How much does it cost to buy the White House: or how much Americans are willing to sell their partners for

Photo: Time

A product to be sold for a profit

For the Trump administration, all relationships and partnerships are not strategic. They are merely a commodity that can and should be sold at a profit, exchanged to whoever pays the highest price.

For example, there was no government in the world that was more excited about Donald Trump's return than Benjamin Netanyahu's government in Israel. But as recent events have shown, even Netanyahu's friendly relations with Trump will not save you from being sold out by the owner of the White House for Arab money.

During his first major foreign tour, which lasted from 13 to 16 May, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, but did not visit his most important ally in the Middle East - Israel. 

If in his first term as president, Trump moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, broke the nuclear deal with Iran, recognised the annexation of the Golan Heights and normalised relations with several Arab countries, he is now ignoring Israeli interests in many areas.

Recently, the Trump administration has held de facto separate direct negotiations with Hamas over the release of an American citizen, concluded a separate peace agreement with the Yemeni Houthis, and cancelled sanctions against Syria. Finally, Trump is negotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran, Israel's greatest enemy, which could ease sanctions against Tehran.

Read more about US-Iranian relations in our article:  “Iran's Nuclear Programme: From the Creation to the Trump Nuclear Deal”

Of course, as long as Israel does not lose the United States as an ally. The majority of Republicans are supporters of Israel, so American support will remain strong overall. But, as we mentioned before, for Trump, partnerships are not something strategic. Trump is hunting for quick, often short-sighted solutions, attractive investment deals and diplomatic arrangements that Israel cannot deliver. As a result, Israel is at risk of having its national interests undermined in areas that have been served by the Israeli-American alliance in the region for more than half a century. 

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf can give Trump what he wants most - quick promises and money. According to the White House , during his tour of the Middle East, Trump signed agreements guaranteeing more than $2 trillion in investments from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE in the US and the purchase of US weapons.

In addition, Trump was gifted a $400 million Boeing 747-8 elite jet by Qatar, which will be used as the presidential plane in the future. In 2017, Trump claimed that Qatar ‘has historically been a sponsor of terrorism at a very high level’. Eight years later, Trump said: ‘We've never had a relationship with Qatar as strong as we have now. And we're going to protect you.’ I wonder which of the Qatari gifts changed Trump's position.  

At the same time, American foreign policy intersects with the business interests of the Trump family. President Trump's family business, the Trump Organisation, manages real estate projects and other businesses in all three Gulf countries that Trump has visited. For example, on 30 April, Trump's son Eric, who heads the real estate development division of the Trump Organization, signed a deal to build a $5.5 billion golf club in Qatar. The deepening of the Trump Organization's ties in the Middle East is of particular concern, as this region plays a key role in US foreign policy.

Selling Europe by buying gas pipelines

And now the question is: how far is the White House willing to go to sell Europe at a good price? If someone offers the right price? Europe, which most of the Trump administration openly hates. Understanding the greedy desires of the White House, Moscovia is offering the United States a cut of Europe's energy market.

Russia's share of the European gas market has fallen from 40% to 19% over the past three years. Six EU countries still buy Russian gas: Hungary and Slovakia receive gas through the Turkish Stream pipeline, while Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain buy liquefied natural gas from Russia's Novatek under long-term contracts. 

Russian imports to the EU: pipeline and LNG

However, the European Union is on the final stage of refusing Moscow's energy resources, especially gas. On 6 May, the European Commission officially presented a new plan called the REPowerEU Roadmap. The aim of the plan is to completely switch away from Russian energy resources. The plan proposes a ban on new contracts for Russian gas and the termination of existing spot contracts (i.e. contracts that allow for short-term gas purchases at current market prices) by the end of 2025. A complete phase-out of Russian gas imports - both pipeline and liquefied natural gas - is to take place by the end of 2027.

On 7 May, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed that the EU would not allow renewed dependence on Moscovia: ‘Some people still say that we should reopen the plan for Russian gas and oil. This would be a mistake of historic proportions. And we will not allow it.’

