Is Ukraine capable of strategically changing the course of the war and forcing the Kremlin to a fair peace?
*Moscovia is the historical name of the Russian Federation.
In recent months, we have been looking for an answer to the question: “Is a breaking point in Ukraine's favor possible?”. And if so, when.
By all indications, Moscovia is going all-in in its occupation of Ukraine. Moscow is trying to maintain a show of force, superiority, and gain territorial conquests as quickly as possible, hoping that in the next 12 months the internal will of Ukrainians will be broken by the constant terror of civilians and infrastructure, and that European and US support for Ukraine will be damaged. Moscow's special calculation is the US elections, where Moscow hopes that if Trump wins, Americans will take a more isolationist approach to foreign affairs, including Ukraine and Europe.
But if we realize where the time and the resource limit of Moscow's “all-in” failure lies, it can help Ukraine tilt the situation in its favor, ensuring a strong position for negotiations when they take place, sooner or later. We do not believe that one factor can contribute to Ukraine's victory over Moscovia, but the combination of factors and circumstances that may develop over a certain period of time is another matter. Determining these factors and the time when these factors will be most unfavorable for Moscovia may be the key to finding a strong position for Ukraine to win the occupation invasion.
What are these factors and when can they occur?
Our latest research on tanks with colleagues shows the beginning of significant problems with replacing tank losses in the occupation army of Moscovia by the end of 2025.
Our latest research on artillery shows a significant degradation in the quality of enemy artillery by early 2026.
Recent research by OSINT analysts Cabala, High Marsed, and others, indicates that Moscow will have significant problems with armored vehicles (BMPs/MTLBs/APCs), even before it has problems with tanks and artillery quality. At the end of 2024, first half of 2025.
Recent reports on China and Moscovia demonstrate that Beijing is definitely a partner of Moscow and has an interest in this war, but the amount of Chinese support is limited by a number of rationalities that so far make it impossible for Beijing to supply Moscow with “military” supplies.
Our recent commentary on Moscow's economy points to a crisis that has already begun and should reach its peak by the end of 2025. The main consequence will be stagnant stagflation, the problems of which should manifest themselves in the second half of 2025.
Our recent comments on Moscovia’s foreign exchange reserves show that this pillow, called the National Welfare Fund, is rapidly shrinking. This will significantly reduce Moscow's ability to respond to the crises of fiscal 2026 and reduce the potential for financing the occupation war led by Moscovia against Ukraine.
Instead, in late 2025 early 2026, the military-industrial capabilities of Europe and the United States are projected to reach levels that will meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to defeat Muscovite aggression. Given that the technological capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in cooperation with Western arms manufacturers will steadily improve, while the technological capability of the occupation army of Moscovia will deteriorate due to the drain on a number of resources, in 2025 Ukraine may gain the necessary qualitative and quantitative advantage to inflict a series of military defeats on the occupation army of Moscovia.
The main condition for this scenario is that Ukraine's partners maintain their sustainable support for Ukraine.
It is for a number of military and economic reasons that Kremlin wants to find a way to freeze the war while preserving the occupied territories by the end of 2025. The occupation of 20% of Ukraine's territory is the element that Putin wants to use to proclaim his victory in the West. Such an outcome would be a political defeat for Europe, leading to a decade of insecurity and uncertainty. Ukraine's victory and Moscow's complete loss of the means to wage war will ensure stability and predictability of security for Europe.
Moscow is implementing the “Debaltseve case” — the essence of which is to occupy as much of Ukraine's territory as possible before a hybrid agreement of some kind, as it was during the signing of the “Minsk agreements”.
Moscow's weak reaction to its own intelligence warning about a Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region shows the Kremlin's overconfidence, its belief that it should not have happened because Kyiv is incapable of resisting on this level after the Ukrainian offensive in 2023. But most importantly, according to the Kremlin, Ukraine's allies would not have allowed this one, because Moscovia is used to being protected by Western bans on Ukraine better than by its own air defense systems.
Instead, the Kursk operation is a radical attempt of Ukraine to change a number of things, which requires additional and different analysis. But as of today, Moscovia will do its best to discredit Ukraine's Kursk operation in media, minimizing its significance, effectiveness, and a number of consequences. Instead, the Kremlin will choose to intensify its offensive on the important Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk in order to:
a) discredit the “Kursk operation” in that way;
b) demonstrate victories to its own society in order to change public discontent that Kremlin is using conscripts for war.
c) return the West to thinking about a “peace treaty” on the background of the formation of the thesis-narrative that “Kursk was an accident” and Ukraine's loss is inevitable.
But if Ukraine's partners maintain at least the current pace of support. Ukrainian society will morally withstand the full spectrum of Moscow's terror. Ukraine's key partners will clearly realize that the China-Brazil peace initiative is aimed at satisfying Moscow's interest, which has nothing to do with international law, then in late 2025 — early 2026 there will be a period when Moscow will be economically and militarily most vulnerable after using up the amount of resources and reserves for its “all-in” in 2024.
Of course, war is a multifactorial phenomenon and it is impossible to predict everything, but our community sees a number of indicators that show that in 2025 Moscow will try its best to convince the West and Ukrainians themselves that they are unable to create stronger negotiating positions than they have now. In fact, Moscow will rush to launch a hybrid of negotiations based on the “Chinese initiative” while it is at the peak of its power, as over the next 12–18 months Moscow will face the fact that its own economic and military capabilities are exhausted to fight a war of this intensity. Putin is a risk-taker. Putin is a gambler, even from his days as a representative of the Soviet secret services, who is used to bluffing. In 2024, by continuing to put pressure on Ukraine with all of his strategic reserves and planning to continue in 2025 with an economy that has all the signs of stagflation, Putin is taking a risk. His risk is based on the belief that Ukraine's allies will show weakness and disbelief in Ukraine's capabilities to insure its strong position.
Therefore, whether Ukraine's faith and the faith of its partners in Ukraine's ability to strategically change the course of events or Moscow's military equipment and economy ends first — this will determine the outcome of the war: the victory of democracy and freedom or the victory of authoritarianism and the policy of international violence.