Potential bias of Witkoff as the main representative of the peace talks
Photo: AP/Evan Vucci
1) When Special Representative Kellogg made several statements about the involvement of Europe in the negotiation process.
2) The publication of an article in the Washington Post, which actually artificially created “Kellogg's bias” through his daughter: ‘Megan Mobbs, Kellogg's daughter, is the president of the RT Weatherman Foundation, a charity that has been helping Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war’, — the main narrative of the article.
These moments make it possible to assert that the restriction of Kellogg's powers and the expansion of Witkoff's powers were some kind of planned process, a certain group of influence in the White House.
Witkoff's potential interest in the deal with Moscow
Witkoff was in charge of negotiations in the Middle East. The first information about the current outcome of the negotiations was negative. But the situation changed rapidly at the end of 2024. Formally, the Biden administration was still functioning, but from the end of November, Witkoff was already involved in the Middle East negotiations.
The Gaza deal began to move forward in the first weeks of January, when Hamas loosened a number of its demands.
It can be assumed that this could have been due to the involvement of Moscow, which had close contacts with Hamas (on 27 October 2023, representatives of the terrorists visited Moscow) and contacts with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Obviously, in addition to official connections, Moscow maintained close non-public connections. This is underlined by the fact that at the end of February 2024, Moscow planned to hold an inter-Palestinian meeting in Moscow, inviting all Palestinian factions, including Hamas.
Then the picture looks like this:
On 28-30 December, a special Il-96-300 aircraft arrives in the United States with a Moscow delegation (possibly with Putin's envoy Dmitriev). Certain agreements are reached during this time. Suppose that, among other things, Moscow's involvement in a ceasefire in Palestine was outlined.
Since January, the ceasefire agreement has been moving forward:
7 January — Keith Kellogg postpones his visit to Kyiv. At the time, it was at least until 20 January. Probably already during this period, Kellogg was being replaced by Witkoff.
13 January — According to Reuters, Putin met with Dmitriev. According to an official transcript of the meeting published on the Kremlin's website, they discussed investments by the Russian Direct Investment Fund, which are estimated at 2.3 trillion rubles ($22.53 billion).
15 January — Biden confirms the Hamas deal, and on 20 January, during his inauguration, Trump uses the agreement as the first success he has achieved before taking office.
From 20 January, the Trump administration avoids commenting on the connections with Moscow, which it will eventually reveal to the world due to media pressure, but before that:
On 8 February, a Gulfstream G650ER aircraft departs the United States. Initially, Moscow claimed that this was not related to contacts with the US side, but on 9-10 February it became known that Special Representative Witkoff was on the plane. The process of releasing Moscow's prisoner, Mark Vogel, probably took more than a day. Therefore, it is appropriate to note that this should have been preceded by a process of negotiations and approval, which Washington and Moscow kept hidden from the rest of the world.
On the same day (10 February), there was an actual information attack on Kellogg through his daughter. It was a Washington Post article.
On 18 February, talks between the United States and Moscow took place in Saudi Arabia.
And on 19 February, the Palestinian president called these talks between the Moscow-American delegation ‘the peak of wise policy’ (this news was later removed from the Internet by Moscow's special services). This moment shows that the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations most likely became the basis for strengthening contacts between the United States and Moscow through their special representatives: Witkoff and Special Representative Dmitriev, who is well acquainted with the Middle East through the activities of the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
This course of events indicates that the Middle East deal (with Hamas) was mediated by Moscow, where the subject of the exchange was further US-Moscow negotiations in Riyadh, which Moscow used both to destroy its own isolation and to try to push Europe and Ukraine out of the negotiation process. In order to achieve this, beforehand, a group of influencers inside the United States removed Kellogg as an obstacle, who was inclined to involve Europe in the negotiation process and was preparing relevant visits.
By the group of influence, we mean a certain informal association in the White House that includes: Musk, Trump Jr, Trump's son-in-law Kushner, Vance and Witkoff, who are in favour of the rapid restoration of commercial ties with Moscow, even at the cost of the vital interests of US allies in Europe.
This thesis is also confirmed by the fact that the US press has published a number of reports that the White House intends to involve Moscow in negotiations with Iran to reach an agreement on freezing Tehran's nuclear programme, which partially depends on Moscow's support.
This thesis was confirmed by the fact that the recent conversation between Trump and Putin on Ukraine included the topic of Iran's nuclear programme. The White House was quick to issue a public statement on the matter: ‘Trump and Putin agreed during their conversation that Iran should never be in a position to be able to destroy Israel’, which obviously refers to Iran's nuclear programme, with which Moscow is currently helping Tehran.
If we take as true the information in The Telegraph article of 05 March 2025, which states that Witkoff is one of those who oppose the renewal of dialogue with Ukraine after the events during Zelenskyy's visit to the White House, then this position of the special representative can be explained by the agreements reached by Witkoff in contacts with the Moscow side:
Moscovia's participation in the Middle East deal.
Moscovia's participation in the Iran nuclear deal.
