Hybrid silhouettes of NATO: nuclear initiation for Ukraine
Vadym Kovalenko
Photo: EPA
There are states that exist on the borderline between peace and war, between history and the future. Ukraine has become such a borderline for the civilisation we call the West. Here, the battle is not being fought by armies, but by ideas about the sense of collective defence, the limits of fear of the enemy, and the price of freedom. We can continue to weigh the risks, hesitate, and write memoranda, but in the 21st century, defence is not measured in kilometres of borders — it is measured in the speed of decisions.
The reality of today is that the shelling of the Ukrainian nuclear power plant is a test of the civilised world's readiness to defend the very idea of security. It is becoming clear that the Alliance needs to abandon the logic of ‘expansion’ and adopt the logic of adaptive existence. It is from this logic that Ukraine's ‘nuclear’ entry into NATO can begin — not just as a symbol of political union, but as a point of no return for the entire Euro-Atlantic system.
The myth of NATO's expansion to the East
NATO's expansion after the end of the Cold War is often interpreted in Russian official rhetoric as an aggressive advance of the Alliance towards its eastern borders, which supposedly disrupted the security balance in Europe. And Russian propaganda has succeeded in spreading this virus in Western minds. However, if you ask a Pole or a Czech for their opinion, you will hear a fundamentally different logic. For these countries, the term ‘entry into NATO’ did not mean the expansion of the structure to the East, but an escape to the West, an escape from the danger of returning to Moscow's control. For these countries, the experience of being in the Warsaw Pact was associated with a loss of sovereignty, the forced location of Soviet military bases, and systematic interference in domestic politics.
In fact, it was sovereignty that was limited in the eyes of the West and conditional in the eyes of the USSR. The invasion of Hungary by Warsaw Pact troops in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 left a deep psychological trauma, so it was obvious to the elites of the region that without external guarantees, the independence of Eastern European states would always be under threat.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the countries of Central Europe faced a dilemma (actually quite simple for them): to remain in the ‘grey zone’ between Moscow and Brussels or to seek integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. The choice was clear: integration into NATO was seen not as an experiment, but as the only way to survive.
Western countries were initially cautious about this idea, fearing that Moscow would be excessively irritated. However, it gradually became clear that Europe's security could not be ensured without stabilising its eastern borders. The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO in 1999, followed by the Baltic states and Romania in 2004, was the result of pressure from these countries themselves, rather than excessive initiative on the part of Brussels or Washington.
It is important to emphasise that their entry into the Alliance did not create new threats, but only neutralised old ones. This emphasis is particularly relevant for Ukraine: attempts to leave the country in a state of ‘non-aligned status’ only increase the threat of Russian revanchism. The logic of ‘escaping to the West’ in the form of integration into NATO is not an act of aggression, but, by analogy, a form of survival in the face of an aggressive neighbour. By the same analogy, Ukraine's membership in NATO will end in the same way — not by creating new threats, but by neutralising old ones.
What lies behind Russia's ultimatum?
In December 2021, the Russian Federation presented the West with a series of demands that could be considered as an ultimatum: NATO's refusal to further expand, the withdrawal of the Alliance's infrastructure from territories that joined after 1997, and legal guarantees of the ‘inviolability of spheres of influence.’ These demands became the ideological prerequisite for further full-scale aggression against Ukraine. To understand their logic, it is necessary to separate the Kremlin's official fears from the hidden motives that determine its policy.
In official Russian rhetoric, NATO is portrayed as a military threat approaching the borders of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin appeals to arguments of ‘historical security’ and ‘balance of power.’ This argument is formed in three key points:
NATO expansion allegedly violates the agreements of the early 1990s, when the West ‘promised not to move eastward’ (an argument that is not historically documented).
The location of the Alliance's infrastructure near Russia's borders is presented as a direct threat of military invasion.
Ukraine's membership in NATO is interpreted as a ‘red line’ that creates the danger of US missiles and missile defence systems being deployed directly near Russian decision-making centres.
