EU Army: Myth, Reality, or Urgent Necessity?
Yurii Boiko
Photo: Carnegie Endowment for International Peac
IntroductionRecently, President Zelenskyy reiterated the need for a sufficient and unitized army of European States with an emphasis on the need for change coming from the EU itself. This came to be as news of the new administration in Washington outlined its strategy for resolving Russian aggression without Ukraine or the EU. In light of this, there was an emergency meeting in Paris, where heads of state of the most powerful countries in the EU, the leader of the United Kingdom, and the Secretary of NATO discussed their own strategy and vision for the future of projects of withholding Russian aggression. Even though the first attempt to create the “Army of Europe” did not succeed right away, it is still valuable to outline what major players in the EU and the broader continent think and how they might attempt to resolve issues in the pro-Ukraine camp.
It is also important to reiterate that the emergency meeting in Paris was not part of the European Union’s institutions, even though President von der Leyen was present. Thus, this paper will have a more detailed focus on how EU frameworks might help with the implementation of the European Army.
This paper is written with the assumption that Washington wants to end the war in Ukraine at any cost, even if it means aligning the United States with Russia, Eritrea, North Korea, and others. If Europeans want Ukraine to keep fighting, the federalization and ramp-up of support of Ukraine is required, yet if Europeans do not want to commit to Ukraine, they will have to prepare for war now. In addition, throughout this paper, I will be referencing Europe as its own entity, which is built on economic cooperation, the promotion of individual liberties and human rights, and a rules-based world order.
How did the European strategy on Russia fail?
History of the European Struggle against Russia
The struggle in Europe did not suddenly occur in 2022; both Russian aggression and the threat of Russian aggression have existed on the European continent ever since Russia divided Poland with Austria and Germany, creating a direct threat of hordes of Russians storming into Central Europe. After the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the threat coming from the Russian state, contrary to popular belief, did not disappear. Rather, Soviet Russia focused on the Russian Civil War, rebuilding and advancing on its so-called frontiers.
This timespan included the Ukrainian War of Independence, the Polish-Soviet War, the Finnish War, the Wars of Independence of the Baltic States, and the annexation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Of course, the extent of Russia in the dismantlement of post-World War 1 fragile European Security and the subsequent conquest and occupation of Eastern Europe during World War 2 and the imposition of the Cold War. So, the threat was always there, and just because Russia spent the last 30 years enjoying the spoils from the inherently wrong strategy of appeasement and free market, it does not mean that Europe was safe.
European Union, and more specifically Germany, thought that by introducing Russian natural resources to European markets, they might make them co-dependent and a safe partner.
Russia in European Affairs post-1999
This strategy comes from previous experiences within the European Union, as the whole European project began from a simple Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 between France and Germany, forcing those countries to cooperate rather than continue the long-lasting competition for resources and domination in Europe between the two.
Although the debates of why the strategy of appeasement and partnership with Russia is still ongoing, it is important to outline that both France and Germany were destroyed by World War 2, and their political systems were fragile. This allowed both states to impose the treaty on each other whilst allowing others to freely join if they wished to do so.
Russia did not wish to join Europe in its current form. The “anti-American way of democracy” speech that Putin made in Bratislava in 2005, for a lot of international relations enthusiasts, serves as the moment of “not coming back.”
This speech is important for quite a lot of reasons; it served as a signal to the West that Russia might not be as willing to cooperate as was hoped. Additionally, the timing of the speech is crucial. Putin was not the only one there in Bratislava; a day before him, George W. Bush was also speaking. He had changed the rhetoric surrounding the Iraq War. Now, the American invasion of Iraq was not about Weapons of Mass Destruction; rather, it was about democracy promotion. American media even started calling the January 2005 parliamentary elections the Purple Revolution, taking the inspiration from the Ukraine 2004 Orange Revolution.
Yet, if you look at it as a conclusion of the story rather than a catalyst, everything makes sense. Russia never intended to join the European project and play “the game” by the “established rules,” regardless of what Putin says now. Back in Bratislava, Putin said that they do not need “Western-style” democracy and they will continue respecting their traditions.
