Fico's government is wobbling. Will Slovakia go for early elections?

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This article examines the disputes within the coalition, economic problems and electoral prospects that could lead to early elections.

Tough relations within the coalition

After the coalition was formed, positions were distributed according to the size of the factions. The left-wing conservative Smer party received the position of prime minister, the social democratic Hlas party received the position of speaker of parliament, and the nationalist SNS, as the smallest faction, received the portfolios of ministers of the environment, tourism and culture.

Leaders of the ruling coalition in October 2023

Pellegrini won the election in the second round and became President of Slovakia. At the same time, he left the post of Speaker of Parliament. To fill the vacancy, Hlas nominated Richard Raši, Minister of Investment, Regional Development and Informatisation. However, Andrej Danko stated that he wanted the position of speaker, which he had already held in 2016-2020, right after Pellegrini, when he became prime minister of the country. Smer supported Danko's aspirations, especially Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák. Hlas strongly disagreed with this. Parliament spent a year without a speaker – the longest in the history of independent Slovakia. This story only deepened the rivalry between Pellegrini and Danko, and most importantly, the second refused to give up his ambitions not because of the results of the negotiations, which he left early, but because of a crisis in his own faction.

In October 2024, the parliamentary club of the Slovak National Party (SNS) fragmented. A group of deputies led by Rudolf Huliak declared they would no longer vote with the government unless his Peasants' Party's name was added to the club's title and he was given a position in the government. This situation was a consequence of how the SNS electoral list was formed in 2023. The list included representatives from other parties, which was crucial for the SNS to re-enter parliament. However, the party's sole representative was Andrej Danko, while three deputies were from the Peasants' Party, three from the National Party "Life," and three were independent.

Without the three deputies, the SNS parliamentary club was at risk of dissolution. To prevent this, Smer "lent" one of its deputies to preserve the faction. Additionally, the coalition was reduced to a minimal 76 deputies. Huliak refused to negotiate with Danko and would only speak to Fico.

At the same time, disagreements also erupted within the ranks of Hlas. Following his election as president, Peter Pellegrini stepped down as party leader. He was replaced by Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok, who began to steer the party's position closer to Smer. He even accused Ukraine of a cyberattack against Slovakia. This shift displeased several deputies, including Samuel Mihaľ, Radomír Šalitroš (who were expelled from the party on 25th January of this year), Ján Ferenčák, and Roman Malatineec. All four refused to support the coalition, turning the current government into a minority administration. Furthermore, Malatinec left Hlas and joined Huliak's Peasant Party, a move that shocked the Hlas leadership, who then expelled Mihaľ and Šalitroš to splinter the group.

As a result, Fico was forced to intervene in the internal party disputes of his coalition partners. The crisis was resolved in March of this year by allocating portfolios to the rebels. Samuel Mihaľ was appointed Minister for Investments, Regional Development and Informatisation, and Rudolf Huliak became Minister for Tourism and Sport. In addition, Hlas deputy Richard Raši was elected as the Speaker of Parliament.

Andrej Danko was left with no real power over the SNS faction, and consequently, he and his party had their ministry taken away. Danko is now left to criticise Fico and quarrel with Pellegrini.

The crisis took a year to overcome. This can be attributed to Robert Fico distancing himself from his coalition partners after the assassination attempt on his life. Politicians from the ruling coalition noted that the Prime Minister has surrounded himself with an increasingly tight inner circle, making him difficult to access. Today, Fico is primarily accompanied by his long-time associate and Minister of Defence, Robert Kaliňák, as well as former Police Chief and Deputy Parliament Speaker, Tibor Gašpar.

Currently, the coalition is held together mostly by its members' reluctance to face any elections.

Economic Problems

The Slovak economy is confronting several challenges, such as high inflation and political instability, which is hindering reforms and the absorption of EU funds.

For example, in March, the National Bank of Slovakia downgraded its forecast for the Slovak economy's development. It is now expected to grow by 1.9% this year instead of the 2.3% the central bank had anticipated in December 2024. Inflation is projected to be 4.3% instead of 4.1%. The primary reason for this is the growing uncertainty in the global and domestic economies. By June, growth expectations had dropped to 1.2%.

Under these circumstances, the government has been forced to resort to large-scale fiscal consolidation measures. According to an expert from the Council for Budgetary Responsibility, almost €5 billion will need to be found over the next three years, but the government remains silent on specific measures. Meanwhile, the government is avoiding dialogue with key domestic players. For instance, the Republican Union of Employers (RÚZ) stated it has not received any draft reform projects, even though a meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the Slovak Republic is scheduled to take place in two weeks, on 18th August. Employers consider it absurd that they are expected to comment on the largest reform package in years without having received any materials in advance.

While the government remains silent on its measures, the opposition is speaking out. The Progressive Slovakia party announced that the government is preparing to increase the value-added tax (VAT) to 25%. As part of previous consolidation packages, the VAT has already been raised from 20% to 23%. Another such measure would lead to even higher prices for goods in shops but would also fill the state treasury with hundreds of millions of Euros.

At the same time, the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) is promoting its own package of measures, which includes the introduction of a bank levy, an increase in corporate tax to 22%, the taxation of dividends, as well as new taxes on elite real estate, digital services, and sweet drinks. This proposal, however, has been criticised by employers who are unwilling to see tax increases, as this would primarily hinder the conduct of business in the country.

