Geopolitical geometry: The Great U-turn of the United States and the EU-US-China Triangle.
Vadym Kovalenko
Digital illustration created by artificial intelligence.
Prerequisites for Trumpist criticism of the existing world order
The debate about whether America should continue to play the role of hegemon began long before Trump. But it was with the advent of Trump that this vision gained favour with some financial elites and, as a result, ideological justification. The main dimension of this rethinking is economic. Among the financial circles behind Trump, there is a belief that the existing world order and globalisation no longer bring the expected dividends to the United States, but instead they enrich competitors and partners, primarily China and the European Union.
After the Second World War, the American establishment strongly believed that it had to maintain a world order in which America, on the one hand, acted as a beacon of democratic values and a guarantor of the security of its allies, and on the other hand, was the primary economic beneficiary of the global ‘centre-periphery’ system, in which the gap between rich and poor countries only widened, allowing the American population to bathe in prosperity.
However, this system began to have problems with the growth of the economies of China and other second-tier countries. America's trade balance with China has become strikingly negative, and US debts are growing, as are the costs of maintaining its role as a global hegemon. But the dividends are coming to an end. Globalisation has fostered immigration, so that the average white American worker is increasingly competing for access to wealth. This discontent has been aggravated by an illogical focus on environmental issues, gender, and the DEI concept. All of this has allowed certain political and financial circles in America to become convinced that globalisation and liberalism have undermined the fundamental values and benefits of the American nation. As a result, these elites have become vulnerable to America's traditional isolationism and to the influence of political philosophers who criticise the liberal order and propose alternative models of government.
According to these ideas, liberal democracy has become a system that depletes resources and makes countries more vulnerable. Some ideologues go even further, recognising modern democracy as an ineffective form of government, and the universities, bureaucracy and media as the main culprits of wrong ideological education. Of course, from their perspective, the guilty party must be destroyed. All of these ideas, although from different perspectives, come to a similar conclusion: The European Union is the most vulnerable link in the event of a change in the current world order. It is weak not only because of economic stagnation and demographic problems, but also because of the lack of real political subjectivity.
The Great U-turn of the United States
The American elites understand that they have reached the limits of their intensive growth (growth by improving the quality of resources while maintaining their quantity). China has not. And this is despite the fact that, according to the Americans, their partners in the world order are also eating up these resources. In the following decades, the world will see three major breakthroughs, two of which - virtual and cosmic.
And in order to have absolute leadership, the country that will implement them must ignore a huge number of ethical taboos. This, by the way, is one of the reasons why Elon Musk is so attacking the supranational structures of the EU and the UN. These are the structures that control unethical scientific breakthroughs with their ethical cobwebs: from bioethics and virtual ethics to eco-ethics and the ethics of space exploration. Those are entire layers of prohibitions.
But on the other hand, those who ignore them have every chance of becoming a global hegemon (or even a galactic one). By the way, the issue of Arctic exploration based on the rules of strong countries (the case of Greenland and claims to Canada), rather than the rules of the old world order, is the first bell of a new ethical paradigm of exploration that would satisfy the new America.
So what do we have?
1. For a hypothetical technological leap, Trump's America is looking for resources in all ways - from ‘optimising allies’ to reconsidering its attitude towards its own imperialism.
2. Trump's America would not mind existing not in the paradigm of the old world order of democratic values, but in the paradigm of a multipolar world where the law of the strong is the law for the smaller, and therefore supranational structures do not interfere with technological breakthroughs. That is why it is beneficial for Trump to keep Putin, the lawbreaker, first as a curtain, and secondly as one of the battering rams for the established international relations. And that is why Trump sees it as profitable and timely to weaken Europe's position, and in this game Ukraine is undoubtedly a bargaining chip to the extent that it is possible to strengthen Putin and keep Ukraine alive at the same time. After all, no one has cancelled the internal situation, and the seizure of Ukraine would be both a betrayal and a defeat for Trump, even in the eyes of the Republicans. The fear of defeat is, incidentally, one of the reasons why the United States is moving from the status of an ally to the status of an arbiter between the parties. The fact is that without a radical increase in aid, Ukraine's victory is unlikely (only through the economic collapse of Russia). But for the reasons described above, aid is unlikely to be increased, so the Trump administration is thinking ahead to its image and does not plan to associate with countries that it believes will lose (Ukraine and the EU).
What is China's perspective on recent events?