By the 2008 Russian transfer of power, Putin consolidated his power, silenced and killed the opposition, completely destroyed the judiciary, consolidated the wealth of the nation in the hands of a few, and started an easy war in Caucasus for future president Medvedev to finish.
Just like Yeltsin did for him. It takes exceptionally unwise politicians who have hoped that Russia will be a part of Europe just because of economic cooperation, and it will take Orban and Fico to still believe in Russia after its blatant invasion of Ukraine.
Why is it important to have a federalized army?
Understanding and Quantifying the Russian Threat
In its current state, Russia is a threat to European Security. Whether the Russian state could, in the future, challenge the whole existence of the European project does not matter because, according to the Danish Defense Intelligence Service, Russia can launch a large-scale war within 5 years and be a threat to the neighboring countries within 6 months.
The current number of Russian troops in Ukraine is more than 620,000, whilst the Russian effort in the rear is still refurbishing the old stockpiles and scaling up the production of new equipment. Quite a lot of finance and economy experts agree that the Russian economy is on a war footing, which does allow higher production rates, yet harder to turn back to civilian economy. equipment, an economy that is focused on expansion, and a state of war, and Neo-Eurasianist foreign affairs theory.
Eurasianism
Eurasianist theory is a viewpoint of Europe and Asia being the same continent and envisions Russia as a main global player in this viewpoint. The closest the world ever got to implementing this was the Russian Empire before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War 2. In both cases, the extent of Moscow’s grasp was sufficient for leaders in London, Paris, and Madrid to seriously consider the Russian threat as something feasible rather than ineffable.
Sarah Dixon Klump, in an article dating back to July 2011 explained Euranism as an
“ideology, which calls for Russia and its “margins” to occupy a median position between Europe and Asia, that their specific features have to do with their culture being a "mix" born of the fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim peoples, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features.”
This definition can be described as partially true. First and foremost, Russia and its vassals do not need to occupy all the land. The example of Ukraine and the Eastern flank of NATO shows that Russia does need to have effective control over that land; rather, the mere threat of possible invasion may stop any programs or movements in those countries.
Another example is the German approach to Russia before 2022, where Russia, through existing mechanisms of lobbying and free markets, effectively appeased the “first responder” to any Russian aggression against states in Eastern Europe. German participation in negotiations during the Minsk Betrayals is just one of the few examples of German political machinery serving the Kremlin’s interests. So, Russia does not have to occupy the land to have de facto control over the land.
Neo-Eurasinist theory, unlike previously, defines the Chinese state as an ally in a fight against the current American-led World Order. Allowance of Chinese troops in Tajikistan, which is in Russia’s sphere of influence, and the training of Chinese soldiers in the Russian vassal state of Belarus proves that, for now, Russia does not only rely on China to help break the world order but also as a strategic partner with whom they might cooperate for broader strategic interests.
Russian economy
The year 2022 saw a historic increase in Russian exports of natural resources. This allowed Russia to soften the economic and financial consequences of its invasion of Ukraine. Since 2023, the Russian government has been running a deficit of 2% of the GDP. In addition, the Russian military budget for 2025 is planned to take 40% of the annual state budget. This does not seem to matter to the Russian government, as its military budget for 2025 was increased by 25% and is now 13.5 trillion rubles, roughly 130 billion euros. But suppose you were to account for the purchasing power parity. In that case, Russia will surpass the military spending of all European countries combined with 462 billion USD, which the Russian state Duma allocated for defense this year. To conclude, Russia has a large number of forces, high reserves of old military equipment eligible for refurbishing, and factories that are working 24/7 to produce new and restore old equipment whilst supporting it with a significant war chest. There are cracks in the Russian economy, overreliance on contract soldiers to restore lost men in Ukraine, inflation, and interest rates, which make the oligarch class in Russia worried about the future and others.
Past attempts of federalisation and challenges in Europe of the EU federalized army
Previous decades saw the European Union reform from a simple economic alliance with passport-free travel(Schengen Agreement) or a Eurozone project. Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the European Union has transformed into something bigger than an economic zone. The introduction of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs with the hope of unifying EU diplomacy and creating a governance structure with a powerful European Parliament to further unify Europe into a cohesive structure.
