The rise of the right-wing conservative movement in Japan. Prospects for Sanai Takaichi's leadership

Photo: AFP

The political geometry has changed – the LDP's long-standing alliance with its coalition partner Komeito has collapsed, and Takaichi found the key to a parliamentary majority through the support of the more radical Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). This opens a ‘window of opportunity’ for a right-wing conservative course, but makes power fragile. Relying on Ishin ideologically strengthens the rightward shift, while increasing the risks of coalition turbulence and early challenges in parliament.

The rise of the right-wing conservative line is not a personal phenomenon, but the result of three overlapping trends. First, security turbulence in East Asia (North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, increasingly aggressive behaviour by China) is shifting the centre of gravity of Japanese politics towards ‘hard power’ and a review of post-war restrictions. Second, the internal fragmentation of the party field after the LDP's defeats and Ishiba's departure has created space for a new configuration of the right-wing bloc led by Takaichi. Thirdly, the socio-cultural ‘return to order’ – a reaction to the pandemic experience, inflationary pressure and fears of economic stagnation – legitimises conservative solutions.

The emergence of Takaichi crystallises these processes, but also generates risks: from coalition instability and tensions with Beijing to a test of economic controllability in the event of fiscal expansion.

Who is Sanae Takaichi?

Sanae Takaichi, is a 64-year-old member of the right wing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. She has held key positions in the government, most notably as Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Economic Security, earning a reputation as an experienced leader in the economic and security spheres.

A long-time ally of Shinzo Abe, Takaichi has repeatedly served in his governments. She openly states that she considers herself a successor to Abe's policies. In her latest campaign, she insisted that her economic policy would remain similar to ‘Abenomics,’ and the market even began talking about ‘Sanaenomics’ as a variant of Abenomics.

Takaichi calls for expanded fiscal stimulus, tax cuts and strong government influence on monetary policy. At the same time, her economic strategy has a nationalist flavour: the government has announced a course of ‘economic security’ – primarily reducing dependence on external supplies in strategic technologies and protecting key industries. This concept is often formulated as ‘sovereignty through capability’ and is backed by plans to significantly increase the military budget (a commitment to reach 2% of GDP for defence), develop national technologies and energy resources, and emphasise the preservation of cultural identity. In general, she is attempting to combine economic nationalism with increased state investment for the first time, consistently developing Abe's policy of a ‘strong Japan.’

Ideologically, Takaichi belongs to the nationalist-conservative wing. She is known for her cooperation with far-right circles, in particular her involvement in Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), Japan's largest nationalist organisation. She has made symbolic gestures aimed at satisfying the right-wing conservative electorate: she regularly visits the controversial Shinto Yasukuni Shrine and insists on revising the pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution (the state renounces war as a sovereign right, does not maintain armed forces with ‘war potential’ and strives for international peace). Takaichi publicly supports strengthening Japan's military and defence capabilities, even proposing a ‘quasi-security’ alliance with Taiwan. She also advocates protecting ‘national interests’ — for example, tough immigration policies and an emphasis on economic independence — which her opponents sometimes call anti-globalist rhetoric.

On social issues, Takaichi is a classic conservative. She strongly opposes the legalisation of same-sex marriage and legislative initiatives that would allow married couples to have different surnames. As a former minister for gender equality, she defends the patriarchal model of the family, believing that the man should remain its head and the woman should maintain the ‘traditional’ order. In particular, Takaichi defended the rule of a shared surname as the basis of ‘family unity.’ This conservatism in her attitude towards the role of women creates a sense of paradox: the government she has chosen includes only two women out of 16 ministers, even though she promised ‘Norwegian-level’ representation.

Takaichi's political style is characterised by toughness and uncompromisingness. Back in 2016, when she was Minister of Internal Affairs, she declared that she could deprive television and radio companies of their licences for ‘biased’ critical coverage of the government. This statement raised concerns about freedom of speech in Japan. At the same time, Takaichi herself built an image of an ‘iron lady’: during the election campaign, she promised to ‘work, work, work’ to restore the country's prosperity. To secure a parliamentary majority, Takaichi formed a coalition with the right-wing Ishin party, agreeing on a common course on security and energy.

