Three unusual steps from the EU and Ukraine that could restrain the White House's destructive actions

Photo: Joshua Roberts

The destruction of international relations, trade, and security is gaining momentum, as the White House is convinced that in the chaos, thanks to its resources and global position, it will be able to rewrite the rules in favour of the United States to maintain its dominance even at the expense of its closest partners: Europe and Ukraine.

The only thing that can stop Trump is a precedent of resistance to his actions. Because blackmail is only effective until the blackmailer receives a response that destroys his image, which is the basis for the fear used as a blackmail tool.

The White House administration, despite its reputation as a fearless adventurer, has to pay attention to internal and external factors.

Internal factors include the following:

• The level of approval;

• Economic indicators;

• Reaction to the White House's actions by the world media;

• The public's definition of what the outcome ultimately is.

Despite the dominant desire of the White House to satisfy Putin's needs to the maximum extent possible in order to de facto end things in Europe and switch to the Pacific, under any circumstances. Yet, Trump's administration and his inner circle are forced to only gradually and carefully promote the ‘reset’ with Moscovia.

Separately, the White House wants to impose on Ukraine an unacceptable deal on rare earth metals, which has now turned into an agreement to transfer a number of key resources and infrastructure facilities in Ukraine to, de facto, American control. Moreover, Kyiv is supposed to pay extra for this in order to compensate for the alleged debt of $300 billion, when the US assistance to Ukraine does not exceed $120 billion and was provided on a grant basis by the previous administration. The terms cannot be changed once agreed, but the US understands that Kyiv is in an exhausted, vulnerable position and therefore continues to blackmail Ukraine.

This is why the pressure on Kyiv is mostly stronger than on Moscovia. Trump wants Ukraine to first sign a suicidal deal with the US, to ensure that the outcome is long-lasting, satisfying the vast majority of Putin's demands, so that the president of Moscovia can demonstrate success to his population.  If this does not happen, Ukraine will not need to sign this unacceptable agreement with Washington, which contains no investment or security guarantees for Ukraine, but ensures that the US manages Ukraine's strategic revenues through the redistribution of Ukrainian profits.

External factors that restrain the United States. 

In today's world, the United States will not maintain its leadership if it continues to neglect its relations with allies and partners at this rate, and eventually the external factors will aggravate the internal ones, as the globalised world in the age of the information revolution is too connected.

So the question is what steps Europe and Ukraine can take to mutually satisfy their interests. For Brussels, this means avoiding duties and ensuring its own security. For Ukraine, it is about avoiding a treaty that would make the country neocolonially dependent on the United States, but at the same time ensuring a stronger position in the face of Moscow's aggression.

There are three components that can defeat Trump, reduce his destructive influence and strengthen Europe and Ukraine.

All three of these components are ‘’unorthodox‘’ for Europe's behaviour, but we are convinced that only unorthodoxy can change the not-so-positive trend for the European continent.

Three components that can defeat Trump and reduce his destructive influence:

1. A potential EU Arctic strategy to limit Trump's destructive influence.

Potentially, the EU's Arctic strategy could limit Trump's political manoeuvres by binding him to the domestic criticism that would result from his policies.

Perhaps not everyone has noticed, but with the election of Mark Carney as prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, the White House's behaviour has changed. Perhaps the departure of Trudeau, whom Trump hated, changed the situation, but there were a number of other events within the same context that had a subtle but interesting impact.

Canada is once again talking about creating a common space with the EU and potentially joining the EU. Furthermore, the newly proclaimed Prime Minister Carney made his first visit to Europe, where he pointed out the deep roots of Canadians with Europeans.

And, not surprisingly, right on the heels of this talk, Abacus Data conducted a survey that showed that 46% of Canadians were positive about the idea of joining the EU and 68% had a positive attitude towards the EU overall. On the other hand, 34% were opposed.

The EU welcomed these results, but quickly denied that Canada could join the EU under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

In fact, Brussels is short-sightedly destroying its attractive construction of pressure on Trump with this statement.

Details.

The United States want access to the Arctic that would be wider than what Alaska currently provides. And here the issue of energy resources is actually secondary, as they are not profitable to extract due to the cost of development yet. Nevertheless, the Arctic holds strategic energy potential, which could amount to 30% of the world's reserves, and is a place of extremely rare minerals, and most importantly — an attractive outpost in trade, future space races, missile defence programmes and similar strategic areas.