Besides finding ways to fill the treasury, it is necessary to find opportunities to cut spending. The business community has already submitted its proposal in the form of cutting social benefits such as the cancellation of early retirement after 40 years of work, recreational vouchers, the 13th pension, or free train travel for students and pensioners. However, these proposals are met with fierce opposition from Prime Minister Fico, who is known for increasing, not decreasing, social spending. Furthermore, such cuts would negatively impact his rating.

The government just literally has no time to delay decisions. The economy requires clear and swift solutions. In July alone, 34 bankruptcies of businesses were announced, which represents a nearly 42% increase compared to June and a 112.5% increase compared to July 2024.

The adoption of the 2026 budget is approaching. Therefore, the questions of "what to do?" and "how to do it?" are becoming increasingly urgent. For now, it is clear that Fico does not intend to abandon his populist promises and will use EU funds to fulfil them. He recently stated that 90% of households will have lower energy prices in 2026. Funds from the European Union will be used for compensation. At the same time, he has denied raising the VAT to 25%. It is likely that Fico will not announce unpopular economic decisions for the time being, but with the start of the autumn parliamentary session, his government will be forced to make difficult choices. It will have to be done quickly, as the two-year immunity that allows the government to pass a budget with a deficit exceeding planned monthly targets expires in November of this year. This year's deficit was 4.9% of GDP, and in 2026, it is expected to rise to 5.1%. According to the rules, if Fico is unable to do this, he will be forced to seek a vote of trust from parliament. In addition, the opposition or other organisations could compel the government to cut spending through the courts. The coalition will only have two months to approve a budget that is favourable to them – a very tight deadline, especially considering that this year's budget was not voted on until December 2024.

A positive aspect of this situation is that the need for EU funds will make Bratislava more accommodating in its interactions with Brussels and will result in the adoption of sanctions against Russia in the future.

Sociological Indicators and Possible Snap Elections

Considering all the challenges and the dysfunctionality of the coalition, would it not be easier for Fico to provoke snap elections and try to re-form the government in a new parliament? At this moment, such a scenario is unfeasible. If you look at the aggregated opinion polls, Smer consistently holds second place. In first place is the opposition party Progresívne Slovensko. This means that in the event of an early election, the opposition would have the first right to form a government. But even this is not Fico's biggest problem.Current electoral tendencies in Slovakia. PolitPro

Also, we should not rule out a "black swan", which can collapse the coalition prematurely despite the wishes of Fico himself. Now the scandal with the tender for ambulances could play such a role. Fico and Danko have already begun criticizing the Hlas Minister of Health for this scandal, but this situation could potentially drive the coalition partners apart, who cannot stand each other.

Russian influence in Slovakia

After Robert Fico returned to power, it became much easier for the Russians to promote their influence in the country. First of all, because the ruling coalition includes the SNS party, which opposes Ukraine's European integration and its accession to NATO, and would like to see Slovakia outside these structures. Robert Fico uses Russian narratives when he accuses the EU, NATO and Ukraine of continuing Russia's war against Ukraine. At the same time, he himself travels to Moscow and meets with Vladimir Putin. Pro-Russian tones can also be heard from the leader of the Hlas party, Šutaj Eštok, when he criticizes his Czech colleagues for reporting on the possible involvement of Russia in the case of threats in schools, when an operation was carried out to detain an attacker who sent threats to Slovak schools, or when he accuses Ukraine of a cyberattack on Slovakia.

But even without its own government, Slovak society is the most likely to believe Russian propaganda among Central European countries. Only 25% of Slovaks trust the media, which creates fertile ground for Russian disinformation. At the same time, the Russian embassy in Bratislava is the most active on Facebook among all embassies. However, it is worth noting that in many cases Prime Minister Fico’s rhetoric is much more radical than his actions. He has already threatened to cut off electricity supplies to Ukraine, veto EU aid, stop humanitarian aid and cancel benefits for Ukrainian refugees in Slovakia. However, none of the threats have been implemented. Only the 18th package of sanctions was blocked, which ended with the adoption of the 2026 budget approaching. Fico understands very well that he does not have significant leverage over the EU, and at home he does not have total political dominance - just remember the winter protests against the government's pro-Russian policy.

Another factor of Russian influence is the continued purchases of energy resources from Russia. The current government clearly did not intend to refuse to purchase Russian gas and oil, but the European Commission’s decision to ban gas purchases will force Bratislava to take more active action. Fico tried to maintain permission for purchases by blocking the 18th package of sanctions, but most likely received an offer from Brussels to increase financial assistance. No details have been made public yet. In any case, the fact that Slovakia will eventually refuse Russian gas is a plus for Ukraine, since this will finally deprive Moscow of the European market. For now, Ukraine can only watch this process, because there are no real tools to accelerate it.

Conclusions

Slovakia is ruled by a government inclined to pro-Russian rhetoric, but which does not have total support from the population and can collapse at any moment. This is a stark contrast to Hungary, where Orban has established total control in the political and social spheres. The upcoming budget adoption will be a serious test for the ruling coalition and will show whether it will survive another year.

In the event of a budget adoption without deficit immunity, Fico will face a dilemma: go to the elections now, when the situation allows him to get second place and a large number of mandates, or wait until 2027 and lose much more. He can try to call early elections next year and sit out in opposition while another government implements unpopular reforms, and then triumphantly return in the next elections. Previous times it was successful.

Analytical article prepared by Ostap Denysenko, commentator on Slovak politics, exclusively for Resurgam.