The structural drivers of the right-wing conservative shift

Japan's right-wing conservative shift has three interrelated drivers – security, institutional-parliamentary and social – and it is their simultaneous action that has made Sanae Takaichi's leadership possible and politically profitable.

The first - is the security arc stretching from the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea. Under pressure from North Korea's missile programme and China's increasingly aggressive activity around the Senkaku Islands, Japan has officially set in its updated National Security Strategy a course of action to develop counterstrike capabilities against enemy bases in the event of an attack, starting in 2022. This effectively normalises what the right wing has long promoted as ‘strikes on bases’ and logically fuels the debate on revising Article 9 of the Constitution to remove legal ambiguities regarding the Self-Defence Forces. This course has been formalised not only politically but also technically: it is stated in the government's basic documents and confirmed by practical steps towards rearmament.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that clashes with Beijing are becoming regular. 2024 was a record year for the presence of Chinese coast guard ships in the border Senkaku area, and in 2025, the Japanese Coast Guard recorded a continuous series of ‘visits’ and prolonged patrols by Chinese vessels, which periodically enter territorial waters — a trend that Tokyo is responding to with diplomatic demarches and increased maritime security budgets. All this makes Takaichi's ‘hawkish’ framework not just ideological, but rather a response to the changed balance of power in the region.

The second driver - is parliamentary geometry. The LDP faced the threat of a chronic minority in both houses and the need to quickly form a new support base for the government. The solution was an agreement with the more right-wing Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), which provided the votes to elect the prime minister and support for the legislative programme, but without Ishin entering the cabinet. Formally, this gives the LDP room for manoeuvre and preserves the monolithicity of the government hierarchy, but in fact increases the risk of the structure's short-lived nature. The lack of portfolios for the ally means fewer tools for discipline, but more leverage for public pressure on the prime minister from the right flank on issues of taxation, defence spending and constitutional reform. In other words, the very design of the coalition pushes the government towards tougher positions, and Takaichi, as a politician of the ‘Abe school,’ takes advantage of this, but the price is the potential cyclic nature of government crises.

The third factor - is right-wing populist pressure from below, which legitimises the right-wing course electorally and cuts off space for centrist compromises. The breakthrough of the Sanseito party in the upper house elections on 20 July 2025 was symptomatic. Fourteen new seats and a high nationwide percentage of votes for a right-wing force with anti-globalist and anti-immigration rhetoric. For the LDP, this is a double signal. On the one hand, the right-wing electorate is mobilised and wants a ‘tougher’ agenda. On the other hand, the traditional coalition formula with Komeito is losing electoral energy, pushing the ruling party to seek allies further to the right and the ‘security first’ rhetoric embodied by Takaichi.

The result is a rare convergence of threats and institutional incentives. China's escalatory behaviour at sea and in the air raises the cost of pacifism, the new parliamentary configuration rewards a more right-wing agenda, and the electoral success of right-wing populists shapes the lower limit of society's expectations from the government.

Economics of power

In her first days in office, Sanae Takaichi promised to pursue a ‘responsible and proactive fiscal policy.’ She faces the challenge of supporting the economy while addressing the problems associated with Japan's huge public debt. Consumer inflation remains at or above the Bank of Japan's 2% target for more than three years. Meanwhile, the central bank is gradually raising interest rates, increasing the cost of borrowing for the government.

Takaichi is proposing a massive stimulus package, larger than last year's ~$92 billion, to relieve inflationary pressures and boost investment in strategic industries (chips, AI, energy). As part of its main measures to combat inflation, Takaichi plans to quickly abolish the temporary gasoline tax. The package will include subsidies for electricity and gas payments during the winter, as well as regional grants to ease price pressures. It also encourages small and medium-sized businesses to raise wages and increase capital investment.

Takaichi has publicly moved the deadline for reaching the defence spending target of 2% of GDP from 2027 to March 2026, transforming the defence budget from a ‘symbol’ into a lever of industrial policy: long-term contracts for shipbuilding, missile programmes, air defence, cyber and space capabilities. In the short term, this means front-loading procurement (accelerated advance payments and localisation of components), i.e. moving most defence procurement to the beginning of the budget cycle in order to speed up the renewal of the arsenal, the contracting process and the launch of production. In the medium term, it means that Japan will create its own ‘counterstrike’ capabilities with a range of destruction, as outlined in the 2022 strategic documents, but now backed by funding. For business, this is essentially an industrial strategy through defence; for politics, it is a signal to allies and opponents in the region.

