The Baltics may lose America. What a potential reduction in US security presence means for the region

The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – are the most vulnerable part of NATO's eastern flank. Their geographical location, their close distance to Russia and the Kaliningrad region, and their relatively small armed forces make these countries critically dependent on external security support. In this context, the American military presence and assistance have traditionally played a key role in ensuring stability in the region.

However, with the start of Donald Trump's second reign, the region faces new challenges regarding the future of the American security presence. Washington's changing priorities, its reorientation towards confrontation with China, and pressure on European countries to increase their own defence spending, are creating the preconditions for a revision of these countries' security strategies.

Potential scenarios for military intervention by the Russian Federation. intellinews.com

The current state of American presence in the region

As of 2025, the American military presence in the region includes up to 2,000 troops. In addition, the Baltic states host multinational NATO battalions led by the United Kingdom (Estonia), Canada (Latvia) and Germany (Lithuania).

Lithuania hosts a US tank battalion, which has been there since 2019 and is planned to remain until 2026. Lithuania also hosts a German multinational brigade, which was officially opened in May 2025 and continues to expand. By 2027, it will reach full operational readiness with up to 5,000 troops, making it the largest permanent foreign military contingent in the region.

An important feature of the American presence in Lithuania is its strategic location near the Suwalki Corridor. This makes American forces a key element in the defence of NATO's most vulnerable point on its eastern flank.

In Estonia and Latvia, the American presence is more mobile, focusing on rapid response units and specialised systems. Canada plans to complete the full deployment of brigade capabilities in Latvia by 2026, when up to 2,200 Canadian troops will be stationed there as part of a multinational brigade.

The countries also receive financial support. In 2021-2025, the US Congress allocated more than $1 billion to the Baltic Security Initiative.

The financial and military presence, like NATO and the US in particular, is critically important for the Baltic states. This is also emphasised by officials from the Baltic countries. For example, General Raimundas Vaitkūnas, Commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, noted that the US presence in Lithuania is one of the main deterrents for potential adversaries.

Reasons for potential reduction

Reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific region

The Trump administration has made it clear that Europeans must take primary responsibility for defending the continent.

Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stated in Brussels in February 2025 that ‘harsh strategic realities do not allow the United States to focus primarily on the security of Europe.’ Instead, the US will focus on defending its southern border and countering China.

Economic reasons

In the US, some officials are saying more and more that the United States just can't afford to keep up its commitments in Europe. Cutting back on the military presence could free up resources for other strategic priorities.

Moreover, the administration's economic philosophy is based on the principle that "American taxpayers should not bear a disproportionate burden for the defence of European allies". This logic particularly resonates with Trump's electorate, who believe that the US has subsidised European security for too long.

Pressure on European allies

European officials say the move is intended to encourage the continent's wealthier countries to fund security assistance in their own region. This is consistent with Trump's long-term strategy of greater responsibility sharing within NATO.

Specific steps taken by the Trump administration

The Trump administration has already announced the termination of some security assistance programmes for European countries bordering Russia. In particular, in September 2025, the Pentagon informed the EU that military support under the Section 333 programme would be reduced to zero from the next financial year. For the Baltic countries, this means the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid.

Pentagon officials are also considering a plan to withdraw up to 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe. Although this does not only affect the Baltic states, such changes could have a serious impact on the overall security architecture of the region.

Reaction of the Baltic states

Faced with uncertainty, the Baltic states have made financial commitments in the area of defence spending.

• Lithuania was the first to promise to reach 5% of GDP for defence, starting in 2026. This decision will allow the country to create a full-fledged military division by 2030, purchase modern Leopard 2A8 tanks, and form a new mechanised brigade.

• Estonia has set an even more ambitious plan to reach an average of 5.4% of GDP for defence by 2029.

• Latvia has opted for a phased approach: in 2025, its spending amounted to 3.65% of GDP, with a long-term goal of reaching 5%.

Military reforms have become equally important. Lithuania plans to create new brigades and expand recruitment, increasing the number of State Defence Service personnel from several hundred recruits to 4,000 in 2028. Estonia is investing in the purchase of HIMARS and anti-tank systems, as well as in the improvement of communication systems. Latvia is building a large-scale training ground in Selonia, implementing a multi-layered air defence system and expanding its procurement of equipment. All countries are actively developing cyber defence, drone technology and means of countering Russian cyberattacks and electronic warfare.

Deepening cooperation with European allies has also become an important direction. All three countries are actively participating in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) led by the United Kingdom.

A separate important decision was the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, as well as Lithuania's withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These steps can be explained by the need to maximise defence capabilities, although at the same time the countries have emphasised that they do not currently plan to use or stockpile such weapons.

Strategic challenges for the region

The Baltic states have several key geostrategic vulnerabilities that increase their dependence on NATO allies and make them more vulnerable in the event of aggression from Russia.

First, these states are far from NATO's main forces. They are geographically separated from the Alliance's military centres in Central and Western Europe, and the main logistical routes pass through Poland. This effectively makes the Baltics a kind of ‘NATO enclave’ in the event of a military crisis. Any large-scale redeployment of forces here would take time, which could be critical in case of sudden aggression.

