Why can't Japan abandon Russian energy resources?
Photo: Depositphotos
Until 2022, Russian oil somewhat balanced Japan's dependence on the Middle East, which accounted for over 90% of imports. After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Japan suspended direct purchases of Russian oil (in the 2022/23 financial year, imports fell by 88.5% to 0.4% of all supplies).
However, the country still gravitates towards Russian energy sources, particularly gas, due to the complexity of quickly restructuring its energy balance. The problem lies in settling the balance between Japan's obligations to the G7 (sanctions against Russia) and its own national interests in energy security.
Japan's energy dependence
Japan imports almost all of its fossil fuels. According to data from Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), approximately 94% of its primary energy comes from oil, coal and liquefied natural gas. In particular, in recent years, oil has provided ≈40.3% of demand, LNG ≈18.2%, and coal ≈22.7%. Almost all of this volume is imported (self-sufficiency in oil and gas does not exceed 1%). In 2025, the head of METI emphasised that Japan ‘covers most of its energy needs with imports of fossil fuels’.
This dependence makes the country vulnerable – supply disruptions (due to military or geopolitical crises) instantly affect the economy and security. That is why Japan tried to diversify its supplies until 2022, but the Middle East's share in hydrocarbons remained critically high.
Russian raw materials partially levelled out the vulnerability of supplies. Before Tokyo stopped importing Russian oil in February 2023, Russian supplies had balanced more than 90% of Japan's dependence on oil from the Middle East. After that, Russian volumes fell to virtually zero (in March 2023, there were none at all), although prior to that, Russia's share of Japan's oil imports was several per cent.
Accordingly, national security was threatened by an energy shock. According to METI, the Japanese authorities are concerned that a sudden disruption of any significant supplies (particularly from projects involving local companies) could lead to sharp price increases and power outages. Without stable oil and gas imports, the country could face shortages with socio-economic consequences.
Although direct purchases of Russian crude oil stopped after 2022 (Russia's share in imports is ≈0.4%), Japanese companies are still co-owners of several oil projects in Russia. The most important of these is Sakhalin-1 (offshore). This project includes three oil and gas fields with total reserves of ≈307 million tonnes of oil and 485 billion m³ of gas. After ExxonMobil's exit with a 30% stake in 2022, 20% is controlled by Rosneft, 20% by ONGC (India), 30% by the Japanese consortium SODECO (which includes METI, Marubeni, Itochu, Japan Petroleum Exploration, and INPEX). METI emphasises that ‘the Sakhalin-1 project remains critical to Japan's energy security.’ Marubeni, one of the Japanese investors, has expressed concern about the sanctions against Rosneft and promises to follow the government's instructions regarding participation in this project. Thus, Sakhalin-1 is important for Japan not only in terms of oil ( its volume is currently small and declining), but also as a geopolitical investment and a source of technological expertise.
Japan is much more dependent on Russian liquefied natural gas. According to METI data, Russian LNG imports accounted for approximately 9% of Japan's total LNG imports in fiscal year 2023 (worth approximately $3.62 billion as of 2024).
The delivery routes – by sea from Sakhalin through the Russian Far East to Japanese terminals – reduce transport time compared to many other regions. Despite geopolitical pressure, Japan remains involved in the Sakhalin-2 project (through its companies) and has not yet abandoned these contracts entirely, with the government stating that it will act ‘in the national interest.’
Development of Sakhalin's offshore resources. Source: Nippon.com
Sanctions pressure and Japan's political line
Japan is a member of the G7 and supports the condemnation of Russian aggression. In 2022, the government promised to phase out Russian oil together with its allies. As part of Western sanctions, Tokyo has abandoned most of its imports of Russian oil (with the exception of insignificant volumes under a special sanctions licence). In addition, Japan has imposed its own restrictions, such as freezing approximately $40 billion in Russian assets and banning the export of certain technologies (microchips, military equipment, etc.).
However, Japan is cautious when it comes to energy. Its government emphasises the need to respect ‘national interests’ and coordinate with the G7. Trade and Industry Minister Yoji Muto openly stated on 21 October 2025 that Japan would act in accordance with its national interests, provided that it coordinated closely with the international community.
The US insists on a tougher approach. In October 2025, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent directly called on Japan's finance minister to stop importing Russian energy. New Prime Minister Takaichi explained in a personal meeting with the US president that it would be extremely difficult to stop buying Russian LNG, as it accounts for about 9% of Japanese imports. According to media reports, she explained that stopping purchases would ‘only make China and Russia happy’ because other countries (India, China) would absorb a larger share of Russian exports anyway.
