Hungarian objectives in the Romanian elections

Photo: MTI-Hungary Today

One of the key areas in this context is the energy sector.

For the European Union, the energy sector, and in particular the energy sector, remains problematic and politically sensitive. Although the process of refusal from Russian gas and oil has been going on for 3 years, it is still far from being completed.

Hungary, led by Orban, uses this to block new sanctions or initiatives or even finds situational allies in such actions, for example, Slovakia. However, the importance of the energy issue for Orban is much broader than that.

Orban, at all costs, seeks to raise his value to those whom he considers to be the key forces of influence in Europe — Russia and the United States.

Last year, Hungary's MVM announced plans to acquire Romania's E.ON Energie România. The deal itself may seem trivial, considering that the German holding company E.ON had been planning to optimise its resources for some time. However, the fact that the plans were announced in December 2024, after the Romanian presidential election and its sensational results, indicates that the situation for the Hungarians is no longer trivial.

This is also indicated by the fact that MVM planned to take control of the company by quickly setting a price of EUR 200 million, which is 4 times higher than the market value of the asset.

The Romanian government, obviously realising the danger of the situation, began to oppose this financial transaction. It should be understood that the authorities cannot simply block the deal, as this would be contrary to the requirements of the free market. Therefore, the Ministry of Energy appealed to the Foreign Direct Investment Review Commission, which has the right to veto this deal (it is also important that the Commission includes a representative of the intelligence agencies).

The deal obviously had some formal risks that would affect the commission's decision:

•  The proposed agreement allows for resale to third parties, including entities outside the EU's jurisdiction;

• Risks of access to private data of 3.4 million customers;

• Unclear origin of funds for the purchase of the company;

• The existence of ties between the Hungarian MVM and Russian companies.

It is also worth mentioning that the Ministry, in its decision to assess the transaction, refers to a similar situation with the purchase of Spanish train manufacturer Taglo by a Hungarian company, which was blocked by the Spanish government, among other things, because this company is ‘important for the modernisation of Ukraine's infrastructure’ (but this transaction should be disclosed separately).

However, the Romanian government's actions do not seem to have stopped Hungarian MVM's plans to acquire the asset, and for good reason. The cancellation of the results of the first round of the presidential election only postponed the deal, not cancelled it. The fact is that the company and the Hungarian government expected and still expect the pro-Russian candidate Georgescu to win. The position of president in Romania, although it does not give direct influence on the executive branch, does give the head of state a key feature: the right to initiate the election of a new prime minister.

When the parliamentary elections were held at the end of the last year, Klaus Iohannis was still president, and therefore the approval of the head of the new coalition government was based on coalition negotiations. However, if Georgescu had won the election, he could have changed the head of government and even had sufficient grounds to do so, as the ideologically close AUR party came in second place, with a gap of less than 4%. Moreover, Georgescu could have dragged the situation to re-elections by prolonging negotiations (the president has the exclusive right to dissolve parliament if his prime ministerial candidate is not approved twice), while AUR could have won first place in recent polls (and by an interesting coincidence, the head of this party, Simion, had contacts with Georgescu and supported his candidacy in the May 2025 elections).

Although the whole structure is only a general assumption, its realism in implementation makes it clear why MVM representatives expect the purchase to close by the second half of the year.

Yes, the decisions of the Central Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have blocked the process, but the protest mood and significant consolidation of support for Georgescu in the polls before the re-election (sometimes the level of support reached close to 50%) pose a threat that votes will go to Simion, who has already announced that he will run for re-election and the situation is far from being resolved.

Recently, Hungarian Foreign Minister Siyarto said that they want to buy Romanian gas from the new field, which is indicated as a desire to diversify their gas imports, which are 100% from Russia. However, for 3 years Hungary has consistently blocked EU initiatives to switch from Russian energy and this statement may be nothing more than a desire to create a favourable background to push through the deal between MVM and E.ON.

We can see that Hungary has been actively confronting the authorities not only in Brussels but also in other European capitals for the past six months, especially after the election of Trump, and economic problems and the upcoming elections are forcing Orban to expand his indirect influence at any cost and create pressure in various areas to create a favourable picture that there is a ‘split’ in the EU, which the Hungarian leader keeps repeating.