Lukashenko's authoritarian regime is more vulnerable than it seems

Photo: Reuters

In this article, we will discuss only one component of dictator Lukashenko's vulnerability – the economic one.

Naturally, by focusing on the economic indicators of Moscovia, we lost sight of the situation in Belarus. And the situation there is such that Lukashenka's regime exists as long as it is supported by the power bloc. The second aspect is the availability of sufficient financial resources to maintain the ‘late-socialist Soviet system’ in Belarus.

Lukashenko's Dependence on Security Forces

Lukashenko exists as a phenomenon as long as the security forces of all levels and types are comfortable with him: military, police, intelligence services, paramilitary pro-government groups. According to official figures, this is up to 1.5 million people in Belarus, plus the number of their families, out of a total population of 9 million.

According to many Belarusians with whom we have spoken over the past 10 years, Lukashenko has no emotional support, even in the security forces. There is an exceptional desire of the elites of the security forces and lower-level representatives of the relevant agencies not to lose the ‘comfort’ provided by the Lukashenko's regime in exchange for loyalty.

That is why the Lukashenko's regime is constantly forced to ensure that the budget has funds for the comfort of life of the security forces and their families. In fact, this is an ‘unwritten contract’: the security forces will protect Lukashenko no matter what, as long as he guarantees them the ‘comfort’ of their existence.

Money will disappear. Social guarantees will disappear. Then there will be no need for the security forces to support Lukashenko's regime as a political phenomenon. A political phenomenon that, by the very fact of its existence, poses a preventive threat to Poland and the Baltic countries through its ties with Moscovia.  Therefore, the most dangerous risk for Lukashenko's regime is the risk of losing the loyalty of the power bloc, which is based on financial incentives.

Belarus' Economic Dependence on Moscow

When Lukashenko faced economic difficulties, he turned to Putin, balancing on the edge of his own dependence. However, the tightening of sanctions against Belarus has brought Minsk's economic dependence on Moscow to an absolute peak.

While Belarus used to have more or less diversified trade and access to the ports of the Baltic states, now 85% of its trade depends on Moscovia.

The Lukashenko's administration, aware of the risk, tried to diversify the balance of trade with African countries, but the plan failed due to problems with the use of Baltic ports.

Belarus' Relations with China

Then, in 2023/24, Lukashenko's regime decided to create a geopolitical counterweight to Moscovia in the form of relations with China for its own convenience.

China planned to turn Belarus into a trade outpost in Europe that would be even more dependent on Beijing than Hungary or Serbia. But the 2024 sanctions made it impossible for Belarus to fulfil its promises to China.

Out of 26 border crossing points with Western countries, only 5 remain operational in Belarus. Together with the sanctions, this has resulted in the loss of 30% of Belarus' cargo turnover with the West.

This, in turn, led to Beijing officially expressing dissatisfaction with Minsk over the ‘transport situation’ and the implementation of the agreements. The reason for China's dissatisfaction is that the investments in Belarus' infrastructure will not be returned.

Conclusion

For the reasons described above, Minsk will remain economically focused exclusively on the Moscow market, which means that Lukashenko directly depends on the macroeconomic situation in Moscovia.

In the second half of 2025, stagflation in Moscovia may worsen, which will certainly affect the macroeconomic indicators of Belarus. 

Any economic problems in Moscow will have a direct impact on the Lukashenko's regime ability to stay in power. The dependence on Moscow for 85% of trade turnover and 10% of direct revenues (gifts) from Moscow makes Lukashenko extremely vulnerable.

Strategically, Lukashenka's government correctly assessed in 2022 that it needed to ‘reorient’ itself, but it was unable to implement this with Africa because there is no logistical possibility while it is under sanctions, and China is unhappy that Minsk's problems with the EU are hurting the return on investment.

Aware of the risks, despite his ‘aggressive’ rhetoric, Lukashenko is testing the West's reaction to the possibility of easing sanctions. For this purpose, the dictator is making what he considers to be a corresponding gesture by releasing more than 200 political prisoners.

So, weakening Moscovia and bringing it to economic collapse through sanctions pressure will certainly affect the stability of the Lukashenko's regime, allowing Belarusians to win freedom and democracy for their country, and Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine to secure their borders from hybrid operations that Moscow may conduct from the territory of Belarus.