back to December 2023, so the actual number as of now may be even lower.
Towed artillery is the main type of artillery to compensate for losses and to supply new artillery units with equipment. Of the 14,111 units estimated for 2021, as of mid-2024, 5453 units remained, or 5139 identified as “with barrels”, which is approximately 1/3 of the fleet available at the beginning of the large-scale invasion. The difference between 2023 and 2024 was 1333 removed from storage and 314 cannibalized with removed barrels.
Small and medium-sized arsenals are being critically exhausted to the point of being “zero”: the most usable artillery was taken out of a large 94th arsenal. The “Karabash” towed artillery storage facility and the arsenal of the “37th Separate Railway Brigade” have also been maximally drained. The 216th and 209th arsenals and 7021 storage bases are very close to exhaustion.
There are only 4 main bases where towed artillery is stored: Shuchye, 80th Arsenal, Lesnoy Gorodok, and 120th Arsenal — 90% of all towed artillery is stored at these bases. More than a dozen of small and medium-sized bases will be completely emptied or closed down in 2024.
At the 120th Arsenal and Lesniy Gorodok, towed artillery is not so much removed from storage to replace losses or to saturate new units, but rather disassembled on site, presumably to provide field repairs and barrel replacements.
Such trains carrying something (probably barrels and spare parts) out of bases — quite a common thing:
Despite the fact that Russia has only 36-38% of the stocks of towed artillery available in 2021, this is still a lot, which will allow replenishing losses and restoring the life of the artillery already available in regular units. However, for a better understanding of the situation, it is worth referring to the “quality”: out of the 5139 units with barrels, about 2000 are artillery of the late 1930s and 1950s (M-30 and D-1 and others).
Given the risk of supplying barrels and artillery from Iran or the DPRK, it makes no sense to predict the timing of the exhaustion of towed artillery. But Iran and the DPRK are unlikely to transfer “state-of-the-art” towed trailed artillery, let alone self-propelled artillery. Therefore, if the risk of artillery transfer from the “axis of evil” does materialize, it will most likely be the same old modifications of howitzers of 1930-50. Therefore, it is better to pay attention to trends: in 2022-2023, the artillery component degraded, when losses were replaced by towed artillery rather than self-propelled artillery. As of the end of 2023, various researchers, including ourselves, agree that 70% of the artillery in the occupation forces is currently towed, and 30% is self-propelled, which mirrors the situation before the full-scale invasion, when the component of self-propelled artillery was 70%, not 30%. And in 2024-2025, the degradation of the already towed artillery in the occupation forces will take place, when newer, better models such as "Msta-B", "Hyacinth-B", D-30/20 will be replaced by M-30 and D-1. The problem of ammunition supply for the M-30 seems to have been solved thanks to supplies from the DPRK.

Thus, we are unlikely to see the deployment of “trebuchets” in the occupation artillery units, but their artillery will be much less mobile, less accurate, with higher ammunition consumption per target unit, with a shorter barrel life due to their age, with a shorter service life and a longer recovery time. All of this will affect the ability of the occupation forces to conduct counter-battery warfare, which, with the proper number of the latest mobile weapons in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, should result in a higher success rate of counter-battery duels and a better ability to suppress enemy cover assets on specific sections of the front, if necessary.

Multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

* “Motovilikhinskie Zavody” is the main enterprise for the restoration of MLRS and modernization of BM-21 “Grad” to “Tornado-G”. As of January 2024, there were 230 disassembled BM-21s in the facility's sump, which we did not include in the main table, as we did not include vehicles with obvious signs of cannibalization (most often, removal of guides (pipes)) in the MLRS study.
** Novoozerne does not have any recent images, but it is unlikely that MLRS appeared there after this base was exhausted in 2023.
*** For the 744 bases, the data is based on old CovertCabal estimates; we do not know if it assessed the presence of Uragan and do not have new imagery as of 2024. As of mid-2023, 16 BM-21s remained at this base. Probably, as of 2024, given the trend, they are exhausted at this base, — or are really close to that.

According to the Military Balance, Moscovia should have kept 1,500 units in reserve. BM-21 “Grad” and 550 units. BM-27 Uragan. Since we have identified 433 Uragan units using satellite imagery as of 2021, the difference of 100 units from the MB can be attributed to storage in closed areas, the lack of BM-27s at small bases (several units each), or simply the MB data often does not take into account the “historical cannibalization” of the vehicles.

