OSINT Analysis: Tanks, Bases, and Factories of Muscovy as of Early 2025

There have been reports of problems in the motorised component of Moscow's troops actively discussed online and in professional communities, as the Moscovite army has been using civilian cars for assault purposes, various kinds of improvised vehicles, and in individual cases, using domestic animals for logistics between positions.

To analyse trends in the armour potential of Moscow's occupation forces, The Resurgam Analytical Centre, together with the team of the Viyskovyy Vishchun online community, decided to update last year's study of Moscow's reserves at storage bases, which was conducted in cooperation with Mortis Aeterna.

And we will start from the end. Here are some of the conclusions drawn during the research.

Conclusions reached during the implementation of the research.

During the calculations, we had to take into account the units that had previously been considered scrap metal. The reason for this step was that new images from most storage bases showed activity in the ‘cemeteries’ area.
In other words, in those areas of the bases where equipment was chaotically located, the restoration of which was almost equivalent to making a new unit from scratch, and sometimes even longer and more expensive, the new images recorded activity for the first time in three years. Therefore, even empty ‘bodies’ were counted as a unit of equipment. Although logically, it would seem that we should not have done so...
The count of tanks in storage bases based on images as of February 2025 showed us that since 2022, 2069 tanks of various types have been removed from open-type storage bases (i.e., in the open air). We also estimate that up to 2,000 tanks were stored under closed storage (i.e. in hangars), and as the best units, tanks from hangars were removed primarily, as evidenced by a number of images showing no activity near hangars for a long time.
In total, from 2022 to 2025, Moscovia has decommissioned, according to our estimates, more than 4,000 tanks of various types, which is 54%, or almost all tanks, which were in good condition for restoration. As a result, it is important to note that the rate of tank removal from storage bases has dropped significantly. While thousands of tanks were removed annually from 2022 to 2024, from February 24 to February 25, the number of tanks removed from open storage was only 342.
At the same time, 3,463 are still at the main storage bases, which indicates the exhaustion of easily repairable tanks. This is because armoured vehicle factories need more and more time to restore a unit of equipment.
Meanwhile, there are still 1253 tanks on the sites of the armoured vehicle plants themselves. It is worth noting that the number of tanks began to decline for the first time from 1,500 in February 2024. This indicates a drop in the rate of receipt of military equipment from storage bases.
So in total, there are about 4,716 tanks at storage bases and armoured vehicle repair plants. However, it is crucial to understand that most of them will not be restored or will be used as donors of spare parts for the restoration and maintenance of existing tanks.In general, we estimate that about 1,200 tanks can still be restored from storage faster than being produced from scratch. The rest would be equivalent in time to producing a unit from scratch, which would have a catastrophic impact on the replacement of losses. We will discuss the arguments for this assessment and the calculation below.
Counting AFVs. Since the images we received and acquired included the main storage areas for armoured fighting vehicles: from BMP-1/2/3, BMD, MTLB, MTLB (u) to APCs 50/60/70, we decided to count them as well. AFVs, from tracked to wheeled, stored at the main storage bases, decreased by 43%, or by 3,252 out of 7,445 recorded at the surveyed bases as of 2021.

It is worth mentioning that as a starting point in 2021, we take the data of Jompi and Coverta Cabala researchers who conducted a detailed study of these aspects.

Also, before considering each base, I think it is worth mentioning some interesting related observations.