These arguments are declared as “rational,” but they serve more as a disguise. The real motives behind Russia's ultimatum lie in domestic politics. It is the fear of losing control over Ukraine, because a successful democratic and European Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia's authoritarian regime, and its integration into NATO and the EU undermines the doctrine of the ‘Russian world’. The first fear leads to a second fear — the fear of the collapse of its own empire. The Kremlin sees Ukraine as the ‘historical core’ of the empire. And it is just as essential as Russia itself, because if we look at the history of intellectual thought, a number of Russian intellectuals of the tsar era even recognised the superiority of Ukrainian intellectual thought over Russian, meaning that the primary source in this pair - is Ukrainian.
The loss of Kyiv would finally undermine Moscow's claims to the status of a ‘centre of power,’ especially in terms of its claims to exclusive dominance in the Orthodox world. Third, I would mention the fear of losing control over resources. Ukraine has significant agricultural, energy, and transit capacities. The integration of these assets into Western economic systems means the loss of geopolitical leverage for the Russian Federation.
Allegorically speaking, Ukraine is a mirror in which Russia sees its own fragility, secondary importance and ugliness, and therefore seeks to break the mirror.
Western fears about Ukraine's entry into NATO
Regarding Ukraine's accession to NATO, the position of Western countries can be described, in the best case, as strategic hesitation, but in most cases we can speak of strategic confusion and strategic fear. If for Ukraine integration into the Alliance is a matter of survival, for NATO member states it is a matter of balancing risks and benefits. Western fears can be divided into two groups: those related to Ukraine's membership and those related to Russia's possible takeover of Ukraine in case of delay.
Security fears
The main concern for most allies is the risk of direct confrontation with Russia. If Ukraine joins, Article 5 guarantees will oblige NATO to respond to any new aggression by the Russian Federation, which puts the Alliance in the position of facing war with a nuclear power. This scenario is described in political discussions as “dragging NATO into war”. In addition, due to the unpredictability of Russia's reaction, Western elites fear that even the process of Ukraine's integration into NATO could signal even more aggressive actions by the Kremlin — from mobilisation to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Since some members of the Alliance (e.g., Hungary) have traditionally been ambiguous about sanctions and military aid to Ukraine, some Western countries doubt NATO's internal unity if it becomes necessary to defend Ukraine. The West also takes into account the financial and logistical complexity of Ukraine's integration. It has long borders with Russia and Belarus, which would have to be fortified, requiring the deployment of additional brigades, air defence systems, and aviation infrastructure. For some members of the Alliance, this looks as excessive financial burden.
Fears about the consequences of Ukraine's loss
Meanwhile, the West has another set of fears that are no less important. If Russia wins and occupies Ukrainian territories, NATO will face new threats.
First, the Russian front will move closer to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. This would eliminate the ‘buffer zone’ and turn these countries into front-line defence states, while the Black Sea would likely become an arms race battleground (on the water, underwater, in the sky and in coastal infrastructure). In fact, NATO will be forced to invest even more resources in its eastern flank compared to what it would have done if Ukraine had been accepted.
Secondly, Russia will gain control over Ukraine's critical assets — grain exports, uranium, titanium and lithium deposits, as well as the gas transportation system, hydropower resources and seaports. Such control would turn Moscow into the main supplier of a number of strategic resources, undermining the energy and technological security of the EU and the world. The EU would gain a new ‘energy and agricultural monopolist’ in the form of Moscow.
Thirdly, the flight time of Russian missiles to European capitals would be reduced. From Ukrainian territory, Moscow will gain an advantage in the speed of strikes on Warsaw, Bucharest or even Berlin. This increases the likelihood of nuclear blackmail and reduces the effectiveness of missile defence systems.
Fourthly, the West realises that at the moment, the two most combat-ready land armies in Europe are Ukrainian and Russian. And given the course of history, unfortunately, there is every reason to believe that Europe will soon have to fight two armies instead of one.