Throughout the war, China has been engaged in:
1) supporting Russia's ability to fight for a long time;
2) politically expanding its manoeuvre, mainly by abstaining from voting in the UN;
3) by declaring its respect for Ukrainian sovereignty, it raised red flags for Russia regarding the existence of Ukrainian statehood;
4) through abstract peace initiatives, it tried to extend its influence to the countries that abstained from voting (in China's view, these are manifestations of anti-Americanism).
China's strategic interest is to defeat the United States. Therefore, China cannot help but react to the US's great U-turn. And it will proceed from the following:
China will benefit from the easing of sanctions against Russia, but it will be concerned about the possible US and Russian ties in the Arctic and space cooperation. Moreover, it is unprofitable for China that as part of such cooperation, Russia should lose its status as a technological vassal of the Celestial Empire.
The longer America remains preoccupied with Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the stronger China's competitive position in comparison with the United States will become. Here we should refer to the idea that has already been publicly expressed in articles by pro-regime Chinese analysts: the division of interests depends less on your contribution to the conflict and more on your strength at the end of the conflict. And it must be said that the Trump administration also understands this. That is why it is trying to equalise its status with China's in the following way: instead of wasting resources, it is trying to moderate a possible conflict between Russia and Europe. It is not clear that the White House believes in the reality of such a conflict, but apparently it will promote its arbitration of this dangerous possibility.
China and the EU are the largest trading partners in the world. And if America demonstratively attacks the superpower structures of the UN and especially the EU, China will demonstratively negotiate with the bureaucrats of the EU political bodies and contribute more to the activities of the UN structures. The only structure that China would benefit from attacking is NATO. Disconnecting Europe's security from America would be a geopolitical victory for China on an unprecedented scale. Therefore, China will do its best to encourage the creation of EU defence forces in any form, as long as these parallel to NATO structures are growing bureaucratic muscles.
Based on this, it can be concluded that China sees the US's great U-turn as a short window of opportunity for getting closer to the European Union, which it considers its main trading partner, the only source of satisfying its technological hunger, and, in the context of the tariff war with the US, a subject for mutual assistance. And for China, Ukraine is an obvious entry point into warm relations with the EU (which is why, as mentioned above, China has put red flags on Russia's issue of preserving Ukrainian sovereignty - precisely to keep the manoeuvre towards the EU).
Chinese signals
Therefore, China has begun, if not to act, then at least to test its system of emergency diplomatic rapprochement. There have been many signals: from the speech at the Munich conference with the position that the EU should be at the negotiating table to the latest speech by China's special envoy for European affairs, Lu Shaye, who in a more harsh manner stated that Trump's attitude towards allies is terrible and used the term ‘equal discussion’, which clearly indicated China's assessment of the separate negotiations between the US and Russia. There have been other interesting signals over the past month. One of China's pro-government analysts publicly argued in an article: China does not need alliances. This is both a signal to Russia, which has been flirting with the US, and to Europe that China does not want to take on commitments for which it cannot respond , first and foremost, with moral authority.
It was also the first time that a group supporting Ukraine, which is atypical for official discourse, appeared in Chinese public space. This group has been given a platform to express the view that ending the war on terms acceptable to the EU (and therefore to Ukraine) is beneficial to China. This is an outright flirting with the idea of strategic rapprochement. This flirting was continued by the fact that for the first time a Chinese TV channel ran a report on the war from Ukraine's perspective (a sign that Ukraine was forced to smile at China's geopolitical wink).
In turn, the European Parliament will lift restrictions on meetings between its members and Chinese officials blacklisted in 2021 for human rights violations in Xinjiang. It is worth reminding you that after China imposed retaliatory sanctions against Members of the European Parliament, the EU Parliament refused to ratify the EU-China investment package.
Potential benefits and obstacles to strategic cooperation between the EU and China.
Given the potential reformatting of the US- EU partnership into a pragmatic (and therefore unfriendly to Europe) relationship, possible cooperation could bring significant benefits to both sides.
First and foremost, it would create a free trade environment. China's economy has been stagnating for two years. And the European Union's economy is in a state of shock from the consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine (gas prices, collateral damage from sanctions, the need to increase defence spending urgently). At this point, the Trump's team launches a global tariff war against both China and the EU. Therefore, a free trade zone is essentially the only way to keep the economy growing, a kind of safe harbour from tariff wars. But this is preceded by a strict condition from Europe - to work out China's commitments to reduce trade imbalances.
Secondly, it is beneficial for both China and the EU to show the partnership's potential as an irritating and constraining factor for Russia and the US, which will make them look out for red flags.
