Can Turkey become a guarantor of Ukraine's security?

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Turkey's intentions

Turkey has repeatedly stated its readiness and willingness to join in providing security guarantees and commitments to Ukraine after the war. In February 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explicitly stated that Turkey was open to providing security guarantees to Ukraine as part of a final peace agreement. And in April 2025, President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that during negotiations, his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan confirmed Turkey's readiness to be among the guarantors of Ukraine's security, especially in the Black Sea region. Zelensky emphasised that Ankara has every opportunity to make a significant contribution to maritime security, and he sees Turkey as one of the key players in the future guarantee system.

At the end of August 2025, Ukraine's ambassador to Turkey, Nariman Dzhelal, noted that Turkey was ready to send military personnel to Ukraine as part of the security guarantee agreements and would provide assistance in demining operations in the Black Sea. All this indicates Ankara's genuine interest in shaping Ukraine's post-war security architecture.

Guarantees at sea

The most realistic scenario is Turkey's participation in ensuring security in the Black Sea. Ankara has already demonstrated its ability to assist Ukraine in this regard during the initiation and implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022. It was a key participant in the negotiations alongside the UN. After its expiry in 2023, Ankara continued its work in this direction. Together with Bulgaria and Romania, the Black Sea member states of NATO, they initiated a trilateral mine-clearing initiative (MCM BLACK SEA). It was created to detect and neutralise drifting/anchored mines, helping to continue Ukrainian exports by sea even after the grain agreement expires.

Therefore, ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation could be a promising area of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. Currently, Ukrainian ships are moving exclusively in the territorial waters of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey to avoid Russian strikes. However, this limits the volume of ships and trade. In 2021 alone, Ukraine exported 151 million tonnes of cargo by sea. The Ukrainian sea route mentioned above has ensured the export of 150 million tonnes of cargo during the war. The difference is rather significant. This is influenced by the temporary occupation of a significant number of ports and the inability of others to operate, as well as restrictions on maritime traffic.

To increase trade volumes, it is necessary to expand logistics routes. This is threatened by the danger of mines and the actions of the Russian Federation in general. Turkey could be one of the countries that guarantees Ukrainian ships free movement in the Black Sea. Turkish ships can participate in patrolling the waters independently or as part of multinational maritime patrols.

Moreover, Turkey is interested in limiting Russian influence in the Black Sea and increasing its power in the region. After the start of the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Ankara did not allow Russian military ships coming from the Mediterranean Sea to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, in accordance with the Montreux Convention. It prohibits the passage of military ships of countries involved in the war. Among the ships that Turkey did not allow to pass were the missile cruiser Varyag, the flagship of Russia's Pacific Fleet, the large anti-submarine ship Admiral Tributs, and four other military vessels. They could have significantly strengthened Russia's air defence ‘umbrella’ over the Black Sea and increased Moscow's missile capabilities, which would have worsened Ukraine's situation.

Ankara's actions helped Ukraine, but also served its own interests. After numerous Ukrainian attacks, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been weakened as much as possible, which may increase Turkish influence. At present, it can be said that, at a minimum, a parity has been established between the naval forces of Ankara and Moscow in the Black Sea. Ukraine has announced the destruction of one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The remaining Russian combat-ready ships are forced to hide at their base in Novorossiysk.

This is a unique situation in recent centuries. Turkey's participation in security guarantees in the Black Sea will only increase this influence. As the potentially most powerful maritime power in the region, it will control the stability in such a scenario. It is also unknown how long the war will last and how many Russian ships will be sunk. Currently, replenishment through the Turkish straits is impossible, so Ankara will benefit from this permanently.

However, after the war ends, Turkey will again be forced to allow Russian military ships into the Black Sea. This will be negative for Ukraine, Turkey and other countries in the Black Sea region, as Russia's naval power may be restored. Obviously, this will also affect Ankara's willingness and ability to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. It is quite difficult to ensure free navigation when a powerful Russian fleet is nearby.

Guarantees on land

The participation of Turkish forces in providing security guarantees on land is more complicated. As noted, Ankara has expressed its willingness to send troops to Ukraine. First, it is worth outlining the factors that play in favour of this:

1. Russia is negative about the potential presence of Western military contingents in Ukraine. Ukraine and its allies, in turn, have a negative attitude towards Moscow and its partners in this matter. Turkey, on the other hand, is a kind of bridge between Europe, NATO and Russia. President Erdogan has a ‘special’ relationship with both US President Trump and Russian President Putin. Therefore, Turkey could be a kind of compromise option that would satisfy all parties.

2. Turkey and Erdogan personally have great ambitions to increase Ankara's geopolitical weight in the world. It is one of the most important players in Syria, in the settlement of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, and, more recently, in the South Caucasus. Turkey has now chosen the role of key mediator in the negotiations and has repeatedly provided a platform for dialogue. If successful, this will cement Ankara's status. Participation in security guarantees will be a sign that the resolution of the biggest war in Europe since World War II cannot happen without Turkey. This will significantly increase its geopolitical influence.

In addition, Turkey seeks to reduce Moscow's power in the Black Sea region. Russia has dominated the region for centuries, and a potential victory over Ukraine would further strengthen it. This can be prevented in the future through effective deterrence in Ukraine and the Black Sea region, using security guarantees and force. This would make it possible to keep Russia in a state where it cannot significantly increase its power in a controlled manner.