Finally, the geopolitical image of the West will suffer a major blow. If Ukraine is left alone and destroyed, it will send a signal that Russia can dictate terms not only in the post-Soviet space, but also in Eastern Europe as a whole. And indirectly, it will be able to impose its security conditions on the entire European Union. In essence, due to the degradation of the ‘open door’ principle, NATO actually recognises Russia’s right to veto NATO's actions.
Thus, the West is faced with a dilemma: Ukraine's accession is a risk of rapid escalation and the need for significant resources now. Ukraine's non-accession is a threat of even greater escalation and strategic defeat in the medium term.
The choice between these fears shows that the real challenge for NATO is not the ‘excessiveness’ of Ukrainian membership, but the lack of a clear strategy to restrain Russia. I believe that the time has come to generate discourses of hybrid concepts on the issue of Ukraine’s accession/non-accession to NATO.
Ukraine's fears about ‘not entering’ into NATO
For Ukraine, NATO membership is not a political choice or a tactical goal. Above all, it is a matter of physical survival. The absence of collective defence guarantees means that the country is forced to stand alone against the aggressor state with significantly greater military, economic and demographic potential. Ukraine was part of this terrible mechanism; its generals and engineers, as part of the USSR, were shaping this ‘greatness of imperial progress and ideas.’ Therefore, Ukrainians are well aware of the direction in which Russia is moving and the value of the word of the Russian authorities or generals. They know this better than any think-tanks. Therefore, Ukrainian fears about not joining NATO are not theoretical, but entirely existential. They can be divided into three main areas: security, economic and political.
The most significant risk for Ukraine is the resumption of war with no prospect of a final peace. Not being a member of NATO means that Russia will always have room for aggression, using the ‘grey zone’ (by the way, Western military theorists need to solve the ‘grey zone problem’ in a joint doctrinal approach with Ukraine, and immediately, since grey zones, although not on such a scale, may appear in the Baltic states) as a field for pressure and blackmail. Without NATO, Ukraine will remain vulnerable to repeated attacks. The Kremlin will interpret Kyiv's non-accession as confirmation of the ‘legitimacy’ of its own sphere of influence.
Another important aspect for this article is nuclear and energy blackmail. Even without the occupied nuclear power plant, Ukraine has the second largest nuclear energy infrastructure in Europe. Without international security guarantees, these facilities will be constantly at risk of military provocations, which is a threat to the entire continent.
Ukraine's non-alignment also means a loss of time in rearmament. A country that is not integrated into NATO systems is forced to modernise its army on its own, at a pace that is far from the minimum necessary. Add to this the need to upgrade the economy and infrastructure as a whole, and it becomes clear that Ukraine's already limited resources will be spread across the entire spectrum of social and state visions. Of course, this will be offset to some extent (hopefully to a large extent) by investments. But they will depend heavily on the political situation. It is quite possible that, in conditions of fragile peace, the pressure of ‘the eyes of Zelensky and the world’ will be lifted from the shoulders of Western leaders, and the cycle of moral responsibility will be renewed (this generation of politicians did what it could and kept its word in supporting Ukraine to the end).
In addition, and here we move on to economic fears, non-membership in NATO keeps Ukraine's status as a ‘risky country.’ No transnational company will invest in the long term in an economy that is under constant threat of war. Investment packages will always be smaller than what is potentially possible (and this decade is a window of opportunity for Ukraine; there will be no more such attention, supplemented by moral promises of recovery). Even in the context of post-war reconstruction, Ukraine will only be able to count on short-term programmes within the limits of risk assessment. In other words, Ukraine will be outside the scope of the EU's actual planning, which is measured in steps of 20, 25, and 30 years. In other words, this will be residual funding (although it may be impressive in everyday terms for Ukrainians themselves).
There will always be a risk of losing strategic industries. Russia will continue to try to disable critical infrastructure facilities — energy, transport, agricultural logistics, maritime transit — and restrict Western investment in rare earth minerals. Without NATO's umbrella, the average Ukrainian refugee will not be able to form a vision in their mind that the war is over for good, no matter what national guarantees Ukraine is given. Therefore, the most important economic resource — people — will also be incomplete.
