Japan is changing its asymmetrical relationship with the United States. How might this affect the world and Moscow's invasion of Ukraine?
* Moscovia is the historically accurate name of the Russian Federation
In the 1990s, Brzezinski and his team wrote that in the coming decades, Japan would face a choice of four possible strategies in its foreign policy:
First — asymmetrics. Maintaining asymmetric relations with the United States. Despite its economic position as a leading country in foreign and security policy, Japan will voluntarily remain an continuation of American foreign policy. Japan has maintained this relationship for many decades from the time of the 2 World War II until recent years, focusing exclusively on economic performance, while Tokyo has shifted security and foreign policy in the region and the world mainly to the United States.
Second — global mercantilism. He advocates Japan's continued focus on economic performance, but a more proactive regional foreign policy to establish additional economic relations (including with China), while maintaining an asymmetric security relationship with the United States. It means, on the one hand, to balance and, on the other hand, to continue to depend on the United States in security matters. In recent decades, Japan has alternated this strategy with explicit “asymmetry” depending on the government.
Third — proactive realists. It is believed that Japan has sufficient economic power and democratic tradition to reduce the world's concerns about the experience of “imperial Japan” and to claim international recognition and an independent foreign policy not in “dependence” but in “partnership with the United States.” In other words, to become at least a full-fledged regional power with an independent international policy and security forces, to go beyond being a merely economic leader.
Fourth — international visionary. To be “above” regional and global rivalries and to focus on the “global agenda” (global security, environmental safety, etc.).
It is increasingly evident that, due to developments over the past two years, Japan is laying the groundwork for the transition to the third strategy, “creating an equivalent partnership with the United States and strengthening independence in foreign and security policy.” Why do we think so?
Over the past year, Japan has begun to pursue a number of unusual “independent” security policies not under the US umbrella, but in “partnership with the United States.”
Initially, Japan planned to double its military budget by 2027 from 1.1% of GDP to 2.2%. According to forecasts, Japan's defense budget will move from 9th place in the world to 3rd or 4th place.
Further, Japan began to formalize “independent regional alliances,” acting not on behalf of the United States, but as a country claiming regional leadership. That is, Japan began to include not only economic leadership, but also an independent proactive foreign and security policy.
Now Japan is concentrating potentially three key components that will allow it to move to a proactive international policy and go beyond “Japanese non-military”:
Economic.
Independent cooperation with Taiwan is aimed at building a network of production facilities for critical microchips and processors. Localization of Taiwanese TSMC production in Japan and a $1.3 billion subsidy for the American chipmaker Micron.
Apparently, Japan wants to localize the critical production of microchips and circuits, both Taiwanese and American, and this is related to both technological and defense production, which is an element of economic and national security. The United States do the same, only they localize such production in their country. Therefore, it can be assumed that the actions of the United States and Japan are coordinated, but not interdependent with the US foreign policy will as it was before, but are laid down within the framework of separate “foreign policy strategies that are not one whole, but are interrelated.”
Further, Japan has signed partnerships with Canada and Australia, with indirect involvement of Chile, to provide itself with rare earth metals needed for technological production, primarily lithium and nickel.
Defense and military.
Japan, perhaps for the first time, has begun to enter and form “defense alliances” outside the United States, or where the United States is involved only as an ordinary “partner” and not as an “organizer.” Moreover, Japan is increasingly acting as an “independent regional leader,” involving itself in security alliances where there is no direct critical security interest for Japan, but there is a desire for international political assertion. This emphasizes, for the first time, Japan's desire to go beyond “purely economic power” with a claim to full-fledged regional or even global leadership. Regional or global leadership - is a broader concept than purely “economic power”.
Only during this year:
Japan is preparing its first military defense agreement with an ASEAN country (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) outside of its direct defense partnership with the United States. This ASEAN country - the Philippines. The agreement will provide for “mutual access of military forces”. The agreement is intended primarily to restrain China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, where Japan has no direct conflicts of interest with China (these conflicts are mainly in the East China Sea). Of course, these agreements make sense if Japan's interest is not purely “‘sporty’” but a direct desire to directly restrain China. Meaning, it is Japan's competition with China for influence and leadership in the region. The peculiarity is that Japan's foreign policy has long avoided direct competition with China, leaving this role to the United States. Also this year, Japan signed direct defense and strategic agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia.