The Arctic issue is not only a priority for the Trump administration, but also an intellectual dominant in US analytical circles. Of course, the majority in the US viewed ‘access to the Arctic’ through the prism of treaties and partnerships, not blackmail, pressure and threats of annexation of allied territories.

Therefore, the hint that the ‘US Arctic ambitions’ could suffer a strategic defeat due to the reckless actions of Trump and his administration could become an internal factor in the powerful condemnation by influential intellectual and media circles that have been defending the idea of ‘Arctic expansion’.

But such a threat to US ambitions must be created. And the situation with the talks in Canada about the EU - this is the best option to play with.

It doesn't matter whether Canada's movement towards the EU will ultimately be a real choice or not. The mere fact that there are discussions about such a possibility is already extremely uncomfortable for the United States. A few demonstrative public gestures to outline this process would be enough to put pressure on the US. And most importantly, a chain of interdependencies would be formed in the media space: ‘The White House's reckless actions have pushed Canada away from the US and towards the EU, which could lead to the US losing Arctic opportunities.’

A Canada-Greenland-EU Arctic axis would pose a threat to US ambitions and force the White House to soften its rhetoric in order to roll back to the status quo (when partnership negotiations were possible). In other words, to reduce blackmail and pressure.

That is why the statement by European Commission spokesperson Paula Piño that Canada cannot join the EU from a geopolitical point of view is a rather early and unreasonable step. Indeed, Article 49 states: ‘Any European country which respects the values set out in Article 2 and is committed to upholding them may apply for membership.’ But the term ‘European country’ itself is not clearly defined. It is not clear whether the criteria it meets are purely ‘geographical’, ‘value’, ‘cultural’ or ‘ideological’. Do all criteria have to be met, or is one dominant one enough?

What's more, Canada is not just a democratic North American country, it is a member of the EU's Horizon Europe treaties. In addition, Canada is a member of the Council of the European Space Agency and is now actively involved in the development of European programmes for alternative to US satellite communications, including for military purposes.

Furthermore, Canada meets all of the EU's Copenhagen criteria, and considering Trump's desire to start a trade war with Canada and the EU at the same time, the latter two could create a ‘safe haven’ for global capital, including Britain. Moreover, for Canadians themselves, given their British-French past, this would have a stabilising effect on the Quebec issue.

In addition, Canada and the EU would enclose Greenland and the United Kingdom, encouraging the latter to pursue closer natural ties with Brussels and Ottawa rather than Washington.

The Canada-Greenland-EU axis would allow this alliance to become the strongest Arctic power.

But we are not describing all this to justify ‘Can Canada really become part of the EU’, but to demonstrate that there are many controversial points that would allow this topic to be discussed.

And the very fact of the discussion would put pressure on the White House, which by its own actions created/restarted these discussions between Canada and the EU.

Pressure on the White House would accelerate the processes, the British-French past, it would have a stabilising effect on Québec issue to weaken trends that are unacceptable to Washington, and thus avoid internal pressure.

This is not only necessary for Ukraine, but also in the EU's direct interest.

But how can such an approach be lobbied for if the European Commission itself denies the possibility of Canada joining the EU?

Let's ask the question:  ‘Which country, like Ukraine, could suffer the most from US actions at the level of national humiliation?’ It is Denmark. It is Denmark that could bring this ‘Arctic issue and Canada’ to the forefront. Kyiv and Copenhagen have very warm and good relations, and the common problems with the current White House administration only bring these ties closer. Denmark's voice (which is not likely to be the only one) will become particularly influential in July, when it will chair the Council of the European Union.

Hungary is Trump's player in Europe that is about to receive a ‘red card’.

2. The second component — the limitation of Hungary's voting rights in the EU.

Limiting Orban. This is a question that has long been overdue, because if Brussels believes that the geographical factor is sufficient to ignore Canada, the question of whether the Orban government is in line with the EU's common values and policies has long been rhetorical.

In July 2023, the European Parliament approved a resolution (442 - in favour, 144 - against) with an absolute majority of votes: ‘Hungary: Members of the European Parliament condemn deliberate and systematic actions to undermine EU values’. In this resolution, the European Parliament questioned the appropriateness and feasibility of Hungary's chairmanship of the EU Council in 2024.