But here is where Military Balance counted 1500 units at storage bases. BM-21 Grad remains a mystery to us. Having covered both large and small bases, major production, modernization and repair plants, as of 2021, we have identified 889 BM-21s, of which more than 200 are purely chassis from former BM-21 Grads. We do not know what happened to the other 600+ units. Even if we assume that a certain number of vehicles are stored at smaller bases or in covered hangars, this figure is still clearly exaggerated compared to the actual number, and it is unlikely that simple BM-21s will be stored in precious places in covered hangars as of 2024, as mass cannibalization will be experienced by vehicles that have been outdoors for decades without any signs of maintenance. The numbers are on the scoreboard — or rather, in the table.

The massive disappearance and cannibalization of MLRS at storage sites is caused by several factors:

MLRS, especially the BM-21 Grad, are fairly simple in design and could therefore be quickly restored to make up for the significant losses incurred in 2022. Similarly, due to the complexity of reconstructing self-propelled artillery systems, the newly created units were equipped with multiple launch rocket systems and towed artillery to provide an appropriate artillery component when self-propelled artillery could not be provided according to the staffing list.
Many MLRS units, especially “Grad”, are being cannibalized for spare parts “for the future”, when the existing “Grad” in the army will be exhausted. Probably, a large number of removed guided (“tubes”) were transferred to storage in more suitable places (hangars/warehouses). The chassis themselves are not of great value, so they continue to be stored in open storage.
“The Grads” that were in the best condition were transferred for modernization to Tornado-G. In fact, until February 24, 2022, Tornado-Gs were supplied to the Muscovite army not by production from scratch but by modernization using the “3 units made from 3 spare parts into 1 unit” method. This may explain the difference in our BM-21 counts and Military Balance's estimates, which seem to have had too high expectations for the number of units of this type of MLRS in storage.

Although the actual amount of MLRS in storage is approaching exhaustion, 17.7% of the initial stockpile of “Grad” and 31% of the initial stockpile of “Uragan” is still quite a significant figure — accordingly, the presence of these systems in storage does not mean the exhaustion of the artillery's rocket component. Due to the range of the “Uragan” system, its destruction is not a frequent phenomenon: during the 2.5 years of the full-scale war, according to Oryx, the destruction of 85 units was visually confirmed (which allows us to round up the number of actual MLRS of this type to a hundred). The second aspect is Moscovia's ability to maintain the operational aspects of these vehicles for a long time. Some “Uragan” systems were cannibalized for future reconditioning, and the launch/guide tubes themselves are not a very complicated “product”. In a critical case, Moscovia could try to secretly purchase and transport the guide elements from the North Korea.

The quantity is another matter. At the current rate of destruction, 100+ “Hurricanes” in the reserve may be enough to compensate for losses within 12-18 months - but this is without taking into account the fact that losses in war are non-linear and there may be a sharp increase in the intensity of their destruction, and vice versa. Therefore, such forecasts in numbers are quite approximate.

The same applies to the BM-21. These are simple designs, with enough components to spare due to cannibalization. The remnants of the BM-21 — is a reserve of spare parts for those MLRS units that are already in service within the occupation army. Perhaps a certain number is still being stored for modernization for "Tornado-G", the losses of which are stated from time to time.

What about artillery production in Moscovia?

We are approaching a very interesting topic, namely the answer to the question: “Why the main potential of the artillery component of Moscovia is modernization and restoration through cannibalization, and not production from scratch. Very often, Moscow media reports on the production of equipment “from scratch”, which is actually the deconservation or modernization of already stored artillery units.

1. Where and what kind of artillery production is there in Moscovia?

Muscovite cannon artillery is produced at “Uraltransmash”, MLRS at “Motovilikhinskie Zavody”, towed artillery and mortars - also at “Motovilikhinskie Zavody”. In addition, there were plans to supply components for the Grad MLRS from Belarus (from the “Volatavto” subcontractor), which were not implemented. Nevertheless, Moscovia will be receiving components produced by subcontractors even without appropriate licenses.

Theoretically, Moscow can rely on the potential for production of “Polonez-M” MLRS in Belarus, but no decision has been made to supply them to Moscow - however, this possibility should not be discounted, although it is complicated by the need to obtain Chinese permission to export and use these systems, as these MLRS use Chinese technology.