At the same time, Japan is actively working to diversify its LNG supplies, particularly from the US. According to a report by Japan NRG, American LNG has the potential to grow significantly in Japan's supply structure. The study notes that by 2030, about 55% of the growth in global LNG volumes could come from the US. Washington has called on Japan to reduce its purchases of Russian energy and has offered alternatives to American LNG projects. For example, Japan has already invested in American shale gas assets. Thus, the US is a key potential partner for Tokyo – importing American LNG allows it to strengthen its energy security and reduce its dependence on geopolitically risky sources. The Japanese government recognises this, but at the same time emphasises that changes must take place gradually, without creating risks for energy supplies.
Impact on Ukraine
Japan's position is important for Ukraine from both a diplomatic and economic point of view. Tokyo has shown consistent support for Kyiv. Since 2022, Japan has provided Ukraine with more than $15 billion in financial aid (another $3.5 billion has been announced), becoming one of the largest donors. Japanese leaders regularly talk about shared threats: as analysts point out, ‘the Japanese are increasingly aware of the interdependence of security in Eastern Europe and East Asia.’ The government considers Russian aggression to be a test of the global order and sees it as its strategic interest to deter the aggressor, as Ukraine's defeat could provoke destabilisation around Taiwan and conflicts with North Korea. Public support among Japanese citizens is almost unanimous: over 74% of citizens are ready to help Ukraine, and 87% consider it a threat to themselves. In such circumstances, Japan has become an important member of the international coalition against Russia.
The signals for the coalition are mixed. On the one hand, Japan continues to increase its aid and strongly supports other economic sanctions. On the other hand, its dependence on cheap Russian LNG means that a complete break in purchases is only possible gradually. This is generally known in the international community. Even before US President Trump's trip to Asia, Tokyo was warned to carefully release oil reserves so as not to give Russia additional income through Asian consumers. If Japan stops imports (which currently account for less than 1% of oil and ≈9% of gas), this niche will quickly be filled by India, China, etc., and for Ukraine this will mean that the pressure of sanctions will be less effective.
At the same time, Japan is valuable to Kyiv as a gateway to Asia. Cooperation with Tokyo helps Ukraine gain support from other countries in the region and find new trade routes. Japan's participation in coordinating sanctions (even non-energy ones) improves Ukraine's position in negotiations at the UN and G7. Therefore, the demand for a complete rejection of Russian energy carriers should not be completely ignored. For Japan, such steps are only possible in the context of a joint long-term diversification strategy, which all developed countries are gradually achieving.
Key conclusions
Low self-sufficiency and dependence on imports. Japan imports nearly 94% of its energy (mainly oil and gas). The lack of domestic resources makes it impossible to suddenly abandon any major supplier without preparing reserves or alternative routes. Russian oil previously balanced imports from the Middle East, so its withdrawal leaves open the need for imports from other sources.
The important role of the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects. Sakhalin-2 provides ~9% of Japan's LNG imports and about 3% of its electricity generation. Long-term contracts last until the late 2020s and early 2030s, and breaking them would be costly and risky. Sakhalin-1 is an important oil project with Japanese participation, although it currently supplies a small share of imports; US intervention here is limited by the involvement of Japanese investors.
Balance between sanctions and national interests. On the one hand, Japan has committed to abandoning Russian oil (G7) and supports most sanctions, while trying to maintain ‘energy security.’ On the other hand, high LNG purchases from Russia are driven by national needs. The Japanese leadership has repeatedly stated that stopping imports from Russia ‘will be difficult for Japan’ and has rejected unilateral pressure from the US, emphasising domestic goals.
Diversification and energy transformation. Japan is expanding imports from the US, Australia, Malaysia and other countries, building strategic LNG reserves, restoring nuclear reactors and introducing green energy.
Impact on Ukraine. Japan is one of Ukraine's key donors and allies, consistently supporting Kyiv financially and diplomatically. However, the continued purchase of Russian gas is causing concern in relation to the united front against the aggressor. Formally, Japan has ‘partially’ joined the energy sanctions (restricting oil), but has not fully joined the EU sanctions and continues to purchase Russian gas. This may reduce the effectiveness of pressure on Moscow, because ‘if Japan stops purchasing, China and India will fill the vacuum.’ On the other hand, Japan is meeting Ukraine's interests in other areas – freezing Russian assets, blocking critical technology supplies and acting solidarily in NATO/G7. Therefore, cooperation and dialogue with Tokyo remain extremely important.
The analytical article was prepared by Maria Hirniak, an expert on Japanese politics, exclusively for Resurgam.
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