The risk of political instability can also be added to the list of problems. The conditional ‘grey zone’ can fuel populism and radical movements and be fertile ground for pro-Russian narratives that will exploit the disappointment of the population. But in the political dimension, the most important thing is the limitation of subjectivity — if Ukraine does not receive NATO guarantees, its policy will remain dependent on situational agreements between major powers. In the worst case, the country's future may again become the subject of ‘big deals’ without the participation of Kyiv itself.
So, if the Alliance countries fear the ‘excessive risks’ of Kyiv's membership, Ukraine fears losing the very possibility of existing as an independent state. Every refusal or postponement of integration only reinforces the ‘grey zone’ where Russia repeatedly tests the limits of the West's patience with its policy of ‘creeping annexation’.
The cluster approach, as a temporary mechanism for implementing Article 5.
So, it seems essential to keep NATO's ‘open door’ policy and combine Ukraine's irreversible path towards defence integration with mechanisms that reduce the risks of escalation for the West. Such a balance is possible provided that membership is systematically enshrined in law and that instruments of ‘limited collective defence’ — clusters — are simultaneously introduced.
Systemic reform of NATO could provide a legal opportunity to limit the guarantees of Article 5 to specific areas (clusters) — for example, protection only of underwater infrastructure, or only of airborne objects, protection of critical objects (dams, clearly defined port infrastructure), protection of nuclear facilities (nuclear power plants), cyber security protection, biosecurity protection. Of course, each type of cluster must have written response and reaction procedures. In my opinion, this will add flexibility to the Alliance — the resulting scope for manoeuvre will provide a range of possible solutions for adoption. Why did the Alliance now become hostage to the critical strategy of ‘no escalation’? Precisely because of its comprehensive nature.
I consider this hybrid approach to be one of the few (if not the only) opportunities for Ukraine to obtain irreversible NATO membership status and at the same time significantly reduce the level of responsibility of the West, and thus its fears about the need to respond to aggression against Ukraine. From all possible clusters, I am interested in the nuclear one.
The nuclear cluster as the first stage of Ukraine's hybrid accession to NATO
Of all the possible areas of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, nuclear security has the highest level of legitimacy in international law and the least potential for political escalation. This is not just about protecting energy infrastructure — it is about preventing a nuclear disaster, the consequences of which will not be confined to national borders. Any attack on a nuclear power plant in Ukraine is a potential threat to the citizens of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Moldova, and, through air currents, to the entire continent. In other words, protecting Ukrainian nuclear power plants is not an internal matter for Ukraine, but a direct function of Europe's collective security.
Therefore, this sector can and should become the first experimental cluster within which Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will be applied in a hybrid manner — limited, but real.
This is not about Ukraine's full security integration into NATO (although NATO membership is unique in its interpretation), but about launching a nuclear security cluster, within which the territory around each nuclear power plant in Ukraine will be considered part of the Alliance's defence space.
This format is a strategic trade-off that simultaneously:
Does not involve the total deployment of troops along the front line or a response to an attack on the front line;
Suggests neutrality in a political meaning (since Ukraine and NATO are not automatically involved in each other's conflicts);
Has an indisputable international justification (the prevention of nuclear disasters is the responsibility of all states in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) and UN Security Council Resolutions No. 1540 and No. 1887.
Complies with the IAEA mandate and can be implemented in coordination with the Agency as a technical partner of NATO.
In short, the result will be the following structure: NATO is obliged to ‘defend every inch’ only within the square around Ukrainian nuclear power plants, is not obliged to respond to military aggression in other parts of Ukraine, and Ukraine is a (full-fledged!) member of NATO, which voluntarily chooses to participate in only one cluster and is obliged to provide assistance to other countries of the alliance only in the event of an attack on their nuclear facilities.
Cluster model
The nuclear cluster involves the creation of a protective square around the nuclear power plant — approximately 20 × 20 km — in which Alliance rapid response units numbering up to one brigade (or equivalent) are deployed.
