Why the West Should Allow Ukraine to Strike Deeply into Moscovia: Counterarguments to Stephen Biddle's Article on Foreign Affairs.
*Moscovia is the historical name of the Russian Federation.
In recent weeks, dozens of articles have been published in European and American media, which our monitoring team has categorized into two narratives that are very favorable to Moscow:
“Why Ukraine should not be allowed to strike deep into the territory of Moscovia”.
“Why the West should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine to achieve peace”.
Unfortunately, there are examples of articles that completely copy the theses of Moscow's propaganda. We have great hope that these are people's internal positions and free opinions, and not paid articles commissioned by Moscow propaganda.
We have been asked several times to analyze the article on Foreign Affairs, which was suspected of a number of manipulations and twisted facts. So we are fulfilling the request.
The analytical report to which we will counterargue is titled “The Empty Promise of Ukraine's Deep Strikes Against Russia” by Stephen Biddle, August 28, 2024.
Briefly, the author of this paper seems to agree that Washington has imposed many restrictions on Ukraine, but with a number of arguments that our team considers to be frankly manipulative, he comes to the final conclusion that removing the restriction on strikes deep into Moscovia will not change anything in the war, because they will be ineffective. Because it cannot be a “crucial instrument in the war” for Ukraine. If this is not crucial, then "why allow additional risks of escalation?"
And now to the arguments and what we consider manipulations in Stephen Biddle's essay:
The first general manipulation is that Ukraine is not capable of conducting a large-scale offensive, not so in terms of resources, but as a type of military maneuver in the organization, and deep strikes are used to prepare the “battlefield” for such maneuvers.
And then the conclusion is that if Ukraine is not capable of conducting offensive strategic campaigns, then why should it be given precious weapons and risk escalation?
Among the arguments in Stephen Biddle's post are the following theses:
Kursk: «Ukraine’s recent advances in the Kursk region of Russia illustrate the difficulty of turning the tide of the war. Ukraine attacked an unusually ill-prepared section of the Russian front, which enabled Ukrainian forces to take ground quickly. But as Russian reserves have arrived, the Ukrainian advance has slowed, and it appears unlikely that Ukraine will make any major breakthrough».
The question is: what is the basis for the claim that the Kursk operation is aimed at a “deep breakthrough” or a large-scale “army operation” by the General Staff of Ukraine?
Next. “ill-prepared section of the Russian front” — consisted of 2 lines of defense, which included anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth and underground fortifications + the border area that was already fired upon.
Next. The fact that the place with the least trained enemy personnel was found is called a correct tactical calculation, which, on the contrary, emphasizes the ability of the General Staff of Ukraine to plan operations. Why is it taken as an irrefutable statement that there are no more such places on the 1200 km of the front line and in the context of time and various circumstances, or that there cannot be such places in the future if the Armed Forces are provided with military equipment and other things to conduct such operations?
The second manipulation is that “it's expensive and supplying a large number of missiles will drain the US budget for supporting Ukraine in other components.” For some reason, Stephen Biddle makes the argument “not about the cost of ATACMS missiles or JASSM missiles, but about the cost of expensive F-16s.
Author states: «U.S. aid to Ukraine is limited by strict spending caps, making such systems impossible to provide without curtailing other kinds of provisions. A fleet of just 36 U.S. F-16 fighter jets, for example, would eat up $3 billion of the $60 billion allocated to Ukraine in the most recent aid bill».
If we even put aside the fact that the US has a significant share of the unused PDA program for Ukraine (10.5 billion), then we can simply look at the cost of ATACMS as an example. Then we will see the following. An ATACMS missile, depending on the modification, costs from 900 thousand to 1.3 million. For example, Finland has ordered 70 ATACMS with additional parts, equipment, and logistics support for 132 million, which is 1.88 million for a fully serviced missile. The transfer of 300 missiles to Ukraine is 550-600 million out of 10.5 billion from the PDA fund alone (not including the balance of 4 billion for USAI).
Given that these are not new missiles from production, but from stocks, the actual cost of these missiles would be even less. Instead, the Pentagon had the opportunity to order new missiles from its own manufacturer and update its existing reserves with more modern models.
The third manipulation is that the authorization of deep strikes will have a “limited, not a ‘crucial impact,’” so why expose the world to escalation for the sake of a limited result for Ukraine.
We would ask a counter question: what weapons have a “decisive impact” in today's warfare? Another question is, “if the impact on the war and the effectiveness are limited,” then why is it taken as an axiom that there must be some kind of “incredible escalation” from Moscow? Why should this “escalation” be different from the one that should have already occurred from the previous “red lines” crossed, which, by the way, also had limited results in strategic terms, but were ultimately necessary from a military point of view: the provision of heavy weapons or aviation.
The second point is that in modern warfare there is no “crucial weapon” — there is a crucial set of factors and tools available for this purpose. There is no Arya Stark to stop the White Walkers with a single blow, no “Death Star,” no “Gandhams.” The argument that “we should not risk escalation because the permission is not strategically decisive” is simply disconnected from the realities of the modern war of extermination for survival. Any weapon is an additional factor that, in combination with others, can create the necessary conditions for the desired outcome.