Schematic of NATO and Russian forces' movements in the region in the event of an invasion. https://www.fpri.org/

The second vulnerability is the Suwalki Gap, a narrow strip of land about 65 km wide that runs between the Kaliningrad region of Russia and Belarus. In the event of a conflict, Russia and Belarus could jointly block this corridor, cutting off the Baltic countries from the rest of their allies by land. In this case, supplies would have to be delivered only by sea or air, which is much more difficult and dangerous.

The Suwalki Gap is a 70-km long narrow stretch of land separating Kaliningrad and Belarus. For years it has been dubbed NATO’s Achilles Heel. [Stratfor.com]

Another problem is the small territory and lack of strategic depth of defence. The Baltic countries are small in area, so enemy troops can quickly advance deep into the territory, leaving no time to prepare for effective defence. For example, it is only about 200 km from Latvia's border with Russia to Riga.

Military imbalance is also a serious challenge. Russia has a significant advantage in terms of forces, especially in artillery, missiles and aviation. In addition, the Kaliningrad region is a highly militarised enclave, home to S-400 air defence systems and Iskander missile complexes capable of controlling a large area in the Baltic region.

In addition to military risks, the Baltic states are also vulnerable to hybrid threats. These include cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and political sabotage, which Russia actively employs.

An additional factor is the significant Russian-speaking minority, especially in Latvia and Estonia, which Moscow can use to destabilise the region from within.

The China factor

It is interesting to note that although the US justifies the reduction of its military presence in the Baltics by the need to focus on countering China, China itself is gradually expanding its economic and technological presence in the Baltics.

First and foremost, this concerns investments in logistics infrastructure. Chinese companies have invested in the development of a container terminal in Klaipėda and a free economic zone in Kaunas. Such projects fit into the framework of "the Belt and Road Initiative" and form economic channels that can be used not only for trade but also just as levers of political influence.

China's role in telecommunications and critical infrastructure is a particular cause for concern. Incidents involving damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea in recent years have led Estonia and other countries in the region to ask China to investigate. Chinese ships have been involved in many cases of cable damage.

Thus, China in the Baltic region acts as a partner in investment and as a potential source of hypothetical challenges. Its economic and technological presence can be used in hybrid scenarios – from putting pressure on governments to creating vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure. However, judging by their actions, the US does not consider these risks to be significant.

Expectations

A gradual but noticeable reduction in the American military presence and financial support for the Baltic states is expected in the next two years. A large-scale reduction of the American military presence in Europe cannot happen overnight, as the transfer of American military facilities to host countries will take years of negotiations.

Most likely, the reduction will take place in stages, starting with the termination of some aid programmes and the gradual withdrawal of rotational units. At the same time, basic infrastructure and key strategic assets are likely to remain. In addition, it is important to take into account the unpredictability of the new US administration. They are prone to changing their minds even on such important issues.

Either way, a more significant restructuring of the region's security architecture is expected in the near future. The Baltic states and their European allies must demonstrate their ability to take on greater responsibility for their own defence.

In the long term, the format of the American presence in the region may change dramatically. Instead of permanently deployed forces, the US may switch to a rapid response model with pre-positioned equipment and regular rotational exercises.

This is already being actively discussed within the Alliance. The concept is called forward defence. The idea is that allied troops should be deployed closer to the borders to avoid a scenario of ‘reconquering territories after occupation’. This directly concerns the Baltic states.

What this means for Ukraine

The reduction of American presence in the Baltic states may have serious consequences for Ukraine’s security. The Baltic states have historically been among Ukraine’s strongest supporters within NATO and the EU, consistently insisting on a firm stance against Russian aggression. The more difficulties and challenges these countries face with their own security, the fewer opportunities will remain for them to support us.

Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Russian Federation. Voanews

The weakening of the American presence may also contribute to strengthening Russia's position in the region and creating conditions for pressure on Ukraine from the north. At the same time, once Finland and Sweden join NATO, Russia will see a noticeable reduction in its ability to block allied reinforcements to the Baltic states via the Suwalki Corridor, which may partially offset the negative consequences.

Given the events in the Baltic states, where countries, as NATO members, would seem to be more confident in US support, Ukraine will have to rely more on European support and develop alternative channels of security partnership. Ukraine must prepare for possible changes in the formats of US support and develop the ability to work with new models of partnership.

Conclusions

The potential reduction of the American security presence in the Baltic states reflects broader changes in US global strategy. For Ukraine, these changes mean the need to diversify sources of support and deepen cooperation with European partners. At the same time, the common threat from Russia may contribute to strengthening solidarity between Ukraine and the Baltic states. This could create new opportunities for strategic partnerships.

In addition, in the long term, the gradual transition to a multipolar security model will mean an increase in the role of countries like Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland. The importance of the Scandinavian countries in the balance of power is also growing – they can compensate for part of the American withdrawal. For Ukraine, this is also a chance not only to avoid isolation, but also to become an active participant in the new balance of power in Europe.

The key factor for successful adaptation to the new conditions will be the ability of European countries, including Ukraine, to maintain their own security without losing transatlantic solidarity and the principles of collective defence.

Analytical material was prepared by Anatolii Horshkov especially for the international information and analytical community Resurgam.