2. What kind of artillery does Moscovia produce from scratch and how great is the potential for establishing/expanding artillery production?

Moscovia produces from scratch both self-propelled artillery systems (“Coalition-SV”, “Malva”, “Floks”) and MLRS (“Tornado-S”, “Zemlyedelie”, “TOS-1”, “TOS-2”, “Uragan-1M“).

The expansion of the production of self-propelled artillery systems depends on both the barrels (the “Coalition” and “Malva” are equipped with different non-interchangeable guns - 2A88 and 2A64, accordingly) and the basis. “The Coalition” is produced on the basis of T-90s, the stocks of which have been exhausted, according to the results of the Covert Cabal and High_marsed research. Instead, the rate of production of new hulls is limited. Therefore, most cannon artillery, both self-propelled and towed, is reactivated by cannibalization. For example, the removal of the barrel from the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled artillery system and its installation on the carriage of the D-20 towed howitzer, as well as the reactivation of the D-30.

As for MLRSs, on the one hand, they are easier to deal with because they do not require sophisticated technologies for the production of guides (launch tubes) and are generally based on a wheeled base at the “Splav” NPO, according to Moscow, both modernized “Grad” and “Tornado-G” are being produced, but the last report on their delivery dates back to November 16, 2022. On the other hand, the TOS-1 is based on the T-72 tank, and the stock of suitable tanks for restoration is rapidly decreasing (although this issue is likely to be resolved by the transition to wheeled TOS-2 production). The biggest problem in the production of cannon artillery is not even the limited production sites and equipment (radial forging machines manufactured by GFM Steyr), but the insufficient production of specialized steel that could withstand the pressure of gunfire.

3. What are the peculiarities of artillery restoration/production?

It is quite difficult to estimate the pace of restoration of self-propelled artillery and towed artillery. The key indicator is the production of new artillery barrels, which is estimated at 50-80 units per year (Pavlo Luzin's data). In general, we are talking about restoration rather than production of new equipment as such, and the restoration of towed equipment can take place even in the field, or, as we have confirmed, directly at storage bases. Instead, the restoration and modernization of self-propelled artillery takes place at limited production sites, which are overloaded, and damaged and destroyed artillery is being dragged to storage bases instead of factories.

4. Where and how many barrels does Muscovy produce for existing artillery or for the production of new artillery?

Artillery barrels are produced at the “Motovilikha” (Perm) and “Titan-Barricades” (Volgograd) plants, and tank barrels at the Plant No. 9 (Yekaterinburg), but, according to the estimates, in a rather small quantity. Pavel Luzin said in a private comment that, in his opinion, production is limited to 50-80 artillery cannons (for rifled barrels ) and a few dozen tank barrels (on the other hand, The Economist, also referring to Mr. Luzin, claims that the upper limit of large-caliber artillery barrel production can reach 200 units — which, however, does not change the overall situation dramatically, given the rate of “burning” of barrels). At the same time, “Titan-Barricades”, at best, plays a supporting role, since, despite the presence of an artillery design bureau in the structure, the plant itself has been part of “Roscosmos” for more than 10 years. Therefore, the status and condition of artillery production in Volgograd raise questions about the scale, if not the doubt.

According to various researchers, Moscovia is unable to produce and does not produce large-caliber artillery barrels on a mass scale. Besides, even such a limited amount of artillery barrel production has an extremely narrow bottleneck. And this bottleneck is not even the Austrian company GFM Steyr, on which all equipment, maintenance and modernization of barrel production lines actually depend on, but specialized “pure” metallurgy and alloy production technology, which has been recognized as “dead” by Moscovia itself.

But even with GFM Steyr behind them, the Russians have to rely primarily on other sources to maintain the level of combat capability of their artillery units:

Deconservation and cannibalization of increasingly old artillery from storage bases;
Increase in the share of MLRS in the artillery component, as it can be quickly put on wheels and used;
Work on the perspective of supplying artillery barrels and systems from the DPRK and Iran.

Artillery in the North Korea and Iran

“Will the North Korea and Iran supply artillery to Russia?” - is an open and debatable question. To work out the most negative options for Ukraine, we propose to assume that in the future the North Korea and Iran will take such a step. Of course, if the condition of Moscovia's artillery reaches absolutely critical levels and, as a result, Moscow is ready to pay a lot. Of course, it's not just about money.