Thirdly, China's most obvious goal is to take advantage of Ukraine's and Europe's disenchantment with America to discover Europe through Ukraine's door. The fact is that after the change in White House policy, Europe sees Ukraine's entry into the EU as a settled formal issue - it is a matter of the EU's survival. Ukraine is a hard-working country that, even during the war against the world's largest country and after losing its best fields, literally floods Europe and the Middle East with agricultural products. Ukraine currently has the most capable army in the world. The matter of rare earth metals is also not the less important one. And China sees all of this. It also sees the prospect that Chinese investments in Ukraine's recovery will sooner or later end up in the EU's economic environment. Europe will in fact consider such investments as investments in the European Union.
Fourth, China desperately needs to unblock the technological blockade that Europe has been imposing on China at the request of its ally — the United States.
Fifth, in cooperation with China, Europe can reformat the basic principles of the gas market. Before the war, Russia and the United States were convinced that the gas market was a seller's market that dictated terms, including geopolitical ones. The new Russian-Asian reality has shown that from now on, the terms of the gas market are dictated by the buyer. If Europe successfully passes through the turbulent period in the energy sector, we can talk about a common strategic position of China and the EU in this regard. Moreover, this position is reinforced by the aggressive stake of both Europe and China on green technologies.
Nevertheless, the implementation of the scenario of rapprochement between China and the EU faces several serious problems:
Europe does not perceive China as a reliable partner after its shadowy assistance to Russia's military economy
Europe is aware that from Beijing's point of view, the best outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war would be something between peace and war. But a hybrid peace is not a good idea for Europe and Ukraine, which are defending their right to exist within the old rules of the world order. Europe actually understands the trap of hybrid peace without any further explanation.
The EU positions itself as a bastion of liberal values, while China sticks to an authoritarian model of governance.
The aggressive reaction to this from the Trump's team. Even if Trump imposes sanctions on such a loyal ‘Labrador ally’ as the EU, an ally that flirts with a rival behind its back may be subject to certain technological restrictions, if not sanctions. But the situation here is similar to that with nuclear weapons — if the US takes such a step, it risks finding itself in a situation where Europe responds by completely removing restrictions on technological cooperation with China, which is an irreversible loss for the US.
Europe understands that China's flirting can only be an imitation. Firstly, to strengthen its image among the countries of the global south, and secondly, to mix up the cards and make a final split between Europe and the United States. And most importantly, despite China's anti-Americanism, we should not dismiss the possibility that China is simply preparing cards to be played during a strategic meeting with Trump.
Nevertheless, it is economic logic that indicates that the rapprochement scenario will happen if the US continues its policy of turning away from Europe.
What steps can Europe take considering the updated positions of the US and China?
1. Preparation of the programme for fundamental intensification of economic cooperation with China. Including infrastructure projects, primarily the reconstruction of Ukraine, and cooperation on joint green industry, technological cooperation (especially painful for the US)
2. As part of this package of cooperation, both sides can hope for mutual lobbying in third countries for payments in euros and yuan, not to mention that an increase in trade between the parties will reduce the dollar's share in global payments. The same applies to the joint gradual exit from US bonds in favour of European and Chinese bonds.
3. Impact on key US geopolitical locations.
In the Middle East, Europe is already gaining the first points due to the change of power in Syria. The tough stance of the new Syrian government and Turkey on the future of the American-backed Syrian Kurds makes the US position weak. Elsewhere, in the Gaza Sector, Europe can also take a position that contradicts US policy, especially after Trump's statements about the displacement of Palestinians, which is not difficult to frame in terms of values and, secondly, in deep, respectful cooperation with neighbouring Arab countries.
On Iran, the EU can take a principled position on convergence and implementation of the nuclear negotiations. By and large, even if the EU and America hypothetically diverge, Europe cannot help but see the potential of the Turkey-Iran-Syria Middle East hub ( given the democratisation of the latter). No matter how fantastic this idea may seem, if the United States saves Russia and preserves its strength, the latter's great-power imperialism will grow to such a scale that it will force Iran to seek protection in Western alliance configurations.
Canada. The free trade area between the EU and Canada has been in place for a long time. Therefore, Europe can encourage American companies focused on exports to Europe to open production facilities in Canada. The obvious solution is defence and economic rapprochement between Canada and Denmark, against the backdrop of Trump's claims to Greenland and Canada's economic sovereignty. It is unlikely that we will witness an interesting interpretation of the word European Union from Ottawa to Bucharest. But in the event of a European military force, some form of Canadian participation is not unrealistic.
