Triumph instead of defeat. How Maia Sandu's party managed to win the parliamentary elections in Moldova

Photo: AP/Vadim Ghirda

Surprisingly, the predictions turned out to be wrong. PAS won an absolute majority in parliament for the second time, which was a domestic political triumph for President Maia Sandu and an important geopolitical signal that democratic forces are capable of winning even in the face of large-scale Russian interference in the elections. But why were the predictions wrong?

Expectations of defeat: pessimistic forecasts by analysts

On the eve of the elections, the sociological picture looked bleak for the authorities. A poll by the iData Institute recorded 34.7% support for PAS against 36% for the pro-Russian bloc. CBS Research gave PAS 48.7% – formally a majority, but insufficient for independent governance. The large number of uncertain voters, capable of radically changing the balance of power, added to the unpredictability of the election.

The pessimism of analysts was well-founded, as Moldovan citizens had experienced a serious economic shock due to a 75% increase in electricity tariffs after breaking their energy dependence on Russia. The end of gas supplies to Transnistria in January 2025 only deepened the crisis, intensifying economic discontent.

Against this backdrop, so-called ‘reform fatigue’ intensified. Despite active statements about the fight against corruption and judicial reforms, by mid-2025 there had not been a single high-profile conviction of high-ranking officials. Voters saw promises, but did not see results. All this created fertile ground for the revenge of pro-Russian forces, just as it happened in Georgia.

The Russian hybrid machine at full power

The Kremlin's interference in the election campaign exceeded the worst expectations. Between the 2024 and 2025 elections, Moscow completely renovated its tactics of influence, replacing direct transfers through Promsvyazbank, which maintained over 138,000 accounts, with a sophisticated digital system. Currently, the main tool is the Taito app, which coordinates the activities of 242 ‘top activists’ who undergo online training and receive $850 per month in cryptocurrency. The total amount of funding, estimated at €100 million, ensures complete anonymity and makes it almost impossible to track transactions.

At the same time, a wave of cyberattacks on government systems, including the infrastructure of the Central Election Commission, was ongoing. In 2025 alone, over a thousand hacking attempts were recorded. A discreditation campaign unfolded in the media, where Maia Sandu's government was consistently portrayed as a ‘dictatorship’ and European integration as ‘the path to economic collapse.’

A distinctive feature of the new approach was the tactic of ‘multiplicity.’ The Kremlin refused to bet on one powerful force, instead supporting several narrowly focused parties targeting specific regions and social groups – Gagauzia, the Russian-speaking population, and pensioners. In the 2024 elections, Moscow simultaneously supported several candidates – Renato Usatyi, Irina Vlah, Victoria Furtuna and Vasile Tarlev – and applied the same approach in the parliamentary elections. This made it difficult to counteract, as blocking dozens of structures at once would have looked as “mass oppression of the opposition.” Therefore, many parties performed a technical function, scattering votes and creating “reserve baskets” that preserved Moscow's influence even after the ban on individual forces.

The final chord of the Russian plan was the organisation of street riots. On the eve of the vote, the police conducted hundreds of searches, finding evidence of the organisation of mass actions involving groups from Transnistria. Pyrotechnics and inflammable mixtures were seized from those arrested, who were supposed to cause chaos and create the image of a ‘'people’s uprising’.

Winning strategy: how Sandu outplayed pessimistic forecasts

Despite negative predictions and Moscow's attempts to disrupt the elections, the Moldovan authorities developed a comprehensive strategy that combined traditional campaign tools with innovative mechanisms to counter hybrid threats. Thanks to this combination, PAS not only maintained its position but also won a convincing victory, gaining 50.16% of the vote (55 seats out of 101).

• The first important factor was the strategic mobilisation of the diaspora. About 280,000 Moldovan citizens voted abroad, and more than 82% of them supported the pro-European course. This was made possible by an expanded network of polling stations – 301 locations, 70 more than in the previous presidential election. The majority of them were located in EU countries: 75 in Italy, 36 in Germany, and 26 in France. Only two polling stations operated in Russia.

The authorities explained this step by security considerations and the fact that the majority of the Moldovan diaspora lives in the EU. This is about 8% of the total electorate – those who have experienced the benefits of European integration first-hand. Digital scanning facilitated the voting process, and the votes of the pro-European diaspora, which were the last to arrive, gradually eased tensions and confirmed the country's course.

• The second factor was the support of Western partners. The EU and the US provided financial, political and technical assistance. The celebration of Moldova's Independence Day with the participation of the leaders of the Weimar Triangle was particularly symbolic, raising the country's international status and strengthening President Sandu's position.

• The third factor was the systematic exposure of foreign interference. The Moldovan government openly documented and published evidence of Russian influence operations. The Central Election Commission excluded three pro-Russian parties from the race due to illegal financing. In July, Ilan Shor's Peremoha bloc, which openly called for ‘unification with Russia,’ was banned. In September, two more parties were eliminated: Victoria Furtuna's ‘Great Moldova,’ which demanded the return of Ukraine's Budzhak and concealed 229,636 lei in illegal expenses, and Irina Vlah's ‘Heart of Moldova,’ which was exposed for receiving funding from Russia.

The exclusion of the Heart of Moldova disrupted the plans of the pro-Russian camp at a critical moment: the Patriotic Bloc was forced to urgently restructure its campaign, reworking its lists and looking for new places for candidates.