As for what kind of artillery Iran and the DPRK will be ready to supply to the Russians, there are two limitations that are undoubtedly positive news for Ukraine:

Neither the DPRK nor Iran are countries in which modern artillery is rapidly developing and is available in commercial quantities. The North Koreans are probably the closest in the world to Moscovia in terms of artillery quantity - but clearly not in terms of quality. Most of the artillery in North Korea is from the 1940s and 1950s, and even from the First World War.
The North and Iran have their own reasons to keep the ratio of military power with their neighbors as minimally as possible at the current level, so this will also affect both the decision to “provide or not provide artillery to Moscow” and how much and how well it can be provided.

Artillery is one of the main components of the North Korean army and probably one of the most difficult to assess, especially after the start of the supply of artillery ammunition to Moscow's occupation forces.

The Soviet heritage, Chinese and local production allowed the North Korea to accumulate an extremely large number of artillery, which in terms of volume overtakes the Russian army's existing artillery as of early 2022. There are different estimates of this number: Covert Cabal, without referencing any source, provides a figure of 14 thousand units of artillery (towed artillery, self-propelled artillery systems, MLRS). Military Balance 2024 provides a figure of 21,600 units of artillery of all types, including mortars. This extremely large difference in the number of artillery can be explained by the fact that Military Balance also added mortars to its calculations.

One of the key reasons for the complexity of the estimate is the landscape and the North Korean army's approach to deploying its equipment. Most of North Korea's territory is covered with mountains in one way or another, which the North Koreans take advantage of by building entire systems of underground storage, production, and firing points that could be used in a possible war with South Korea. About 2/3 of the artillery is stored in such underground facilities, which have a completely autonomous infrastructure, with logistics, firing positions, ventilation, power plants, headquarters, etc.
In addition, there are at least 17 firearms and artillery factories in the North Korea, according to information posted on North Korean forums.

However, the main purpose of the study is to determine what Moscovia can get out of all this. Most of the artillery in North Korea's possession is old Soviet artillery from the WWII.

8,600 towed artillery/SAU:

122мм: М-1977; М-1981; М-1985; М-1991;
130мм: М-1975; М-1981; М-1991;
152мм: М-1974; М-1977; М-2018;
170мм: М-1978; М-1989

Towed artillery:

122мм: D-30; D-74; М-1931/37;
130мм: М-46;
152мм M-1937; M-1938; M-1943

5,500 MLRS:

107мм Type-63; VTT-323 107mm;
122мм: BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-323 122mm;
200мм: BMD-20;
240мм: BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991;
300мм: some amount of M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (is being tested);
600мм: some amount of M-2019 (is being tested)

7,500 units of mortars of 82 to 160 mm caliber.

Which of these could theoretically fall into the hands of Moscow's occupation forces?

It should be understood that potentially any of these systems could get to Moscovia. It is impossible to objectively assess artillery stockpiles and their condition, and North Korean propaganda is not a very reliable source for assessment. Added to this is the North Korea's ability to produce new artillery. Of course, with the help of China, they can produce it, and moreover, we can be sure that they are producing it, because the 170-mm self-propelled artillery (“Koksan”) is the artillery that was produced directly in the North Korea.

However, there may be some questions about the quality of this artillery, since the production of barrels requires a certain technological level so that the barrel does not explode after firing (this applies to new systems as well). As for the old systems, which represent the majority, there are still issues of restoration and ensuring the service life.

We already know that the quality of the ammunition supplied to Moscow from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unsatisfactory, or at least has a number of problems. Artillerymen of the occupation forces complain about the poor accuracy of the shells and their quality. Consequently, there are obviously questions about the state of the systems in North Korea's arsenal.

But what exactly can the North Korea transfer to the Russians?

First and foremost, Moscow's occupation forces need to replace barrels for their artillery — this can be solved either by providing barrels directly from the assembly line, or by transferring barrels removed from artillery in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or together with artillery systems. Of all these systems, Moscovia is primarily interested in barrels for D-20/30 cannons, because these are ones of the most common systems that they use.

There is currently no need to transfer barrels to the M-46, the Russians still have enough of this type of system and the need to replace barrels has not yet increased, as 130mm is not the main caliber for Moscow's occupation forces, although shipments of 130mm shells have been observed from Iran and the North Korea. Other systems are either too old to be used by the Russians or use different shells, such as the D-1, which uses single-belt 152.4 mm shells that are not produced by Moscow directly — otherwise we would have seen more massive use of the D-1.