Or do we finally want to hear which one type of weapon or type of permit is “crucial” for Ukraine in its defensive war against occupation attempts by Moscovia?
The lack of understanding of the current realities of war in this analysis can be seen even in one phrase: “Cheap drones cannot fly hundreds of miles to reach remote targets.”
The range and effective destruction of Ukrainian drones has been recorded at a distance of 1600 km (1000 miles). The only problem is that a drone cannot carry the weight of a warhead that a ballistic missile can. Therefore, the tactics and tactical purpose of the munitions between UAVs and ballistic missiles are different.
But if deep strikes are allowed to be used in tandem with “decoy missiles,” “ballistic missiles,” “interceptor missiles,” air-to-ground cruise missiles, and a hundred Ukrainian drones that will destroy Moscow's air defense, will this surely have no effect? It seems to be the opposite. Moreover, taking into account the territory of Moscovia that they are forced to cover with air defense and the presence of more than 3 hundred different targets that could be targeted by Ukraine to prevent Moscow's logistical and other military capabilities from maintaining the current tempo of the invasion.
Allowing Ukraine to conduct highly accurate strikes does not mean an indispensable and immediate strategic advantage. And very few people would argue that now. Like the Abrams tank or the F-16, it is a means of warfare, not a guarantee of “unquestionable strategic advantage,” especially in the quantity that Ukraine has been given. But a limited number or a limited strategic impact on the overall course of the war does not make them “useless,” although the risk of their transfer has also been threatened by Moscow with “red lines.”
Ukraine needs to be allowed to strike deeply enough because:
1. The very fact that the possibility of a combined strike pushes back the occupation aviation (which includes attack helicopters with a limited tactical range), logistics bases and logistics centers. The mere fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can strike forces the enemy to act more carefully, increases the operating costs of equipment and the cost of logistics, and increases the potential time for the Ukrainian air defense forces to react. The fact that part of Moscow's aviation has been pushed back only from the mention of the possibility of “permission” already demonstrates its effectiveness, but this does not prevent them from using the airfields in the future if the West displays another fear of Putin. And it's not just aviation, there are facilities that cannot be moved, such as technical support bases and logistics centers.
2. To be effective, Ukraine must be able to conduct combined strikes in the depths. Each weapon has limited effectiveness separately from other means - tactical or strategic results are achieved in a “combination of means.” Ukrainian attack drones that can fly up to 1,000 miles have limited effect without being combined with other means, just as other means have limited effect without being combined with air defense depletion, such as cheap Ukrainian drones.
3. To stretch the logistical shoulder of Moscow's occupation forces. Moscow's logistics are highly dependent on railroad lines and logistics bases near the railroad. This is a limited number of targets that do not require “thousands of missiles.” Even the mere potential for destruction, which is the banal permission for deep strikes, will force the logistics shoulder to be stretched.
4. Undermining the “red lines” as pressure on Putin to stop the war. We would like to remind you again of the “red lines” that have already been crossed: the transfer of heavy weapons to Ukraine, the transfer of aircraft, the attack on the Black Sea Fleet, the blowing up of the Crimean bridge, the freezing of Moscow's assets, and the use of frozen assets for Ukraine's military support. And the main red line is the transfer of the war directly to the territory of Moscovia. All the red lines previously declared by the Kremlin had been crossed. In which of these cases did Moscow prove its “red lines” threats?
5. Moving enemy operational and tactical missile systems (OTMS) away from Ukraine's borders. Moscow uses OTRKs to terrorize civilians from Kharkiv, Sumy, and other Ukrainian cities. Also, the range allows them to reach tactically important Ukrainian airfields, as the range of Iskander-K is up to 500 km. OTRCs are often located deep in the territory of Moscovia, because they know that there they are “better protected by Western restrictions on Ukraine than by their own air defense systems.”
No war is won without risk, because war is the highest form of crisis in international relations. War — is already a risk in its essence. A defensive war, as in the case of Ukraine, is a risk, only imposed from the outside, by the imperialist intentions of Moscovia.
And if you constantly demonstrate to the aggressor that you are “not ready to take risks,” “you are afraid of him,” but at the same time the aggressor is ready to take risks, you will “lose” every time. The collective West, democracy, and freedom will lose to terror and the principle of the right of force.
Putin also has a limit of “risk,” but every time you show weakness to him, this limit shifts not in favor of Ukraine and its partners. Every time the West demonstrated resilience, unity and willingness to make decisions, Putin pushed back his “risk” limits, because he also has a “risk limit.” And allowing strikes deep into Moscovia is clearly not a real risk limit, where Putin would risk himself and his entourage.
The last time Europe and the United States were afraid to take risks, it ended up in World War II, so maybe you can't always avoid risks if you want results. It is not for nothing that there is a concept of “coercion to peace by force,” because repeating the same historical mistakes for the third time in the hope of a different outcome — is a clear sign of insanity.