Within this square:
a closed sky regime is introduced: any unknown airborne objects crossing the perimeter may be destroyed; an agreement may be signed with national governments to shoot down objects outside the square if there is objective data about a threat to the square (in simple terms — shooting down missiles on approach).
a mixed surveillance system (reconnaissance, radar, satellite monitoring) is created; the country is alerted to the danger in the region where the square is located.
the civilian presence of the IAEA, as an observer with a permanent mandate, is foreseen.
In essence, this is a ‘protective dome,’ and such a dome will become the first legally defined NATO space on the territory of Ukraine, where collective defence mechanisms will operate in a limited area.
The political appeal of the concept for allies
The nuclear cluster provides Western partners with an institutionally convenient way to support Ukraine without entering into open confrontation with the Russian Federation. Most importantly, it would remove the Kremlin's demand that “Ukraine must not join NATO” once and for all, which would provide significant political relief to Eastern European countries. Let us not forget that for the EU, this is also a guarantee of environmental security.
Most importantly, such a step can hardly be interpreted by Moscow to the rest of the world as aggressive NATO expansion, since it is exclusively defensive and humanitarian in nature, aimed at preventing man-made disasters.
For Ukraine, the nuclear cluster means the real, not declarative, implementation of Article 5.
In fact, it is a precedent for mutual defence participation.
The advantages are obvious:
guarantee of physical security of key energy facilities;
creation of a permanent contingent of allies on the territory of the country;
integration of Ukraine into the NATO command system;
accelerated synchronisation of protocols and technologies;
strengthening investor and public confidence
In a strategic key, this is the beginning of ‘normalisation of membership’.
As for the disadvantages, it is difficult to think of anything except the enemy's focus on nuclear facilities in order to test NATO's red lines. But such actions could permanently alienate Russia's economic partners (with almost immediate consequences for Russia's economy). In addition, the risks should be measured at least over a 5-10 year period (the people in the Kremlin, who want to escalate the situation so much, might no longer be there).
Of course, such asymmetric membership (I would say ‘asymmetric response’) requires significant changes to the NATO Charter, which is a considerable challenge (currently almost impossible to implement).
The new articles of the Alliance could look like this:
Article 5 (New)
Participating States may, by mutual agreement, establish specialised defence clusters for the purpose of joint training, information exchange, rapid response and collective defence within specific areas of security.
Each cluster shall have its own rules of procedure, but shall be subject to the general principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The joining of a State to a particular cluster shall not entail the full range of obligations under Article 5, unless otherwise agreed by all members.
Article 10 (New)
Any European state capable of contributing to the security of the North Atlantic area may be invited to join the Organisation.
By mutual agreement, such a state may be admitted as a participant in one or more defence clusters, with full membership in all NATO structures.
Article 12 (New)
If necessary, the Council may amend this Treaty to expand defence cooperation mechanisms, including cluster formats.
Difference from associate membership
It should also be clarified that this form of participation differs significantly from associate or any other limited form of membership. This is because the cluster format provides for equal status for all members, access to operational planning, grants veto rights, and removes the rhetoric of superior partnership or setting conditions, etc. If there is any uncertainty, it is the timing of opening other clusters (remember that a cluster is not only about rights but also obligations, and therefore costs).
A state that joins NATO with the New Charter and the Cluster Format becomes a member of the Organisation under international law — it ratifies the Washington Treaty, has representation in the North Atlantic Council, participates in decision-making, signs protocols, etc. A NATO member independently — through an internal decision (parliament, government) — chooses the clusters within which it: applies the provisions of Article 5; participates in joint exercises and financing; deploys or hosts NATO forces; opens access to data, facilities and technologies.
This format is also not intended to create ‘deferred membership’ or a ‘transition phase,’ as it has often been suggested. It is about full membership, which is only operationally segmented by defence areas (clusters). There are no categories such as ‘restriction,’ ‘deferral,’ or ‘freeze.’ Therefore, it will not look like a substitution, but rather as a new type of institutional adaptation of the Alliance to the hybrid security of the 21st century. Perhaps this is that hybrid response which everyone has been looking for.