This decision is a certain complement to the European Parliament's resolution of September 2022, which, based on the Commission's report, concluded that ‘Hungary no longer meets EU democratic standards and is an “electoral autocracy”’.  In addition to these reports, there are comments from the European Commission, accusations from Brussels, and Budapest's demonstrable anti-European behaviour, which ignores common European values and directions.

There is Article 7, which provides for the deprivation of voting rights in the EU Council ‘for violation of fundamental values’, and there is the EU Treaty, which in exceptional cases gives the right to stop any rights of a member state for ‘serious and persistent’ violations of basic European values.

As we can see, the EU has a number of legally established documents that it can rely on to make the necessary decision in order to restrict Budapest's voting rights. While Budapest used to be able to count on the support of Poland, which also often violates EU norms, relations between Warsaw and Budapest are now, if not in conflict, at least far from being partnerships.

The same can be said about Hungary's other neighbour, the Czech Republic, where relations are characterised by high conflict, in particular due to the pro-Moscow position of the Orban government. And after the formation of the coalition between the SPD and the Svobodní, Trikolóra and PRO parties, it is not certain that Babiš's partner from the opposition ANO party and Orban's ally from Patriots for Europe will be able to secure the necessary victory to form a governing coalition.

With the verdict against Le Pen, Orban's ally in Patriots for Europe, the Hungarian prime minister's position at the European level is significantly weakened.

Also, Herbert Kickl in Austria, another ally of Orban's Patriots for Europe, has also lost ground, as he failed to form a government despite winning the election. And now, Austria's foreign policy is led by a pro-European government with a foreign minister who is extremely critical towards Orban, Beate Meinl-Reisinger.

Now, the EU's political will to limit Orban can be supplemented by Germany, where the coalition agreement states that the conservatives of new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) have agreed that they will demand that the EU stop funding and withdraw voting rights from countries that violate key principles such as the rule of law.

Of course, Hungary is primarily at risk. The second candidate - Slovakia.

Without any significant country backing it, Slovakia is unlikely to choose to support Orban in its own economic condition. The only significant country that Orban can rely on is Italy. But it is difficult to understand what Maloney's position on Orban will be. On the one hand, Orban's activities in cooperation with Le Pen have ruined Meloni's ambitions to be the ‘queen of the right,’ and on the other hand, the Italian prime minister's rather close relationship with the Trump administration may influence her decision.

In addition, the process of restricting one of the EU members is still a risk for Brussels, as it is difficult to predict whether the situation will get out of control as a precedent and whether it will ultimately affect the macro-stability of the entire Union.

However, if the EU does find the political will to risk short-term stability for strategic stability, it could be a significant restraining factor for Trump's ambitions.

No wonder Orban is a kind of US's voice in Europe.

Not only statements, but also rather interesting communication ties between the Hungarian prime minister and Trump's administration. For example, a close friend of Vice President Vance, Rod Draeger, lives in Budapest and is an important element of the connection between Orban and the US ‘new right’, which includes Vance, Musk, Till, Yarvin and others.

Restrictions imposed on Hungary would certainly provoke a strong reaction in the White House, but it would send a powerful signal that the EU remains united, even against Trump and his pressure. Restricting Hungary would unlock the possibility for Brussels to respond more dynamically to Trump's pressure, protecting the EU from the possibility of ‘undermining from within’ through individual members' abuse of EU procedures and regulations.

3. The third component of the EU to limit Trump's destructive actions.

This component is expressed in a simple phrase — reject fear. The fear of a potential trade war and the fear of a US exit from Europe in terms of security are Trump's tools to achieve his own goals, where one of the parties must be the ‘loser’.

The behaviour of the US establishment in its correspondence during the SignalGate scandal over operations in Yemen and the role of Europe, which ‘must pay for it’, clearly demonstrates the White House's attitude towards Europe and its allies. This is proof that pressure on Europe is a deliberately chosen strategy, not a way of behaving.

Therefore, the only way to maintain the pressure is to prove that Washington has more to lose, and for this, Europe must realise that it needs to choose a strategy of non-standard behaviour towards the US, rather than bureaucracy and clear rules. Meaning, not to seek a compromise, but to present a united front and respond firmly to blackmail over Greenland, tariffs, and the security of Europe and Ukraine in particular.

Only in this case, through ‘escalation’, can an acceptable result be achieved for both sides, where the White House will be forced to show a higher level of constructiveness for a number of internal and external reasons.