Potential reasons for Xi Jinping's absence at the BRICS summit

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So let's look at these factors from the most significant to the least one, which together could have created a motive.

1. China's unwillingness to share leadership in BRICS and, as a result, deliberately devaluing the status of the summit in ‘uncontrolled countries’.

Since the creation of BRICS, Beijing and Moscow have held a certain informal leadership in the organisation, but full-scale invasion, harsh sanctions and, ultimately, the exhaustion of Moscovia have led to China's dominant position for Moscovia. Therefore, the status of ‘partnership’ has shifted to ‘dependence,’ and BRICS has become more ‘Chinese.’ Therefore, although formally the Kremlin remains the leader in the organisation, its position is extremely dependent on Beijing's position.

Yet, countries in the organisation such as India and Brazil can (and potentially do from time to time) take independent steps within the organisation that do not correspond to Beijing's vision of developing BRICS as an organisation for promoting Chinese interests.

Xi Jinping's refusal to attend certain events is sometimes interpreted as an unwillingness to strengthen other BRICS participants. For example, Xi Jinping did not attend the 2023 G20 summit in India, as well as he did not attend the 2019 G20 summit in Japan, due to a number of political conflicts with India at the time and Beijing's unwillingness to raise India's international political status with high-level representation, and thus the status of the event.

2. China's reaction to Brazil's blocking of new members at the BRICS summit in Kazan in 2024.

Brazil blocked Nicaragua and Venezuela from joining BRICS. The public reason was political tension between the Brazilian government and the governments of these countries.

The non-public reason for the blockade is Brazil's unwillingness to strengthen the positions of China and Moscovia in BRICS with countries from South America.

Brazil, positioning itself as the ‘regional leader of South America,’ considers itself in BRICS as the main representative of the South America's interests.

Hence, according to Lula da Silva's government, South American countries must either be close to Brazil's positions or not be in BRICS. Brazil has problems with both the Nicaraguan government and Maduro's government in Venezuela.

Plus, these two South American countries are more oriented towards Moscovia and China, and therefore their accession to BRICS was not in Brazil's interests. But it was in China's interests, which could also have influenced Beijing's decision to minimise its representation at the summit in Brazil.

3. Current trade and political differences between Brazil and China.

In 2025, several areas of tension arose between China and Brazil:

• Dumping disputes. Since early 2024, the Brazilian government has been under pressure from domestic manufacturers over China's ‘dumping policy.’ As part of it, the Brazilian government plans to raise tariffs on imported electric vehicles from 10% to 35% at the end of 2025. This will mainly affect Chinese manufacturers.

• March-May 2025: Brazilian prosecutors conducted a series of inspections and searches at Chinese BYD factory construction sites in Brazil, where they found violations of labour laws, tax evasion, and cases of forced labour and, possibly, human trafficking.

In addition to the fact that the Chinese manufacturer may be forced to pay a $50 million fine, this case could also damage the Chinese brand directly (especially if the fact of human trafficking and slave labour at the plant construction site is confirmed).

For example, the US and the EU have partially imposed sanctions on Turkmenistan and refused to buy Turkmen cotton and cotton products because of the use of forced and child labour.

The scandal in Brazil, if it becomes public and the investigation goes on, could affect the sales and expansion of Chinese electric vehicles, which are already perceived with caution by other countries due to dumping, and such scandals could become an additional motive to impose restrictions on Chinese manufacturers.

Therefore, official Beijing is ‘interested’ in covering up the Brazilian prosecutors' case as quickly as possible and probably believes that Lula da Silva's government should do so through administrative pressure.

• This year, during Lula da Silva's visit to Beijing with his wife to sign trade agreements, the Brazilian president's wife, Janine da Silva, broke protocol and publicly spoke about the ‘dangers of TikTok’ and ‘cases of children dying because of TikTok.’ This was done in Beijing, which could have been perceived as disrespectful by the Chinese elite.

It did not escalate into a major scandal, but, according to media reports, it caused tension between the delegations.

So, the combination of these current differences may also have prompted Xi Jinping to ‘give a signal’ to Lula da Silva's government by his absence.

4. Putin's absence at the summit.

Brazil is not ready to guarantee ‘security for Putin,’ which, at this stage of geopolitical tension and bloc-like formation in the world, could be perceived by Beijing as Brazil's desire to ‘sit on two chairs’ at the same time.

Another point is that China is currently using the publicity of contacts between Xi Jinping and Putin as an indirect method of sending a signal — both to the Kremlin itself that it is in the zone of ‘Chinese influence’ and therefore Moscovia should abandon the idea of too fast rapprochement with the US, and to constantly remind Washington of Beijing's influence on the Kremlin (their ties), which is important in the context of the global ‘balance of power’ between the US and China. This has a certain strategic character, both in terms of competition between the countries themselves and in terms of which country will be the gravity centre for “the third countries” .

Putin’s absence, combined with the other points described above, also could have potentially motivated Xi Jinping to cancel his visit.

5. Disagreements over the peace plan for Ukraine.

The least likely reason, but according to unofficial reports, Beijing was interested in Brazil taking a more active role in promoting the Chinese-Brazilian peace deal.

While Beijing appointed a special representative who made several tours of Asian and European countries to promote the plan, Lula da Silva's government did not appoint a responsible ‘special representative’ from the president who would do similar synchronised work and strengthen the ‘joint plan’ in the international arena.

Ultimately, this led to a decline in the dynamics around the ‘China-Brazil peace deal’ and led to a shift in initiative towards the United States after Trump's election.

Beijing viewed speculation about “peace in Ukraine” only as a tool to ensure stable communication with other countries (especially Europe) and a tool to strengthen its geopolitical weight.

The decline in dynamics, for which Beijing might blame Brazil, could have been another motive for reducing the significance of the BRICS summit in Brazil.

6. There are rumours about Xi Jinping's internal problems with controlling the elites and the system, which may prompt him to ‘stay at home,’ but these are unconfirmed theories that should not be relied upon.

Conclusion

It is likely that the combination of factors described above could have motivated Xi Jinping to turn down participation in the BRICS summit in Brazil.