Thus, the cluster model is not a ‘half-membership.’ It simply forms a new category of membership within NATO itself, compliant with international law and truly flexible to contemporary security challenges.
Nullification of Russia's demands
What is important is that, first, this format makes it impossible to implement the demand for ‘guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO.’ Legal membership is a fact, and it is happening in such a way that Russia's ‘legitimate concerns’ are significantly losing their persuasive power. The operational limitation (the application of Article 5 only to the nuclear cluster) does not violate the principles of the Alliance, but at the same time minimises political confrontation: Russia loses the formal basis for interpreting this as a “membership-threat”.
Secondly, Russia's second demand, that NATO troops must not be deployed on Ukrainian territory, will also be rejected. The cluster model neutralises this demand, but through several unique aspects:
The most fundamental aspect is the localisation of the contingent. NATO forces are deployed only within the nuclear security cluster — a 20×20 km square around nuclear power plants, which are international critical infrastructure facilities.
A comprehensive legal definition of the contingent's functions — namely, ensuring the security of nuclear facilities and controlling the airspace above them.
Creation of a ‘neutral defence presence’ regime by the Alliance. Sending a contingent within this regime publicly removes some of the political tension. The presence of NATO forces is interpreted not as preparation for offensive actions or ‘colonisation’ within the framework of expansion, but as an international security guarantee.
Here, of course, NATO needs to work on its terminology. But the consequences of rejecting these two Russian demands are significant. First, part of the propaganda effort is undermined: this case will have to be either forgotten or recognised as a geopolitical defeat within the framework of these demands. At the same time, it will no longer be possible to appeal in such an arbitrary manner to the fact that NATO boots are already at the border.
NATO's interaction with the IAEA
In addition to the fact that the described decision is a non-standard, asymmetrical move, behind which full NATO membership is hidden, the hybrid nature of this approach is also evident in the fact that nuclear safety is a civil sphere. At the macro level, it is regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Therefore, the implementation of the cluster is also possible in the format of NATO-IAEA cooperation, where the IAEA is responsible for monitoring, auditing and technical control of the safety of facilities, and NATO is responsible for the defence component, i.e. physical protection, surveillance and response to threats. This would establish the principle that nuclear safety = a component of international defence security. A joint framework with the IAEA could deprive the Russian Federation of arguments about ‘NATO's military expansion,’ as a joint presence in the ‘square’ would acquire a partially civilian mandate. Among other things, (with or without the IAEA) NATO has the opportunity to develop a series of scientific and technical security protocols in the field of nuclear energy.
Three manoeuvres for Ukraine
The idea of Ukraine's ‘cluster’ membership in NATO, where the initial stage is the defence of nuclear facilities, opens up three political and security manoeuvres for Kyiv.
The time manoeuvre. The nuclear cluster becomes an institution that gives the West the opportunity to adapt its political will, legal framework and public opinion to the inevitable — the full mutual opening of clusters between Ukraine and NATO. For Ukraine, this means the opportunity to gain critical time to strengthen its defence-industrial base and deploy a system of full integration with NATO. Every day lived in the format of membership reduces the space for Russia's payback and, by and large, is one of the main reasons why Russia may abandon its tactic of increasing grey zones with their subsequent development.
The manoeuvre of expanding defence clusters. The second strategic field is the prospect of gradually expanding defence clusters. Of course, as part of a broad compromise (peace agreement), Ukraine will have to give up expanding other clusters for a long time, but in 10 years' time, such expansion could extend to cybersecurity and certain critical ports. Each new cluster can be introduced by a separate decision of the North Atlantic Council, without changing the Alliance's charter, but with the agreement of all participants. This creates a mechanism for gradual integration that is politically acceptable even to countries that fear direct confrontation with Russia.
