Putin tests NATO's Article 5 to continue the war in Ukraine
Photo: Associated Press
The escalation currently gaining momentum on the part of the Kremlin, is both an attempt to scare Europe away from the intentions on which a consensus has finally been reached in leading European capitals, and an attempt to persuade Chinese leader Xi Jinping to provide better assistance than is currently available.
Map showing the flight path of three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets that crossed Estonian airspace on 19 September 2025. Source: Estonian World
‘Sharp power’ check
The effectiveness of NATO's Article 5 can be tested not only through direct military intervention, which is a high risk for the Kremlin, but also through hybrid methods below the level of conventional warfare, which deliberately do not reach the ‘necessary level of escalation’ but gradually blur the boundaries of Article 5.
Internal interference in European politics will be carried out not on the basis of ‘hard/soft power,’ but with the use of ‘sharp power.’ According to Joseph Nye's concept, a country's ‘hard power’ is based on coercion and is primarily a function of its military or economic might. ‘Soft power,’ on the other hand, is based on a country's attractiveness — the positive image of its culture, political ideals and policies, as well as its independent civil society.
National Endowment for Democracy analysts Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig supplemented Joseph Nye's concept by introducing the concept of ‘sharp power,’ which reflects the aggressive nature of authoritarian regimes that has little in common with the friendly appeal of soft power. The actions of authoritarian regimes to exert influence are ‘sharp’ because they penetrate, break through or pierce the political and information environment in victim countries.
Ultimately, through sharp power, Russia will try to undermine trust in NATO step by step, minimising the risk to itself, because any agreement – commercial or security-related, it does not matter – is based not on a signature on paper, but on trust and confidence in its implementation.
Locations where Russian drones were shot down in Poland on 10 September 2025. Source: The Independent
And then these small steps, taken together over the long term, will become one big step towards the destruction of NATO – undermining trust without the risk of direct war for the Kremlin.
Why would Putin want to accelerate undeclared war against NATO right now?
The answer is paradoxical – so as to continue the war in Ukraine, despite the fact that such operations against NATO force the Kremlin to divert resources from Ukraine.
The fact is that in 2026, Putin will face a serious dilemma:
either reduce the resources allocated to the war, which will further slow down the pace of achieving military objectives;
or freeze the war to take a break (primarily economic).
Choosing the first option means destroying the economy and plunging it into a state similar to that of the 1990s. Choosing the second option means failing to achieve the necessary goals in the war against Ukraine.
But there is a third option – to reduce Western support for Ukraine. Then, consequently, Russia will need fewer resources to achieve its military goals in Ukraine, which will at least partially ease the pressure on its own economy (although the imbalances will not be corrected). To achieve this goal, the Kremlin relied on Donald Trump and on stretching the conflict space, to which the West would be forced to respond.
The Kremlin bet on Trump's arrival and, as a result, the complete end of US support for Ukraine in 2025 (even that provided by Biden). In the end, Trump did reduce support for Ukraine and made a number of concessions in favour of Russia. However, thanks to the fact that European support has grown significantly in both quantitative and qualitative terms of cooperation, most of the lost American aid is being covered, and Ukraine's critical needs, which only the US could meet, are in fact being ‘bought with European funds’ through the PURL mechanism.
Thus, the combination of financial, military and political support provides stability of resources for Ukraine in 2026 and lays the foundation for years to come.
The Kremlin's attempts to divert Europe's attention to other areas have failed. Operations to destabilise the Balkans through Milorad Dodik, Gagauzia in Moldova and the South Caucasus were preventively destroyed. Instead, Europe's interest in and attention to the war in the Middle East has diminished due to the specific nature of Israel's actions and the lower intensity of the conflict.
Moreover, Europe is fundamentally ready to put pressure on China and India in order to put pressure on the Kremlin through them, but not in the format of Trump's interests. Combined with a decrease in revenues from energy sales, which is not only a situational factor but also a global trend due to falling prices, all this contributes to a reduction in Russia's capabilities and, consequently, an increase in risks, primarily economic ones.
Making it with someone else's hands
Russia cannot afford to open a second front in its confrontation with Europe because it simply does not have the resources – since the end of 2022, 90% of its forces have been concentrated in Ukraine.
Hybrid threats through the provocation of local conflicts are becoming a more difficult task for the Kremlin due to the decline in the quality of its influence and agents and the gradual ‘vaccination’ of Europe against the ‘Russian virus’ (threats), as stated in 2024 by then-CIA Director William Burns and MI6 Director Richard Moore at a joint event. They emphasised that the quality of Russian agents had significantly declined and that the Kremlin's main force was no longer professionals, but criminals and teenagers who could perform one-off tasks, but this did not create the necessary ‘long-term network’ as it had in the past.
Therefore, the Kremlin needs a conflict to which Europe would react and, as a result, reduce its support for Ukraine. This would preserve the necessary balance of power for Russia, even if in 2026 the Kremlin is forced to reduce the financial component of its occupation war due to the poor state of the economy.
And the solution is Taiwan.
According to Taiwanese intelligence, a potential Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan would take place in 2027. But, first, this is too late for the Kremlin, and second, 2027 itself is questionable in terms of China's intentions. For Xi Jinping, an invasion or blockade of Taiwan is of existential importance — therefore, losing there is not an option.
To achieve this, Beijing needs three things:
Speed, to avoid negative reactions and consequences and not repeat the Kremlin's mistakes.
The absence of consolidated support for Taiwan from the US and Europe.
A military balance of power between China and the US and its allies.
Due to a number of economic problems in China, the modernisation of its naval component to the level of the US is not possible until the 2030s at the earliest. Beijing's increasingly frequent statements that it is not a party to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are also a consequence of processes in the EU, which is beginning to perceive China as a full-fledged enemy and to exert pressure on it.
In addition, China needs to emerge from its economic crisis, as Beijing has increased its budget deficit for 2025 from 3% to 4% of GDP this year.
China has set its official deficit at its highest level in a decade. Bloomberg
Therefore, a significant number of analysts believe that Beijing will not be ready for aggression against Taiwan before the 2030s. Similarly, expanded support for Russia requires significant resources and carries significant political risks for China, which will affect the economy.
But Putin needs to act sooner. It is worth noting that the escalation on the part of the Kremlin is taking place against the backdrop of unpunished actions by the US, but also against the backdrop of events following the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which took place from 31 August to 1 September.
There are two strategic goals in this escalation:
Through escalation, delay the EU's intentions to increase pressure on the Kremlin, both directly and through third countries; reduce intentions to support Ukraine; create the impression that war will come to EU territory sooner if the trend of supporting Ukraine continues.
To convince Beijing of the weakness of its main deterrent – NATO – and the complete dysfunction of the West as a collective entity. The Kremlin needs to convince Beijing to such an extent that it either risks expanding its support for Moscow or risks stretching its forces across Taiwan earlier (for example, at the end of 2026).
Therefore, the only correct strategy is to strengthen the reaction and response to the Kremlin's actions by tightening sanctions and increasing support for Ukraine (responding to escalation with escalation), because only then can further escalation be avoided, as this will disrupt the Kremlin's show, which aims to make Beijing pay for Putin's ambitions, because Russia desperately needs China to change its status from ‘war subscriber’ to ‘war participant’.
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