The issue of supplying SAUs is also controversial. New weapons are too valuable for Pyongyang due to their limited number, and the feasibility of supplying old conserved models for restoration is questionable. Another factor is that Moscovia still has its own large stockpile of self-propelled artillery systems, but due to overloaded production capacities, technical condition and the rate of losses, it relies primarily on replacing the firepower component with towed artillery and MLRS that can be quickly reactivated.

As for MLRS, of all the listed equipment, the Russians can only use M-1977, which is an analog of the BM-21. However, the Russians still have enough systems of this type for at least the next year and a half. In addition, this type of weapon would hardly be the main one in Moscovia's attempts to gain access to North Korean stockpiles.

Most likely, the occupation forces of Moscovia will only need to supply ammunition, which is a constant need. As for the systems of other calibers — none of them is being used by Moscovia.

So, as we can see, the situation with artillery in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is extremely vague. We know that there is a lot of it, but it is outdated, even compared to what the occupation forces are now forced to use. There are also questions about the condition of this artillery in the storage, because it is unlikely that such a zoo of military equipment can be kept in good condition with a military budget of $ 2-3 billion and the need to feed an army of 1.2 million.

Iran's artillery potential

Unlike the North Korea and Moscovia, Iran relies significantly less on its artillery component. Iran's climatic conditions, namely dry air and hot climate, allow us to assume that the condition of Iran's artillery may be slightly better than that of the DPRK or Moscovia, on the assumption that this artillery is stored in the open air.

The peculiarity of the artillery in Iran's arsenal is that it consists of both Western and Soviet artillery. In total, Iran has more than 6,798 units of artillery in service (according to Military Balance 2024) - but less than 300 of them are self-propelled.

292+ units of SAU:

122 mm: 60 units 2C1 “Gvozdika”; Raad-1 (Iranian version of 2C1);
155 mm: 150 units. M109A1; Raad-2 (Iranian version of the M109);
170 mm: 30 units М-1978;
175 mm: 22 units M-107;
203 mm: 30 units М110;

2,030+ units of towed artillery:

105 mm: 130 units M101A1; 20 units. M-56;
122 mm: 540 units D-30; 100 units of Type-54 (M-30);
130 mm: 985 units M-46;
152 mm: 30 units D-20;
155 mm: 120 units GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 units Type-88 WAC-21;
203 mm: 20 units M11

1,476 MLRS units:

107 mm: 700 units Type-63; 600 units. HASEB Fadjr 1;
122 mm: 7 BM-11 units; 100 units BM-21 “Grad”; 50 units Arash/Hadid/ Noor;
240 mm: 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985;
330 mm: Fadjr 5.

*Note: 700 units Type-63 and 600 units HASEB Fadjr 1 are very unlikely to be used by Moscovia under any circumstances, given the obsolete nature of these weapons, their tactical characteristics and ammunition caliber.

3,000 mortars in calibers from 81 to 120 mm.

Iran has a much smaller number of Soviet systems that it could share with the occupation forces of Moscovia than North Korea. Instead, Iran is involved in a much larger number of active proxy conflicts, for which it has to have the necessary arsenal of supplies to protect both its borders and to supply its terrorist entities such as Hamas, Yemeni Houthis, or Hezbollah.

The only thing that Moscow could realistically ask Iran for to compensate for its needs, and most importantly, what Iran could hypothetically agree to, is barrels for D-30s. Hypothetically, in the future, Moscow could buy back some of the M-46 guns if the deficit of 130-mm shells is resolved.

So, if we draw conclusions based on the state of artillery in Iran and the North Korea, we can assume that Muscovy may first of all turn to these countries to compensate for the lack of barrels for systems that are actively used: we are talking about Soviet calibers. However, despite the total number of artillery on paper in these two countries from the “axis of evil,” the number of these systems in both Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is limited, and hardly enough to cover long-term needs.

All other systems in service in these two countries can be used by Moscow either in case of a total lack of barrels and artillery systems in general (which is unlikely at this stage) or with a desire to expand its capabilities for long-range and accurate strikes (to ask for 240+ mm MLRS systems), but this depends on the political will and capabilities of the DPRK and Iran, which, in our opinion, are unlikely to be ready to transfer the latest weapons.