5. Defence contracts. The European Union has a direct interest in ignoring American manufacturers more and more. This is especially true for the F-35 fighter jets, and the EU can act in tandem with Canada, which also has contracts for the jets.
6. Developing and supporting alternative geopolitical alliances.
What does the EU's position look like in the eyes of the USA?
In a nutshell, it is rhetoric without action. The US administration sees the EU's current position as weak and vulnerable one. Although the Europeans declare the need to reduce their dependence on the US, their real steps have been unimpressive so far.
The main problems of the European approach:
Lack of speed and determination: Europe takes too long to agree on a solution, sometimes at the cost of an irrational trade-off that devalues part of the solution.
Lack of economic autonomy. In the past, Europe voluntarily drove itself into Russian gas trap. It is still critically dependent on American financial systems and defence contracts.
Political dispersion: France, Germany and, for example, the countries of the South have different views on foreign policy.
That is why the White House considers all statements about ‘strategic autonomy’ to be unworthy of attention. And the US is not afraid to act tough against Europe.
The EU must act radically.
Europe has historically been predisposed to compromise and slow decisions, but in the context of an existential challenge, it simply has no choice. If Europe wants to survive as a power and not become a peripheral object, it will have to act tough.
And I think this policy will bring tangible results. After all, neither the US, nor China, nor other players expect Europe to take any radical action.
Expansion of relations with China should not be articulated but actually implemented. But from a position of variability and strength. Within the framework of variability, the EU is already negotiating a free trade area with India. A strong initial position is also already being demonstrated, for example, in an unusually harsh communiqué towards China following the G7 meeting. These are all signals to China that Europe is not in a dead end and will consider all options.
It should be emphasised that although convergence with China should be done through active actions, it is more of a very strong negotiating card for strategic discussions with the US, so that the latter changes its position towards its ally. Such changes can also come from internal US factors, the main ones being the lack of ‘victory cases’, falling ratings due to the rejection of the new strategy, and, finally, the victorious mid-term elections to the US Congress for the Democrats.
Therefore, Europe's basic method for internal changes in the US will be to develop radical algorithms of action that the Trump administration is not ready (or expects) to respond to; and delaying time with simple sabotage of Trump's cavalry attacks on any issue. All cavalry attacks must get stuck in the swamp of bureaucracy and summits. If the European anti-crisis is successful, the White House will sooner or later be forced to change both the MAGA screws of its system and its own policy.
In the meantime, the most urgent issue for achieving real European autonomy and radically changing the balance of power is the creation of an independent military bloc within the EU. And here, if successful, Europe has a whole galaxy of trump cards.
First of all, it is the nuclear Army of Britain, which, although it values its status as the closest ally of the United States, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a strategic interest of the Crown. So Britain, although it will elegantly moderate US/European relations in the direction of its strategic interest, will take advantage of the historic chance to become the leader of the democratic world. Recently, an interesting and underestimated geopolitical event took place — Canada invited King Charles to attend the opening of the Parliament. The last time the British monarch attended the opening of the Canadian parliament was in 1957. Somehow, Trump's team forgot that Canada is actually a constitutional monarchy, which means that Trump will have to look back at London, which, by the way, is trying to take full advantage of this opportunity and is increasing the geopolitical importance of the British Commonwealth and the CANZUK alliance. Moreover, in the new realities, Britain may even return to the European Union under certain conditions.
The second trump card of the defence alliance is the Ukrainian army, currently the largest and most capable army in Europe with first-hand expertise in most military technologies. In fact, the Ukrainian army can cover all of Europe's urgent land needs with its size. It is enough to add European aviation to the Ukrainian army to make it a truly threatening European force.
Thirdly, Turkey is ready for difficult negotiations with the EU on its participation in a common European defence. Apparently, the EU will have to make concessions, and such discussions are already underway. As long as giant Russia looms over Turkey, Ankara will be a ‘natural ally’ of Romania and Ukraine (I recommend that you remember this term for Turkey), and therefore of the European Defence Union. Turkey is the second combat-ready army in Europe, which is currently consolidating its influence in Syria in cooperation with the EU, in contrast to all other supervisors of the conflict - America, Russia, Iran, Israel.
P.S. It is already known about the historic increase in funding for European rearmament. According to this plan, in 2-3 years the European Union should be rearmed and have 2 nuclear armies, two experienced predators on its eastern flank - Ukraine and Turkey. But the time when Europe will hypothetically be feared is still several years away. And Europe is already facing historic challenges today.