At the Moscow storage bases, they began to sort through the ‘graveyards of equipment’, in addition to the equipment that was in storage. This was recorded for the first time during the observation period and indicates a high level of exhaustion of the available suitable stocks at the storage bases to recover losses.
Winter images for different periods of 2024/25, snow tracks and other surveillance tools allow us to record an almost complete absence of movement in the area of covered storage facilities (i.e. near hangars).
While at the beginning of 2024 some movements of equipment from the garages were recorded at some bases, as of December 2024/January 2025, there were no such movements. This gives us a certain opportunity to confirm that the equipment from the garages, as the most suitable for restoration, has already been removed from storage and has been sent either to the battlefield or to factories for restoration.
To compensate for the losses of the main Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), the deconservation of BTR-60/70 has begun. The shift in decommissioning from BTR-1/2, MT-LB, MT-LB(u) to less protected and wheeled BTR-60/70 indicates that the first mentioned vehicles are depleted and cannot be restored quickly.
Repair plants started using equipment stored in their own storage areas. The equipment in these areas at the ARMORED REPAIR PLANT (ARP) was most often dismantled for export orders or upgrades and stored without being moved for more than 10-15 years. This indicates that the leftovers at the storage bases are of approximately the same quality as the equipment that was cannibalised many years ago at the sites of the repair plants.
In 2022-2023, the massive amount of equipment brought in from storage bases gradually began to decrease in waiting areas, especially in the tank component. We estimate that in the second half of 2025, the restoration and modernisation of T-80 tanks will be finished due to the fact that they are depleted at storage bases and waiting areas at ARPs.
By the second half of 2025, tanks in ‘satisfactory condition’ suitable for more or less rapid restoration will be exhausted. There will be units that will require actual restoration from scratch, which will require appropriate financial and time costs.
From the second half of 2025, the main focus of restoration will shift to T-62 and T-55, which, although in poor condition, like the T-72 in storage, will be easier to restore when it comes to the need to restore from scratch.
According to our observations, the analysis of the movement of equipment from bases and ARPs, as well as the available data on the rate of restoration, provide an approximate (I emphasise approximate) correlation between the rate of restoration/production of tanks: in 2022, up to 120 units per month (or up to 1500 per year). By the end of 2023, the rate had dropped to 90 units (or 1,100 units per year). But this rate of tank production (by production we mean restoration + production) covered approximately the current annual losses of the Moscow army.

By the end of 2024, the average production rate had dropped to 50 tanks per month (600 tanks per year), which is significantly lower than the rate of losses, given the need to replace 1200-1300 tanks per year.

Initial observations in 2025 estimate the production rate at 30-35 units per month (or 360-400 tanks per year), with the potential for a sharp drop in the recovery rate at the end of the first half of 2025. The drop in the rate will be primarily due to the exhaustion of T-80s suitable for restoration and modernisation.

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

So what we see is that from the second half of 2025, the current rate of replacement of the Moscow army's tank losses will hypothetically cover no more than 30% of the current losses at the front.

Therefore, the population of tanks will rapidly decline from 2025 onwards, which in turn will lead to a decrease in the involvement of military equipment in assaults. And this will increase infantry losses during assaults, with consequences for the aggressor's economy.

Our conclusions are not a statement that Moscovia will be ‘without military equipment’. Moscow is capable of producing and will be able to restore equipment from its bases for some time as well. However, the intensity of the use of armoured vehicles in assaults will continue to decline due to a decline in the ability to replace losses. This, in turn, will lead to a corresponding increase in infantry losses and an increased burden on the Moscovia's budget for recruiting new soldiers and providing them with supplies.

In this case, the Moscow command will face a dilemma: either to slow down the pace of the offensive to reduce the need for armoured vehicles, or to reduce the involvement of vehicles in assaults and accept the increase in infantry losses with the corresponding military and economic consequences.

If the Moscow command attempts to maintain the current offensive pace by increasing the use of infantry, this will inevitably lead to a proportional increase in losses in the absence of sufficient motorised support.

For example, by 24 February 2022, the Muscovite army had a total of about 3,200 tanks. Between 2022 and 2024, Moscovia created 11 additional divisions, which, according to calculations (approximately 187 to 210 tanks per division), should have brought the number of tanks to 5,000-5,100.

However, according to the data of the US intelligence community and comments by various intelligence agencies, including the Ukrainian one, there were about 2,200 tanks in Ukraine and near the border in early 2024. Given the fact that at the end of the second half of 2024, the rate of losses exceeded the level of recovery, as of 2025, the Moscow formation has less than 2,000 tanks in Ukraine and near the border, according to our estimates. Or up to 40% of the required number of tanks.

In 2025, the Moscow industry will hypothetically produce, restore, and repair up to 400 units. That is, hypothetically, the grouping can have 2400 tanks, but taking into account the losses on the battlefield in 2025, if Moscow tries to maintain the pace of equipment deployment at the level of 2022/23/24, this will lead to the loss of 1200 tanks in 2025, which will reduce the total number of tanks to 1200 units in combat formations by the end of 2025 (i.e. 2400 that could be available with production, minus 1200 tanks).