Another important step was the introduction of the EU Defense Cooperation (PESCO - 2017), which aimed at reducing reliance on NATO and the U.S. for security in the face of the first Trump term in office. Yet, not every attempt at federalization succeeded; larger projects that depend on active cooperation between states, such as the common asylum and migration policy or the policy of Fiscal Union & Eurobonds, were unsuccessful.
But the Fiscal Union and Eurobons, although opposed by Germany and the Netherlands at first, saw progress as the COVID crisis hit the European continent, proving that even stalled projects like Eurobonds may move forward in the eyes of real crises.
European Union is still merely an economic and regulatory alliance. Although in the Treaty of the European Union, some articles and subclauses call for the creation of a common defense effort, it requires the unanimous decision of the European Council, where Mr.Orban and Mr.Fizo represent their respective countries. This effectively makes the most pro-Russian heads of member states hold the future of European Security.
There are ways around it; for example, the empowerment of the European Defense Agency with larger responsibilities or establishing sort of Joint European Defence Initiative, changing its statute or rules only requires a qualified majority of votes in the European Council.
Unlike NATO, where the statute clearly outlines the responsibilities, structure, participants, and other important clauses, TFEU or TEU do not provide clear guidelines on the establishment of joint European Armed Forces. This means that leaders of the member states are in unknown territory, and they have to make fundamental decisions on the same level os the establishment of the European Union itself or the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and they do not have decades to plan and outline everything, as previously.
Challenges in Europe and the EU of federalized army
The phrase “If you want peace, prepare for war” will not apply here, as the members of the European Union are already in a semi-state of war with Russia. There may not be Estonian troops holding off the Russian horde, but there are government agencies that have to fight off Russian cyber-attacks. Russia established a way of warfare against states in Eastern Europe that amounts to “sucker punching” someone when the referee is not watching. Russia may steal Crimea, but Ukraine cannot retaliate; Finland and Sweden’s maritime forces and police have to observe and protect their underwater cables, and if they were to retaliate, they might get a call from Washington where the President, Democrat or Republican, will ask them to proceed with caution. This environment has always existed. Americans largely lack a fundamental understanding of the struggle of the people of Eastern and Central Europe against Russia. This spiraled into the second Trump presidency, where President Macron had to ask Trump if NATO even exists anymore. The correct phrase is not “to prepare for war” anymore; it is “prepare for the war you will be fighting, not the one you are fighting right now.” Ukraine is effectively fighting the future war, where drones are dominating the battlefield. Russian experience with missile stocks showed that no missile is ideal, and the stock runs out fast. This breaks the thinking of the European leaders and militaries, where Germany, for example, only has 350 Taurus missiles, far less than the Russian stockpiles pre-2022. France and the United Kingdom also lack the capacity to scale up the production of overpriced SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles. Although some states have already started the development of new technologies with the cooperation of Ukraine, the scale is far from the one needed to win the war of the future. To be frank, I do not believe that drones or missiles are game changers and define modern warfare. But Europe lacks the conventional forces as well, and Europe is left to play catch up to Russia, even as the war enters its 12th year.
We do not know how the Russian Army will look by the end of the Ukraine war, what capacity it will gain, who will win the peace, and multiple other factors that are required to make a somewhat close analysis or prediction. Yet one thing is clear: the United States cannot be part of the thinking of the European leaders. Bush (43), Trump, and Biden administrations all created issues within the European thinking on security and defense.
There is a chance that the United States will withdraw from NATO, not provide a nuclear umbrella, not commit to defense or intelligence sharing(shout-out to Assad-loving Tulsi Gabbard), or even help foreign countries by blocking their licensing of American weapons. I am not a Taro reader and can’t see into the future, but to not consider that Trump’s America and America in the future is in no way a reliable partner will be a mistake and a crime of every European leader.
Some, if not all, American capabilities in Europe and in space are under threat of non-existence. This includes replacing the already stationed 100,000 US troops with an additional 200,000 Americans needed in case of a war, NATO planners estimated.
According to a Bruegel report. Europe needs roughly 50 new brigades to replace American continents in the continent. In addition, the European Union has to create a command center, aiming to replace the American-led Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, who is always an American General.
