How is the European Union getting rid of its energy dependence on Russia?

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As of 2021, the Russian Federation supplied Europe with about 40% of its imported gas, more than a quarter of its oil and more than half of its coal. In some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, dependence on Russian gas reached 80-100%. Rosatom maintained key positions in the supply of nuclear fuel and the construction of nuclear power plants in a number of EU member states. This model ensured stable volumes and competitive prices, which for years was perceived as the optimal solution. At the same time, it created strategic vulnerability: a significant number of EU member states were dependent on a single supplier that repeatedly used energy resources as a political tool.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine presented the EU with a clear dilemma: either maintain its dependence and effectively finance the aggressor, or dismantle the energy system that had been built over half a century. But the problem was not only the technical complexity of rapidly replacing the huge volumes of Russian gas, oil and coal that had supplied Europe's energy needs for decades, but also the fact that any delay would mean not only economic losses, but also a direct threat to the political unity and security of the continent.

In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the escalation of energy blackmail, the European Union launched the REPowerEU plan in May 2022, which evolved into a full-fledged roadmap with clear deadlines in 2025: a complete phase-out of Russian fossil fuel imports by the end of 2027. This strategic shift, backed by the 19th package of sanctions of 23 October 2025, not only dismantles old dependencies, but also transforms the energy crisis into a catalyst for green transformation, where diversification of sources, economy and renewable energy become the pillars of a new security architecture.

In three and a half years of war, the EU has reduced its imports of Russian gas (pipeline and LNG) from 45% in 2021 to 13% in the second quarter of 2025. This dynamic not only weakens the financial basis of Russian aggression, but also highlights how Europe, despite growing LNG imports from the US (45% of 100+ billion m³ in 2024), is balancing between urgent replacement and long-term sustainability.

Key stages of transformation: from shock to legislative consolidation

REPowerEU, as an instrument of geo-economic resilience, focuses on three pillars: robust diversification, green energy development, and strict energy conservation. The ban on Russian gas imports (including LNG) will be phased in: from 1 January 2026 for new and short-term contracts (until June 2026), and for long-term contracts – from 1 January 2028, with exceptions for landlocked countries such as Hungary and Slovakia.

The 19th package of EU sanctions, adopted on 23 October 2025, significantly tightened restrictions in the energy sector by introducing a phased ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). Short-term contracts (less than one year) must be terminated within six months of the package coming into force, i.e. by 25 April 2026, while long-term agreements (more than one year, concluded before 17 June 2025) will remain in force until 1 January 2027, one year earlier than the initial REPowerEU plans.

The package also extends the ban on transactions with key Russian oil companies Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, includes Tatarstan oil refineries and imposes sanctions on Chinese intermediaries — two oil trading firms in Hong Kong and the UAE that purchase Russian crude oil. In addition, the fight against the ‘shadow fleet’ is intensifying: 117 new vessels (557 in total) are banned from entering EU ports, and maritime transport services, including insurance and brokerage, are restricted to prevent circumvention schemes. These measures are complemented by a new monitoring mechanism.

Ukraine, in turn, has stopped the transit of Russian gas since January 2025, which was the final blow to the old model, but also a challenge for the EU: the loss of 15 billion m³ per year forced the acceleration of LNG infrastructure construction, with capacity increasing by 70 billion m³ in 2023–2024, with plans for an additional 60 billion m³ by 2030.

In contrast, in the first half of 2025, the structure of gas imports changed dramatically: Norway provided 55% of pipeline gas, Algeria – 19%, Russia – only 10% (via Turkish Stream), and the US – 27% of total imports thanks to LNG, doubling supplies compared to 2021.

This transformation was made possible by the systematic involvement of three key alternative sources from other regions, namely:

• North Africa: gas exports from Algeria to Italy (up to 10 billion m³ annually) and a new LNG hub in Egypt (+9 billion m³ from 2021).

• Azerbaijan – 11.4 billion m³ of pipeline gas in 2024, with plans to increase to 20 billion m³ by 2027 via the Southern Gas Corridor.

• Middle East (mainly Qatar) – 5% LNG, with simultaneous investments in future hydrogen “green corridors”.

Thus, in three years, supplier regions such as North Africa, Azerbaijan and the Middle East – together with Norway and the United States – have replaced 35–40% of former Russian volumes.

This replacement volume has become a reality thanks to investments of around €300 billion by 2030 in LNG terminals, the expansion of existing pipelines (TANAP–TAP, Transmed, Greenstream) and bilateral contracts that combine short-term security with long-term ‘green’ projects (hydrogen from North Africa, solar energy in Algeria).

However, there is a paradox: despite sanctions, Russian LNG imports rose to 16% of LNG imports in the first half of 2025, with France, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium as key hubs (with re-exports to Germany). Two-thirds are long-term contracts, which complicates the break, but the ban on spot deals from 2026 will cost Russia €5 billion in annual losses.

In contrast, the share of renewable sources in EU electricity generation has grown to 47% (with +58% installed wind and solar capacity from 2021), saving 38+ billion m³ of gas; consumption savings are 20% from 2021.

Thus, the EU's complete energy rejection of Russia has become one of the most effective sanctions against the aggressor, which is suffering systemic losses due to the final loss of its largest and most profitable market on the European continent. European energy independence not only weakens the aggressor once and for all, but also returns Ukraine to its natural role as a reliable energy partner of a united Europe. After restoring the energy system destroyed by Russian attacks, the country will once again be able to export clean electricity (as it did before 2022) and become a modern, secure transit corridor for Caspian gas from Azerbaijan.

In this scenario, Ukraine stops to be merely a ‘transit pipe’ of the Soviet legacy and becomes a full-fledged participant in the new European energy map — with its own generation, renewable sources, and diversified routes that strengthen the security of the entire continent.

Finally, it should be noted that the bulk of the replacement of Russian energy sources was ensured by the conclusion of medium-term contracts for the supply of LNG with the governments of other gas-producing countries with a term of 12–24 months.

Therefore, European institutions should refrain from focusing all their efforts and finances on one large ‘flagship’ project (e.g., a single giant stationary LNG terminal or a new main gas pipeline). Instead, 10-20 relatively small projects should be launched simultaneously, with the main and only selection criterion being the speed of commissioning – up to 24 months.

The energy boycott of Russia has become the most effective sanction and, at the same time, a catalyst for Europe's green transformation.

Therefore, after 2027, any attempts to resume imports of Russian energy resources should be interpreted directly as a weakening of sanctions and co-financing of aggression. This needs to be clearly enshrined in security strategies and international agreements to prevent political backtracking even in the event of changes in government or foreign policy circumstances.

The analytical article was prepared by Nikita Nosik, an intern at the think tank Resurgam