And this is only 23% of the required number of tanks. In the future, with each production cycle, the rate of tank production will decrease due to the poorer quality of the units that will be restored.

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

Since 80% of the so-called manufactured tanks are recovered from storage bases, and only up to 20% are produced from scratch, this component will continue to be depleted. Of course, this will happen if the intensity and involvement of equipment is maintained.

The current production from scratch, according to the British International Institute for Strategic Studies, from 17 May 2022 to 6 May 2024, shows that Moscovia produced 164 T-90M tanks, or about 80 tanks per year.

These are the only tanks that Moscovia can produce from scratch. Although even these 80 units per year may include a certain amount of upgrading from T-90s, more than 100 of which were in storage, to the T-90M version.

As a result, reduced mechanisation will lead to increased losses and will increase pressure on the Moscow budget: from payments for the dead and wounded, to the maintenance of demobilised soldiers who have been injured, to the necessity to increase costs to attract new soldiers and to provide them with supplies.

Therefore, we emphasise that it is important to consider the decline in Moscow's ability to restore lost equipment not in the context of ‘run out of tanks, run out of war’. No. This is the wrong approach. There will always be a certain number of tanks and other armoured vehicles (because they are being manufactured), but their insufficient production rates to replace losses trigger other processes, from economic to political and social.

Therefore, this information on storage bases and restoration rates should be considered in conjunction with other factors, including: ‘what will be affected’ and what will be the consequences for the economy, etc.

It is also worth mentioning how much recovery potential is left in storage facilities?

We counted 3,463 tanks at storage bases. There are about 1253 more tanks at the waiting areas of ARPs. The total is 4716. But we should understand that not all of these tanks can and will be restored due to their technical condition.

For example, out of the total 4716 tanks, about 650 are T-64s, which cannot be restored due to the need for components manufactured in Ukraine. The only chance is smuggling, but how widespread it can be, considering that a certain number of T-64s are already in service in the Moscow army and need maintenance - it is a matter of debate.

That leaves about 4000+ tanks. Out of these, about 2/3 are tanks in extremely poor technical condition and therefore need to be restored almost from scratch. So most of them will likely be used as donors, and only a small part will be used for restoration in the last instance.

Therefore, only about 1,200 tanks can be restored somehow after overhaul, which will require more time and money, but will be slightly faster than production from scratch.Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

Eventually, Moscow's defence industry still has something to restore, but the question arises of the ‘rate of restoration’, which is rapidly decreasing along with the exhaustion of suitable equipment at storage bases.

We can already see in various ways that Moscow's troops are experiencing problems with mechanisation. The available equipment still enables them to conduct mechanised assaults, but production is no longer able to compensate for current losses.

Below, we will look at the interesting points for each of the bases separately and take a look at their local features.

22nd storage base

There are few changes in tanks.

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

This is due to the fact that the base has almost completely exhausted its potential. Of the 850 tanks at the base in 2021, 116 T-80 U/UD and T-80V/ VB tanks remained. The remains of the worst tanks were systematised and grouped in a separate area.

It is likely that the last T-80 units will be shipped to the ARPs closer to mid-2025, when they run out of tanks at the Omsktransmash site, which is engaged in the restoration and modernisation of T-80s. In the second half of 2025, the base can be considered ‘empty’.

Out of the 116 remaining tanks, about half are the Kharkiv version of the T-80UD. Due to the technical specifics of the design, it will be almost impossible to restore these vehicles without smuggling in scarce components (Kharkiv engines).

The worst remaining T-80 units have been systematically grouped at the 22nd base. Maxar

On AFVs.

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

A certain number of BMP-1s in mediocre condition were withdrawn. At the current rate, by the beginning of summer 2025, the base will be left with only a graveyard area.

A large number of BMP-1 units have been removed from the 22nd base. Maxar

111st storage base

On tanks

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

There were no particularly big movements compared to 2024. Out of a fleet of 890 tanks as of 2021, about 260 remained as of February 2025. These are mostly T-55s and T-62s in poor condition. Their use will potentially begin in the second half of 2025, when the stock of T-80s for renovation is completely exhausted.

On the AFVs

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

The situation is much more interesting. Active movements have begun in the area of the graveyard where the BMP-1s were located. In previous years, no activity was recorded in this area due to the terrible condition of the available machinery in this area of the ‘’graveyard‘’. In fact, there are previously dismantled vehicles there that were declared worthless and dragged away to the ‘disposal’ zone.

