Why Europe should not listen to Colby Bedworth's advice and continue on its path to “defense autonomy”.
Colby Bedworth has published an analytical article titled “Draghi's dilemma — European arms manufacturers must face reality”
Our group does not agree with the theses expressed by the honorable Colby Bedworth. The theses that we perceived from Colby Bedworth's article are as follows:
European defense corporations will not be able to meet their needs because they do not have a number of military developments like ATACMS or Patriot.
Even if the Europeans try to create their own developments, they will be more expensive than the US ones.
Even if they do develop them and are willing to buy them at a higher price, the industrial scale will not meet Europe's needs because the European defense market is too fragmented.
Even if Europe develops, invests, and produces, it is not a given that the United States will get it through the NATO standard certification. In fact, this is the main manipulative card of the American military-industrial complex.
Therefore, Colby comes to a conclusion that we take as follows: “Europe should not actively hope to change the status quo, so it should accept reality and buy American.”
But in our opinion, Colby Bedworth misses a number of important points that we would like to add to support the Draghi report and Europe's overall intention to have “defense independence.”
For now, Bedworth suggests accepting reality and living with it. The problem is with reality itself. The reality is that the United States continues to blackmail Europe with its security. Trump's statements as a potential US president pose particular risks. The fact is that any increase in defense spending by countries in Europe is 76% of orders to the American military-industrial complex. Increasing defense spending in Europe is the right thing to do, but the question is how to do it. Why should the United States benefit from increased European defense spending while constantly emphasizing at the political level the “dependence on Europe's security” and sometimes even manipulating this dependence for political purposes?
Now, let's talk about Draghi's report and a number of points that Colby either did or did not take into account, in our opinion.
In fact, in his oral presentation, Draghi provided most of the answers to Colby Bedworth's remarks:
The EU plans to raise up to 500 billion euros over the next decade by issuing joint bonds for the development and production of weapons. Therefore, it would be rather illogical for Europe to borrow money on foreign markets and from private lenders to invest more than 70% of these funds in the American ordering market. No matter how much European weapons cost, it is advisable to leave these funds in the economies of those countries that will then repay the bonds.
Draghi noted that “the fragmentation of the EU defense market” will be overcome by mechanisms of joint development and joint procurement, which will be stimulated by Europe, similar to the way it already works in the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the proposed European Defense Industry Program (EDIP).
Draghi also made the argument that since 1990, the US defense industrial base has shrunk from 51 leading defense companies to just 5. This means that the period of scaling up and acquisition is not something that Europe cannot go through.
The issue of development is the issue of investment in this development. The EU has already adopted a seven-year program, under which 1.1 billion is allocated annually for joint development of new weapons within the EU countries. Joint development later leads to joint procurement — this is also the answer to the “scale of orders” question. In addition, the European Commission is considering doubling investments in joint weapons development once the Eurobond mechanism is launched.
The ATACMS or similar weapons of the 90s are not impossible to replicate if funding is available.
An important issue is the guidance and satellite network, but the European Commission is currently preparing a number of solutions to compete for “satellite space” with the Americans, Moscovia, and the Chinese.
The 2024 documents showed that the European Commission has funded more than a billion euros worth of development projects this year. These include the development of new-generation military helicopters and transport aircraft, hypersonic engines, and unmanned aircraft and ground systems. France and Italy are at the final stage of creating an air defense system that should be on the same level as Patriot. This is a deep modernization of SAMP/T, which should result in the system exceeding Patriot's performance.
Therefore, despite Colby Bedworth's respectability as an analyst, his position is very pro-American, detached from the needs of Europe and its internal motives:
It's like telling Americans now: “Ignore your own industry and buy Chinese because it's cheaper and on a larger scale, and ignore all other arguments and logical consequences.”
Draghi's report proposes to fundamentally disrupt the approach that has been in place for decades: “invest in European security through the American military-industrial complex,” which is why there has been an overreaction to the report in the United States and related analytical communities.
But is the problem for European intellectuals that they have begun to see the US as a less than reliable partner in foreign policy? Or are certain US actions, including support for Ukraine and blackmailing Europe itself with security, causing this uncertainty?