Japan-Central Asia. Japan, perhaps for the first time since 2004, held a large-scale meeting and discussion of “strategic partnership” with 5 Central Asian countries at once: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In fact, according to China and Moscovia, “Japan has invaded their exclusive geopolitical field,” irritating both.
Japan-EU. Japan has signed/plans to sign a number of additional agreements with the EU. With these treaties, Japan for the first time moves its relations with the EU from a purely “economic partnership” to a “security and economic level”.
Japan-Africa. Following Prime Minister Kishida's African tour, Japan, together with Britain, will make a number of strategic investments in Africa to counter China and Moscovia's expansion on the continent.
Foreign policy.
This is the news that prompted us to write this article. For the first time since the Second World War, Japan is preparing to reconsider the feasibility of bans on “defense exports.” Japan's ruling parties are planning to start negotiations on lifting the ban on the export of defense weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and possibly “beyond,” to certain countries with close security ties.
This is a fundamental shift in the “non-military Japan” policy embedded in the Constitution. The principle of “non-military” determined Japan's passive international security policy and asymmetric relations with the United States, where Tokyo was under the American “umbrella” and deliberately refused to take international/regional leadership. As American analysts wrote: “Since the Second World War, Japan's foreign policy has been a continuation of American foreign policy.”
Why is Japan now ready to abandon “asymmetric” relations with the United States and wants to be an “equal partner” with a full-fledged international policy and a demand for regional or international leadership?
The answer to this question lies in several components:
Today's security challenges have become broader than at any time since the Second World War and the rise of communist China. The strategy of “economic strength” pursued by the EU (and Japan) has proved to be almost helpless in direct security challenges against the authoritarian regimes of Moscovia, China, and Iran. Instead, security challenges are growing not only in China's actions, but also in proxy threats such as North Korea, which has apparently gained access to Moscovia’s nuclear, missile, and satellite technologies.
The United States remains the world leader, but the scope and advantage of its “dominance” has significantly decreased compared to past decades.
Japan's younger generation of politicians is free from national guilt complexes of World War II, globalized in the modern world, and wants to fully realize the country's economic leadership position internationally. That is to say, to realize its economic potential to become a full-fledged regional leader.
The U.S. security umbrella is no longer seen as reliable. Of course, Japan will not voluntarily give up this “umbrella,” but it is becoming more obvious that the United States does not have time to respond to the “complexity of security challenges and their width in the world.” In addition, the rapidly growing desire of the United States to fall into “isolationism” and uncertain actions regarding existing “partnerships” do not contribute to overall confidence in Japan. It is not without reason that Nikki Haley spoke about this at the Republican Party debate. Therefore, Japan is protecting itself with additional security partnerships.
How a global shift in Japan's international strategy could affect the security of the Europe and Ukraine?
Japan can become more relaxed in foreign policy and security if it fully moves away from its “asymmetric relationship with the United States.”
Japan's full transition from an “asymmetric relationship” with the United States to a “partnership” with Europe and Ukraine will open up several opportunities:
In the short term. For its own security, Japan will be forced to move away from the “non-military state”. Japan will find it necessary to strengthen its contacts with NATO, especially with its European part, and reconsider its attitude towards supporting Ukraine as a component of European security and the security of countries that conventionally share democratic traditions and values. The point is that Japan can start providing Ukraine not only with financial and humanitarian support, but also with military support in its own interests to hold back the aggressive, anti-democratic Moscovia-Iran-China alliance. The main condition is for the ruling party of Japan to make a number of legislative changes and to maintain political power for the current ruling party, despite the existing political disagreements and scandals.
In the medium term. European-Ukrainian-Japanese relations can develop into a direct strategic partnership without the need to wait for the US “approval” or “involvement” as it would be in Japan's asymmetric relations. For the first time on its own, Japan is looking at Africa, Latin America, and Oceania beyond “economic interests” as a contender for full-fledged regional leadership, which requires diversified and reliable political alliances.
In the long term. The London-Brussels-Kyiv-Taipei-Tokyo economic and political axis looks like a potentially feasible idea as a separate informal entity that strengthens each other's interests and increases the potential to counter aggressive regimes of the present and future.
For the first time in almost 80 years, Japan is becoming open to new forms of interaction with the world. The only question is whether European and Ukrainian politicians are able to see this.