Now, some of the vehicles from this area are being dragged to the central part of the base (probably the workshops) and then returned to their original location. Traces in the snow also confirm these manipulations with the vehicles. The hulls of the armoured fighting vehicles disappeared from the graveyard at first, and after a while they reappeared, but in a different sector of the graveyard.

Such increased activity in the area of waste vehicles indicates that the vehicles are being sorted out for spare parts for potential donation to other vehicles. The machine is unblocked from the others, pulled to the centre of the base, sorted out, its parts removed and returned to a new location in the disposal area so that it is not confused with other machines that will later experience the same cycle.

Red markings indicate BMP-1 vehicles, chaotically moved from the graveyard zone of the 111th base. Maxar

Blue markings indicate the relocation of dismantled vehicles to the graveyard zone, where they were previously absent. Maxar

2544th storage base

On tanks.

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

Of the 436 tanks at the beginning of 2021, 277 remained as of January 2025. The remaining tanks were withdrawn in 2022/23. Since 2024, there has been almost no movement of military equipment.

Interestingly, out of the dozens of tanks that have disappeared since the last count, T-72s without turrets have begun to disappear. Perhaps they were transported to Kuberkovo to be used as donors or as a tracked base for some units of special military equipment.

Among the removed tanks, T-72 units without turrets are noticeable. Maxar

On the AFVs

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

After the depletion of the most suitable BMP-1/2 for restoration, the deconservation of BTR-60/70 began. The BTR-60/70, which have a wheelbase, are less protected and in a terrible condition, but are probably in better condition than the remaining BMP-1s at the base. Therefore, the BTR-60/ 70 will be more suitable for restoration than the remaining BMP-1s.

This detail indicates the practical exhaustion of BMP-1/ 2 that are suitable for restoration. In other words, not the kind of restoration that would be comparable in time and cost to producing a unit from scratch. BTR-60/70 were hardly moved from 2022 to 2024.Mass decommissioning of BTRs in the worst condition. Maxar

769th storage base

On tanks

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

The base holds most of the T-62s in storage - more than 800 units. However, after the most suitable ones were decommissioned in 2022, there was virtually no activity around the tanks at the base in the following years. There were only isolated cases of cannibalisation of vehicles. Most of the T-62s are in a terrible condition and are described as ‘better dead than alive’, but we still take them into account. It is better to proceed from the worst-case scenario.

Complete lack of activity in the T-62 zone after the removal of serviceable vehicles. Maxar

On AFVs

Similar to other bases, interesting activity is observed around the BMP graveyard. Once again, I would like to point out that this is not a storage area for conservation equipment, but rather a ‘’graveyard‘’ area where technical remnants for disposal are located. They used to be for disposal. And they began to pull away and disperse these AFVs in the central part of the base to ensure free access to them from any side.

Probably, this is done in order to sort out several units and assemble a single serviceable one on the spot. Or they can be used solely as spare parts donors. No activity is observed at other sites of the base, which indicates that most of the units are ‘used up’ and require at least long-term restoration ( in fact, from scratch).

Activity in the graveyard zone: BMPs are being randomly extracted and dispersed in the central part of the base. Maxar

6018th storage base

On tanks

Out of the 200 tanks that were at the base in 2021, about 59 units remained, including empty hulls. These tanks are in the worst technical condition and have not been moved since 2023.

On AFVs.

There are no vehicles left in good condition. The 436 remaining BMP-1 and BTR-80 units include the worst condition models and in most cases can only be restored from an empty hull. As at other bases, the so-called ‘’graveyards‘’ have started to show the movement of vehicles. In one area, the BMPs were placed in a staggered pattern to ensure free access.

Dispersed BMP-1 units are being cannibalized for spare parts. Maxar

Empty BMP hulls have disappeared from the graveyard zone. Maxar

The goal, as at previous bases, is to turn several units into one working unit or to use them as a spare parts donor. At another site, where the worst examples of BMPs were stored, up to two dozen BMP-1s were removed in a chaotic order, indicating the search for those suitable for restoration.