Resources. A plan to loosen sanctions against Moscovia
The unconventionally subtle diplomatic behaviour of Moscovia (different from the classic, usually extremely aggressive one) emphasises the fact that a separate group is engaged in negotiations on behalf of the Kremlin. The rapid growth of Dmitriev's popularity in Putin's circle suggests that Dmitriev is probably responsible for the current successes in the negotiations (‘’the strategy of negotiations'').
Moreover, Dmitriev also appeared in the report of the US Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who investigated Moscow's interference in the 2016 US presidential election. Mueller discovered that before Donald Trump's inauguration in 2017, Dmitriev met with Eric Prince, a Trump's sponsor, in the Seychelles.
Dmitriev then used his contacts with Goldman Sachs. The NYT described the situation (in 2016) as follows:
‘Dmitriev, the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and an unofficial spokesman for President Vladimir V. Putin, sent a text message to a Lebanese-American friend with close ties to the Trump campaign. Mr Dmitriev wanted to quickly contact someone in Mr Trump's inner circle, preferably Donald Trump Jr or Jared Kushner. By the end of the month, he contacted Rick Gerson, a friend of Mr Kushner (Trump's son-in-law) who runs a hedge fund in New York. They discussed a possible investment joint venture.’
The Mueller report reveals the depth of ties between the Trump campaign and Russians. Donald J. Trump and 18 of his associates had at least 140 contacts with Russian nationals and WikiLeaks or their intermediaries during the 2016 campaign and the presidential transition. Photo: nytimes.com
Instead, Putin allowed some Western funds (purely American) to sell Russian securities, Bloomberg reports.
According to the published edict, Putin allowed the US-registered fund 683 Capital Partners LP to buy securities of Moscow companies previously owned by about a dozen of Western investment and hedge funds. Among the funds that were allowed to sell their assets were Franklin Advisers Inc., Templeton Asset Management Ltd. and Baillie Gifford Overseas Ltd.
Thanks to his position at the Direct Investment Fund, Dmitriev has many connections in the Middle East — in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE - and the same business interests as Witkoff/Kushner.
It can be assumed that Dmitriev has used the same contacts (through Kushner) that in 2016-17 allowed him to communicate with Trump's environment. As in 2016-17, Dmitriev used his business contacts to attract the interest of certain individuals in Trump's surrounding.
Does Kushner provide a communication bridge between the US and Moscow?
This is the main question. Assuming that both Kushner and Witkoff are well-connected, it is quite possible to build a Putin-Dmitriev-Kushner-Witkoff-Trump contact chain.
The most sustainable connection between Kushner and Witkoff can be ensured by Musk. Musk has good, even friendly, relations with Trump's son-in-law Kushner. But the most interesting point is the event at the end of 2022.
On 19 December 2022, Musk and Kushner were filmed together at the FIFA World Cup final in Qatar. One of the reasons for Musk's interest in football was the need to find Qatari-Saudi investors to acquire Twitter (Qatar Holding and Kingdom Holding Co).
Kushner, who had the relevant contacts, helped Musk with this need, and at the same time wanted to provide Trump with media support (for example, Trump is grateful to Kushner for the support of the Mexican media network Grupo Televisia, which provided Trump with additional Latino votes).
Kushner was Trump's informal media director, who arranged media support, financing of Trump's campaign and the purchase of Twitter — this is one of the components of the strategy.
We are interested in the fact that one of Musk's investors in the purchase of Twitter was Witkoff, and this is publicly recorded in the report.
There were also reports on the Internet that Kushner was also a participant (stakeholder) in the negotiations in the Middle East between Hamas and Israel, as he has a corresponding business, among other things, via investments in Phoenix Holdings.
Eventually, the situation turned out to be as follows:
Witkoff, a close friend and business partner of Trump, reached the current agreement between Israel and Hamas (apparently through contacts with Moscow).
Witkoff and Co (Kushner?) propose to reach a ‘deal’ with Iran via Moscovia's mediation.
Dmitriev, on the part of Moscow, is responsible for direct contacts with Trump's environment
and for the direction that is generally called ‘sanctions relief’.Dmitriev ensures a coordinated response from Moscow (e.g., statements about resources), which enhances the ability of Witkoff and Co. to keep Trump interested.
What does this situation dictate to Ukraine?
As long as Witkoff holds the position of special envoy, and Musk has more influence than a staff member like Rubio or Waltz in the White House, it is extremely dangerous for Ukraine to get involved in actual peace negotiations in this format, as there is a direct threat of bias from the US, which is pursuing a ‘`divide and rule’ deal with Moscovia, where Ukraine is only an object of interest.
However, Ukraine is in a vulnerable position, so one of the acceptable strategies that Kyiv is pursuing is to publicly declare its readiness to negotiate, but to delay the process by non-public methods, or to create a duplicate process (together with Europe). At the same time, this delay should buy time to wait for Musk's position to weaken during the internal political competition in the United States.
The Weakening of Musk — will weaken the Kushner—Witkoff ties and potentially strengthen the White House's personnel politicians. Strengthening of White House staff politicians will potentially reduce Witkoff's influence on the current negotiation process and allow Ukraine to try to recover its own position in this process.