Together, we have a comprehensive architecture of an 'economy of power'. Fiscal stimulus for dual-use sectors, accelerated growth of 2% as an industrial multiplier, and an increasingly wider export valve for defence products. The market shift in sentiment will depend on the pace of exit from ultra-loose monetary policy and the extent to which the government can balance spending growth with confidence in debt instruments. But in a strategic sense, Takai's course is already clear: the economy must serve defense capabilities, and defense capabilities must become the driver of new industrialisation.

Foreign policy.  The US, China, Taiwan – and where is the ‘window’ for Kyiv?

For Takaichi, the first test is Washington, and it currently appears that she has passed it successfully. Under Trump's second administration, Japan will have an ideologically close White House with tough rhetoric on migration and demands for allies to ‘pay more,’ but at the same time, highly personalised diplomacy, where the outcome is determined by the leader's trust. That is why Tokyo is building an early ‘corridor of influence’ on the president. The prime minister is synchronising the signal to increase defence spending, offering symbolic trade gestures and playing on nostalgia for the ‘Abe-Trump channel,’ demonstrating political proximity and a willingness to coordinate on critical minerals, shipbuilding and defence industry issues.

The initial contacts appear to be successful. On 28 October, during his visit to Japan, Donald Trump and Sanae Takaichi signed the GREAT DEAL, which is expected to lead to a ‘new golden age’ of alliance between the two countries. This agreement, the details of which have not yet been made public, will allow the US and Japan to strengthen their economic security and promote their economic growth. Japan and the US have also signed a framework agreement on cooperation in the field of rare earth and critical minerals. Under the agreement, Washington and Tokyo will work together to secure their national and joint reserves of critical minerals through joint investment in mining, cooperation in identifying critical mineral deposits, and mutual stockpiling. In addition, about 20 companies from Japan and the United States have shown interest in projects that could help Tokyo meet its commitment to invest $550 billion in the United States.

During the meeting, Takaichi organised lavish hosting for Trump, presenting him with several gifts, including a set of golf clubs that Trump and Shinzo Abe used during a game together in 2017. In addition, Takaichi announced Trump's nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump praised the gifts and said that Takaichi ‘will become one of the great prime ministers.’

The second dimension is China. Beijing reacted nervously to Takaichi's arrival, which is understandable – her ‘hawkish’ reputation, her support for constitutional revision, her emphasis on counterattacks and her demonstrative support for Taiwan are a worrying puzzle for the PRC. Chinese media and official spokespeople are already encouraging Tokyo to ‘keep its political commitments to Taiwan’. At the same time, Western analysts note Beijing’s irritation with Takaichi's ‘Taiwan’ line. In practice, this will mean cyclical escalations around the Senkaku Islands and air-sea incidents in the East China Sea, to which Tokyo will respond by demonstrating its capabilities. The risk is that such competition will spill over into the economy, but here too, Japan is ‘insuring’ itself with economic security policies.

The third contour is Taiwan. For the current government, this is not an abstraction, but a matter of Japan's direct security. It is here that the first ‘tectonics’ with Washington may appear. If the White House tries to trade off some of the pressure on China for a ‘big deal’ in trade, Tokyo will insist on a tough line on defence planning around the island and the participation of allies in deterrence. For Takaichi, this is a test of her ability not only to please Trump, but also to influence his priorities.

Where is the ‘window’ for Kyiv? First, policy towards Ukraine is a litmus test of trust with the US and Europe for Tokyo. Japan maintains sanctions pressure on Russia, scales up macro-financial, humanitarian and non-lethal military assistance (demining, communications, air defence services), and will do so more actively as a contribution to the ‘Western front,’ which indirectly deters Beijing.