However, there is currently no complete certainty about the participation of the Turkish military or the presence of foreign contingents in general. This entails the risk of direct confrontation with the Russian army, which every country wants to avoid.

A more realistic and safer option is to participate in a ceasefire monitoring system. A similar system existed during the ATO and OOS under the auspices of the OSCE. It cannot be said that it was particularly effective, but in the future, this scenario may be reconsidered in many configurations. For it to function properly, effective means of observation and sanctions for violators of the ceasefire/peace are necessary.

If foreign military contingents do enter Ukraine, it is almost 100% certain that Turkish troops will be among them. Ankara will not miss the opportunity to demonstrate its real military power.

Effectiveness

During Russia's isolation since 2022 (which is now gradually disappearing), Turkey has become one of the few bridges to the ‘big world’ for Moscow. It did not close its airspace to Russian aircraft, Russian tourists continued to travel en masse to Turkish resorts, and trade between the countries even increased.

According to Reuters, "bilateral trade between Ankara and Moscow more than doubled, peaking at $68 billion in 2022 and then stabilising at $46 billion in 2024. During this period, Turkey rose from 14th place among the largest buyers of Russian oil to third, with 70% of its maritime oil imports in 2024 coming from Russia. It also became the world's largest importer of Russian petroleum products, absorbing 21% of Moscow's global fuel exports."

Gazprom's Turkish Stream remains the only gas pipeline from Russia to Europe. This increases Turkey's importance to Moscow and contributes to the Russian leadership's susceptibility to Turkey's decisions or requests.

One can imagine a situation where Turkish monitoring forces or peacekeepers record violations of the ceasefire and report them to the Russian side, demanding that such actions cease. What would be Moscow's likely response in such a case, given that the last gas pipeline to the West passes through Turkish territory and that Turkey is used to bypass sanctions or conduct other important economic operations in the context of the Western blockade? It is obvious that Russia would be more inclined to make concessions to Turkey than it would be to similar claims from European countries.

The situation at sea is similar. As mentioned, the Turkish navy is currently no weaker than the Russian navy, which means greater opportunities for bold actions. The interception by the Turkish Navy of Russian ships attempting to interfere with the future maritime corridor involving Ukraine does not seem too far-fetched. Ankara's participation in maritime security guarantees will be the most important and realistic.

It should be noted that all of the above is only possible if there is a benefit for Turkey to participate. In addition to increasing its geopolitical influence, Ankara must have a certain economic interest in Ukraine. This relates to the broader issue of creating favourable conditions for business and investment in our country, but priority must be given to our closest partners.

A factory belonging to Baykar, a company owned by Erdogan's son-in-law, has already been built in Ukraine. It was hit by a Russian missile, which does not increase Turkey's friendliness towards Russia and suggests that Ankara will not play along with Moscow. After this incident, Turkey refused to sell Russia the S-400 air defence systems that Moscow had previously requested.

In addition, Turkey is building Ada-class military corvettes for Ukraine. Two ships have already been built, and two more have been ordered for the future. Thus, the two countries already have a joint venture in the shipbuilding industry for the coming years.

Another very promising area of cooperation is the production of various drones. Not only Aerial, but also Land as well as Marine. Ukraine has used relatively inexpensive marine drones to level the playing field with Russia's numerically superior fleet and made it possible to export goods by sea. It is becoming clear that marine drones are the future.

The joint production of such devices, as well as their sale to Ankara, is quite promising. Turkey is a large maritime power that is interested in all innovations in the field. It would also be interesting for Turkey not only to establish joint production or import these goods from Ukraine in the future, but also to learn from experience. Turkey has its own large fleet, which is very vulnerable to similar attacks. Ukrainian instructors could train Turkish sailors and help them not only to use drones, but also to combat them.

Continuing the topic of drones, it is worth mentioning cooperation in the field of UAVs. Ukraine already supplies Turkey with engines for its aerial drones, including the Akıncı UAV, Bayraktar Kızılelma and others. They are manufactured in Zaporizhzhia at the O. G. Ivchenko Progress Design Bureau and Motor Sich.

Another interesting development is the joint participation of the two countries in the development of mineral resources in the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea. Currently, Kyiv lacks its own technology, but after the active phase of the war ends, Ankara could help with technology and receive a share of the profits. This would benefit both countries.

In general, for Turkey to participate effectively in security guarantees, Ukraine needs to ‘tie’ the two countries together as much as possible. This could include greater involvement of Turkish business, for example in rebuilding the state, as well as joint maritime and technical projects. Without this, the desire to help Kyiv will be much less.

Prospects

Turkey's participation in ensuring the post-war security architecture is inevitable. It is unknown what form it will take, but Ankara's involvement in maritime initiatives is definitely to be expected. The deployment of ground troops is a more complex process and depends on the general trend of other countries.

Ukraine cannot stand aside and wait for its partners to provide all the necessary guarantees just like that. It is necessary to implement decisions today that would contribute to strengthening our integration and cooperation. This would tie countries together and increase the desire of foreign states to guarantee Ukraine's security.