The manoeuvre of broad interpretation of ‘nuclear facility’. The last manoeuvre is legal and technological. It consists of jointly formulating with NATO a flexible definition of a ‘nuclear facility’ that falls under the cluster. The technical parameters of such a definition may in future cover not only classic nuclear power plants, but also:
small modular reactors (SMRs) (or a set of them) that can be deployed near strategic facilities (dams, bridges, power supply nodes);
“auxiliary” spent fuel storages;
Thus, in the future, Ukraine will be able to extend the scope of NATO Article 5 not only to conventional nuclear power plants, but also to a number of critical points, effectively creating a network of ‘energy-defence enclaves’. If we are to speculate, this gives Kyiv unique manoeuvring flexibility: by relocating low-power facilities, it is possible to legally change the geography of NATO guarantees without making formal changes to the Alliance's charter.
Present-day context
Discussions between NATO and EU countries increasingly revolve around two basic scenarios: limited peacekeeping deployment of Western troops on Ukrainian territory after the end of active combat operations; and a less likely option — the creation of a no-fly zone along the Dnipro River. The cluster model of NATO membership would not contradict such initiatives but rather complement them. In addition, we must be honest: the initiatives proposed by Western countries at this stage do not create a systemic guarantee capable of stopping the Kremlin's strategic desire to ruin borders. Russia, realising that such deployments are symbolic in nature, may perceive them just as “temporary signals” rather than as a deterrent. In this meaning, Europe's peacekeeping plans are an attempt to postpone a decision. No symbolic contingents will stop the Kremlin's desire to seize even more Ukrainian territory until it is in NATO. In fact, no one is talking about this openly, ashamed of their indecision, but a race is underway: how much land will Russia manage to seize in the years or decades before Europe matures enough to decide to accept Ukraine into NATO?
China's position on the idea of deploying an international contingent in Ukraine is also illustrative. Beijing insists that any peacekeeping mission must receive a mandate from the UN Security Council. At first glance, this looks like a commitment to international law. In reality, it is an attempt to use its veto power in the Security Council to get a free seat at the table at the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In fact, this position is also beneficial to Russia itself, since any UN decision where it has the right to veto is doomed to paralysis. This is the true nature of Chinese ‘neutrality’: it expands Moscow's room for manoeuvre and weakens the West.
The proposed cluster format of NATO membership is fundamentally undesirable for Beijing because, firstly, it complicates China's strategy of gradually weakening the Alliance and, secondly, it deprives China of the prospect of participating in the Ukrainian nuclear programme, which, judging by statements about reconstruction, it has set its eyes on. From this point of view, this issue may be promising when discussed primarily with the American side.
Summary
Thus, the current geopolitical situation indicates that the West is approaching a critical point in its attitude towards the future security architecture of Ukraine, but is still not ready to finally cross the red line and publicly acknowledge what is acknowledged behind closed doors: Ukraine's security architecture is part of the West's security architecture. There is really only one reason for this unwillingness: the fear of fighting Russia on a ‘broad theatre’ with a morally unprepared, pampered population. Therefore, the West's only policy in response to the challenges remains one of non-escalation.
The proposed cluster format will be viewed with scepticism by the majority. The purpose of this article is to generate a slightly different discourse than the usual ‘Should Ukraine be a member of NATO? Yes/No’. In February 2024, Macron’s statement about placing NATO boots on Ukrainian territory was met with sceptical smiles. A year and a half later, countries are discussing the technical details of that proposal. So why not?
If the UN has long resembled a decaying Rome, captured by barbarians, then the Alliance resembles Byzantium. Which has become an embalmed museum of former power. And which, in the same way, may fall at the feet of a tribe from the East. It clearly lacks managerial dynamism. Sometimes the statements of the Alliance's leadership are simply embarrassing. The cluster concept is a certain level of evolution of NATO itself, which will provide a new tool for interaction with states that are far from full membership in the Alliance but are too important for the West in its struggle against China. The proposed approach combines contractual strictness (legal membership), operational flexibility and political caution. Modular defence architecture (from weapon platforms to NATO structures) is naturally just an adaptation to new types of threats.