Secondly, the acceleration of defence spending to 2% of GDP and the liberalisation of exports are creating new channels of ‘indirect’ support through the replenishment of the arsenals of the US and its allies, who are already transferring weapons to Ukraine, and the expansion of production lines in Japan under partnership licences. This does not mean a quick lifting of the ban on lethal weapons, but it opens up space for trilateral ‘Japan-partner-Ukraine’ schemes, where Tokyo formally supports its ally and Kyiv gets the effect on the battlefield.

Third, the ‘security economy’ gives Ukraine a window of opportunity for reconstruction, namely investment in transport, critical infrastructure, cyber and energy resilience with Japanese insurance instruments and state guarantees — where Kyiv can quickly tie JETRO/METI (Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Japan External Trade Organisation) to specific projects and localise part of its production for the European market.

Forecast for Japanese policy (2025–2027)

Japan's track under Takaichi is no longer just a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine, but part of its grand strategy of ‘economic power’ and a reformatted alliance with the West. After the December 2023 liberalisation of defence equipment export rules, Tokyo opened the valve, allowing allies to replenish their arsenals with finished products manufactured under foreign licences: Patriot was first for the US, followed by an expansion of the product range and production lines. This creates an indirect channel of support for Ukraine. When American stocks are replenished with Japan's participation, Kyiv will have more room for its own packages from the United States and Europe. According to Takaichi, this mechanism will not only remain in place, but will become part of the ‘normality’ of Japanese policy, as it simultaneously nourishes the domestic defence-industrial ecosystem and cements Japan's role in the ‘defence club’ of democracies.

In financial and humanitarian terms, Tokyo has consistently increased its weight – according to the Centre for Eastern Studies, the amount of support already provided to Ukraine has exceeded $15 billion, with an additional $3.5 billion announced, with an emphasis on macrofinance, reconstruction, demining, cyber defence and the ‘non-lethal’ needs of the security sector. At the same time, Japan is steadily pouring funds into NATO mechanisms to support Ukraine. The result is a rare case of a non-transatlantic donor simultaneously closing Kyiv's ‘budgetary’ and ‘technological’ gaps without exceeding its own legal restrictions.

However, Japan's sanctions policy also has its limitations. In September, the government lowered the national price cap on Russian oil to $47.60 per barrel, in line with the EU's decision, and tightened export and financial measures. But Tokyo cannot completely ‘cut off’ the energy track from Moscow: long-term LNG contracts with Sakhalin-2, which last until 2028–2033, are a safeguard for electricity costs and industrial competitiveness. This exception does not destroy the sanctions framework, but it does limit the speed of its radicalisation. For Kyiv, this means one simple thing: arguments with Tokyo must take into account the balance between principle and the energy stability of its partner, otherwise Ukraine will undermine its own case.

Given Tokyo's internal political configuration and external challenges, it is most likely that Japan will maintain firm sanctions, increase its contribution to Ukraine's stability through non-lethal defence capabilities and financial instruments, and at the same time accelerate business participation in reconstruction – machine building, transport, green infrastructure, and agrotechnology – under the guarantees of state agencies. The lethal component will remain off-limits, but indirect swap schemes through allies will become a systemic mechanism. If Takahichi's right-wing allies in parliament push through further export deregulation – or if Washington directly signals the need to close critical air defence and ammunition production hubs in the Indo-Pacific region – acceleration is possible.

What practical steps should Kyiv take to ensure that the ‘Takahichi window’ works to achieve results?

First, make requests to Japanese instruments so that every dollar has a double effect, increasing our resilience and simultaneously strengthening Japanese value chains. This applies to air defence service and modernisation, anti-drone solutions, demining and cyber defence – areas where Tokyo is ready to scale up its commitments right now.

The second is to construct trilateral agreements with the US and Europeans under Japan's new export rules, transforming ‘exceptions to the taboo’ from isolated cases into established logistics. And finally, to correctly formulate the narrative, namely that restraining Russia is not a Eurocentric ‘mission of love’, but rather Japan’s investment in the security of the Indo-Pacific region and the stability of supply chains on which its own well-being depends. In this framework, every decision Tokyo makes regarding Ukraine stops being altruism and becomes a rational policy that the Takaichi government can defend at home and scale up abroad.

Analytical article prepared by Kateryna Vodzinska, expert at the Resurgam think tank on Southeast Asia and China.