As for all the bases, it will be relevant to add that there is almost no evidence of vehicle movement near the covered storage garages (tracked by footprints, especially in winter). This point confirms the thesis that the covered storage equipment was removed in previous years as it was in the best condition. Now the garages are empty. There could potentially have been from 1,500 to 2,000 tanks inside the garages, not including other equipment, as the available parking spaces allowed.

Armoured repair plants (ARPs)

General trend of the ARPs

1) After the massive delivery of equipment from storage bases for restoration in 2022/23, the number of vehicles in waiting areas sharply increased. And this overcrowding of waiting areas persisted from 2022/23 to early 2024. It was only in 2024 that it gradually began to decline, as fewer batches of equipment arrived for restoration from storage bases. The reason for this has already been discussed several times: the exhaustion of suitable equipment for relatively quick restoration.
2) There are significantly fewer cases of equipment being brought from storage bases to waiting areas.
3) According to superficial estimates, but based on long-term observations, the rate of tank restoration at ARPs has dropped from 120-150 per month in 2022 to 30-35 as of the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025. This conclusion is based on the rate at which tanks are being deconserved from storage bases, tendencies, movement in the waiting area of the ARPs, and other indicators. Of course, the numbers on the pace are subjective estimates, but these estimates have a number of confirmations.

103rd ARP

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

The number of tanks in the waiting area decreased from 700 as of February 2024 to 525 as of February 2025. For the first time, the plant switched to using T-62s from its own storage area. This area had been untouched for more than 10 years and was previously used to restore other machines. These processes show that the T-62s remaining in the storage bases are in no better condition than the previously partially cannibalised T-62s on the plant site. This makes it impractical to transport them from the storage base to the plant's waiting area.

T-62 tanks have been removed from the waiting area. Maxar

560th ARP

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

There are no major changes. The plant's capacities are busy restoring BMPs and BMD-2s. It seems that the plant is not engaged in tank restoration. As in the previous year, there are about a hundred tanks on its site.

Omsktransmash

Calculation by the analytical community Resurgam and the OSINT group Viyskovyi Vishchun

A satellite image showed the arrival of T-80 tanks. This is likely to the last usable batch of T-80s to be delivered to the plant. There are 473 tanks stored at the plant, but it is unlikely that all of them will be restored and sent to the frontline. Many units have been cannibalised. There is no confirmation that the production of specifically T-80 tanks from scratch will be resumed. The plant is currently doing restoration/modernisation. By the summer of 2025, the vast majority of donors will have been used up and the pace of recovery will begin to drop significantly.

Conclusion

Trends on the frontline show a sharp increase in the use of civilian vehicles for assaults on Ukrainian positions by the occupation army of Moscovia. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the number of destroyed vehicles of the occupants skyrocketed from 1,000 per month at the beginning of the second half of 2024 to 3,000 by the end of the year.The rate of destruction of Moscow’s military vehicles continues

The increase in the number of destroyed Moscow vehicles is connected to both the development of UAVs in the Ukrainian army and the use of converted civilian vehicles for assault missions by the Moscow army. This jump in vehicle destruction cannot be attributed solely to the development of UAVs or the intensity of the battles.

At the same time, the rate of losses of tanks and other armoured vehicles began to fall due to fewer cases of their involvement in assaults. Approximately by half. From 300-400 recorded cases of damage and destruction of tanks in September-November 2024 to 200-240 in December 2024-January 2025.

The same trends are recorded not only in the data of the Ukrainian General Staff, but also in other Western OSINT researches.

The exhaustion of storage bases leads to a drop in the rate of restoration of equipment at the ARPs due to the increasingly poor quality of the samples received for restoration. The slowdown in restoration rates is beginning to create a shortage of military equipment in combat units. The longer the Moscow command tries to maintain the intensity of the fighting, the more critical this deficit becomes, eventually leading to a dilemma of choice: reduce the intensity or compensate for the lack of sufficient equipment with infantry.

Reducing the armoured and motorised component and increasing infantry assaults will lead to higher casualties. Higher casualties will require additional replacement funds from the budget. Additional replacement funds increase the burden on the budget and accelerate stagflationary trends in the Moscow economy, and so on with each lap of the cycle. As each cycle goes through a spiral, the negative effects become more severe, eventually turning the trends into a strategic factor.

That is why we are watching the storage bases and factories, not to tell you when Moscow will run out of tanks.