As a result, the Patriotic Bloc received 24,17% of the votes, the Alternative Bloc received about 8%, and the Our Home party received 6.3%. Instead of mobilising voters, the opposition spent the last few days on internal coordination, which negatively affected the effectiveness of its actions.

Also, the government's decision got international support in the form of coordinated sanctions. The EU, Canada, Switzerland, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia put restrictions on pro-Russian leaders. On 20 September, Ukraine joined the sanctions front – President Zelensky imposed 10-year sanctions against 11 Moldovan politicians, freezing their assets and banning financial transactions. At the same time, this deprived them of access to important resources at a critical moment in the campaign, significantly reducing their ability to influence the elections.

However, tensions only grew against the backdrop of other events. A few days before the vote, police found 200 ballots for the pro-Russian Alternative bloc's ‘carousel scheme’ in a printing house, when one person votes multiple times at different polling stations.

At the same time, the extradition of Vladimir Plakhotniuk added significant political points to Maia Sandu, becoming not only a legal step but also a powerful signal to society. The oligarch's name is strongly associated with the country's biggest financial scandal – the ‘theft of the century’. In 2014, Plakhotniuk and his associates withdrew more than $1 billion from Moldova's banking system, which amounted to 12% of the country's GDP. This robbery affected every citizen, and its consequences are still felt in the economy today. Plakhotniuk's arrest strengthened the mobilisation of the pro-European electorate and reinforced confidence in the authorities among those who had previously been uncertain.

An additional factor in the victory was the differentiated voter turnout.  In areas where Sandu won last year, turnout remained roughly at the level of the second round of the presidential election. In contrast, turnout fell by 3-4% in traditionally opposition areas. This decline was particularly noticeable in Gagauzia, where turnout was 45.3% in the parliamentary election compared to 51.9% in the presidential election.

The authorities also restricted the participation of voters from Russian-occupied Transnistria. Two days before the election, the Central Election Commission moved key polling stations dozens of kilometres away from their usual locations, making them inaccessible to most voters. On the day of the vote, it suddenly became difficult to get to the polling stations that remained in place due to reports of bridges across the Dniester being mined. Only 12,000 people took part in the vote, out of a total of around 270,000 registered voters.

Another factor was the visible results of European integration. PAS could rely on real results: in 2025, the country received €300 million from the EU, a three-year economic growth plan worth €1.9 billion was announced, energy projects to connect to the Romanian electricity market were completed, and roaming charges with the EU are planned to be abolished from 1 January 2026.

The Ukrainian factor: security architect

Ukraine actively helped to protect democracy in its neighbouring country, acting delicately but effectively on several levels at once. After Russia's energy blackmail in January 2025, when gas supplies to Transnistria were cut off, Sandu urgently visited Kyiv and agreed about support. Romania took over the main electricity supplies, accounting for 62% of imports, Ukraine helped with night-time supplies from Energoatom, and European electricity grid operators created a special import mechanism. This regional partnership saved Moldova from an energy collapse.

The systematic nature of the support was also evident at the political level. On 11 June 2025, the first summit of the presidents of Ukraine, Moldova and Romania took place in Odesa, where the course of European integration and joint counteraction to Russian attempts to destabilise the country were confirmed. Later, on 8 August, the foreign ministers signed an agreement on enhanced cooperation in combating hybrid threats, creating a Trilateral Cyber Alliance and a Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats in Odesa, which turned the format into an effective security tool in the region.

The exchange of intelligence and expert support became a particularly important component. Thanks to Ukraine's assistance, Moldova received critical information about destabilisation plans and learned effective methods of countering voter bribery, disinformation and cyberattacks. Internships at relevant Ukrainian agencies allowed Moldovan services to master practical skills in combating hybrid threats, increasing the state's ability to respond effectively to risks during election campaigns.

Lessons and challenges for the future

The Moldovan elections demonstrated the birth of a new model of regional security in Eastern Europe – a coordinated system for countering hybrid threats. The trilateral format of Ukraine-Moldova-Romania is becoming a real tool, with each country making a unique contribution: Ukraine provides experience in countering Russian aggression, Romania provides access to the EU and NATO, and Moldova demonstrates its determination to defend its European choice.

For Ukraine, the victory has direct strategic significance. The pro-European forces maintaining a parliamentary majority neutralise a key vector of Russia's hybrid strategy — the use of Transnistria and Gagauzia as instruments of pressure on the south-western borders. A stable Moldova preserves the critically important transport corridor through Romania — one of the few safe routes to the EU. At the same time, Moldova's experience proves the possibility of effective regional policy even during a full-scale war and shows that security depends not only on military power but also on the stability of democratic processes.

Maintaining Moldova's European integration course is of direct importance to Ukraine in the context of negotiations on EU accession. Both countries gained candidate status in June 2022 and are currently moving in parallel. This synchronised approach strengthens their negotiating positions and increases the weight of arguments in favour of the European Union's eastward expansion.

The failure of Russian plans in Moldova has strategic implications for the entire region. For many years, Moscow has tried to create a ‘belt of instability’ around Ukraine by influencing elections in Central and Eastern European countries. The victory of pro-European forces in Chisinau has destroyed this strategy.

However, victory is only one battle in the long war. Russia will continue its attempts at destabilisation through economic pressure and support for the opposition, and the key challenge for Sandu's government will be to deliver on its promises in order to avoid ‘reform fatigue’.

Analytical article prepared by Diana Lebed, a political observer of Moldova, especially for the international information and analytical community Resurgam.