This will not replace NATO, nor should it, but not having this command structure if your security is under attack and Americans are not getting involved will result in 29 countries fighting their own wars with no clear cooperation.
The experience of the Ukraine War shows that artillery is still the king of the battlefield.
According to the low-end estimation of the US Army III Corp, Europe will need to have 1400 main battle tanks, 700 artillery pieces, and at least 2000 armored infantry fighting vehicles. This is below the current capacity of all European Armies. Another example from Ukraine shows that artillery is useless if you do not have the shells. North Korea, Iran, and Russia overproduce NATO countries in a number of artillery shells, not to mention the former two have enough stockpiles to fuel the Russian war effort for years.
Europe also has to have a satellite system, not only for intelligence gathering but for connection as well. Systems like Starlink proved themselves on the battlefield, allowing the Ukrainian military to cooperate while providing critical connections to civilians.
Nearly 43 million people live in the Baltic States and in Poland, all of whom will be under threat of living life without water, electricity, and connection to an outside world from day one of any possible future invasion. Russian indecisiveness in the destruction of the Ukrainian power grid, as well as Ukrainian resistance from day one, helped Ukraine to survive. I am not sure Russia will make the same mistakes twice.
Russians learned from the Ukraine war and have experience fighting and destroying tactical and strategic AAA and SAM systems. Recent trends show the usage of not only Shahed (Geran) drones but also dud drones whilst sending salvos of missiles. This confuses the radars and the operators of SAM systems. Both SAM systems and the ammunition for them are currently lacking, and the production is not enough for Ukraine itself, not to mention the possible defense of European skies.
Another battle will be the skies. American and broader NATO structure rely on not only Air Supremacy but Total Air Dominance for its military operations.
Crucial in both Desert Storm and the invasion of Iraq in 2004 were the F-117 Nighthawks and other stealth-oriented aerial platforms, which were allowed to circle the best-defended city in the world for hours unnoticed before firing their salvos. The critical enablers are what the European Army lacks; tankers, AWACS, and other systems are is deficit. The proven air forces of Europe lack the capacity to operate stealth aircraft, which is crucial in the aerial denial strategy that the Russians will surely force upon Europe.
The Russian air force suffered in the early stages of the invasion, yet apart from a few breakaway moments in Bryansk and Zaporizhia in 2023, they have been saving their aircraft. Moreover, it is not the planes that Russians are in need of; they are outproducing their losses. They need pilots, and if we were to assume that Russians will have 4-5 years of a break between the end of the Ukraine war and the start of their challenge to European Security, they will have sufficient time to train and test new pilots.
Conclusion
Years of peace had softened the state of European armies. In a debate about welfare or war, Europeans chose welfare, yet war is on our doorstep. The current state of European Armies may not serve as a sufficient deterrence against millions of Russians who might be conscripted to advance the wishes of the Russian government to establish the Eurasian sphere of influence. Previous attempts by the German and French governments of deterrence through economic and trade cooperations failed spectacularly, and now Europe has to decide the future of European National security. A lot of statements of support for the Ukrainian war effort were made over the years, but three years of Ukrainian resistance did not serve as a wake-up call to Europe.
Amidst the transition of power in Washington, it was made clear that America would follow through on its promise to eventually pass the torch of European defense to Europeans. This retreat showcases the lack of European strategic capabilities, starting with sufficient nuclear deterrence, clear military structures of the collective European Army, or the space and communication assets that Americans provided before.
Now, Europeans have to decide on how to win possible peace in Ukraine and how to stop future Russian aggression. In addition to that, each national parliament of member states of the EU, each leader, and every executive and legislative branch of the EU have to decide if the project, which started as a simple common coal production treaty and ended with the biggest economic alliance in the world, can join China, Russia, and United Stared as an actual player in the world of international relations and deal with threats to European Security.
As Napolean Bonaparte said, “Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious than to be able to decide.” Maybe it is finally time to decide. Otherwise, leaders of European countries will not be able to hide behind the backs of Ukrainians and will have to answer to the future generations of men and women of a continent filled with graveyards of indecision.