Nevertheless, Moscovia is coming up with a scheme to export its gas to Europe, offering the Americans stakes in the Nord Stream and, it seems, the Turkish Stream as well. The scheme is simple: Moscovia restores/sells its gas through the same flows, but at the entrance to Europe, these flows become ‘American’ - thus, Moscovia's gas does not fall under EU sanctions. 

The first to propose this scheme was American financier Stephen Lynch, who had been doing business in Moscow for two decades. In November 2024, the Wall Street Journal wrote that Lynch had asked the US government to allow him to bid for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline if it was put up for auction as part of a bankruptcy procedure in Switzerland.

‘The bottom line is this: this is a unique opportunity for Americans and Europeans to gain control of Europe's energy supply before the end of the fossil fuel era, which is a once-in-a-generation opportunity,’ Lynch said.

According to Reuters (12 April), in a version of the US-Ukraine subsoil deal, the United States demanded for Ukraine to give the US International Finance Corporation control of Russia's Gazprom gas pipeline in Ukraine.

In April, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told French magazine Le Point that Russia's Gazprom was ready to consider selling gas to Europe if the new owner took control of the gas network between Russia and Europe:

‘This is a purely commercial issue that we have never politicised’. ‘’Gazprom‘’ will certainly be discussing it. We are ready to negotiate about our gas and we know that some European countries want to continue buying it from us. Everything will be decided on a commercial basis’.

On 8 May, Reuters reported that the US and Russia were discussing the possibility of resuming Russian gas supplies to Europe. The restoration of Russia's role in the European gas market is seen as a possible element of a peace agreement. US involvement in this process could smooth out political resistance in Europe and give the Americans control over how much Russian gas Europe will receive.

Various options for American involvement are being considered: investments in Nord Stream and the Ukrainian GTS, a stake in Gazprom, and participation of American companies as intermediary buyers. Gazprom is also considering offering German customers short-term contracts for 24 months with significant discounts, instead of traditional multi-year agreements.

On 9 May, the Wall Street Journal reported that the US hedge fund Elliott Investment Management, headed by billionaire Paul Singer, is considering buying a stake in the Bulgarian branch of Russia's Turkish Stream gas pipeline, the last pipeline still exporting gas to Europe. 

According to the WSJ, Elliot has signed a non-disclosure agreement with Bulgaria's state-owned gas transmission operator Bulgartransgaz. In addition to investing in the company's infrastructure network, Elliot is also considering refinancing Bulgartransgaz's debt. Bulgarian expert Martin Vladimirov from the Centre for the Study of Democracy notes that ‘this deal could become a template for similar deals in Ukraine and Germany’.

Paul Singer, the founder of Elliot, is a prominent donor to the Republican Party, having donated $7.5 million to the political action committees Make America Great Again and Preserve America, both of which are linked to the re-election of Donald Trump. 

On 15 May, Euractiv wrote that the Bulgarian government is in talks with American investors to expand the Turkish Stream gas pipeline to increase the transportation of Moscow gas to Europe. Of course, the American investor will receive a corresponding share from Gazprom, although formally this share will be through a number of intermediaries. 

To put it simply, the oligarchic circle around the White House - and yes, it is oligarchic - is now directly influencing negotiations on promoting separate agreements with Moscow, as this will allow the Americans to take control of the share of Moscow's pipes in Europe and share the profits from gas sales with the Kremlin.

It seems that the Kremlin is ready to do this, because one way or another, it is only a matter of time before Moscow loses the European market completely. In the meantime, it preserves volumes against the backdrop of China's still abandoning the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project. It also allows Steve Witkoff to motivate Trump for a ‘great deal’ by convincing him that a deal with the Kremlin with such achievements will not make Trump look ‘weak’.

And here we come to the answer to the question: why does Trump avoid imposing sanctions on Russia?

The sanctions that the EU plans to impose in the next 18th package will simultaneously block the possibility of similar fraud with the Nord Stream and Turkish Stream, which are now being used by American billionaires and are now being motivated by Vitkoff. There is no ‘great deal’ on pipelines - a minus point for Vitkoff.

According to Reuters, Steve Witkoff and Putin's representative Kirill Dmitriev have held talks about gas as part of the peace talks on Ukraine.

The 18th package of sanctions is a fundamental necessity to break the separate Vitkoff/Dmitriev talks.

For more details, see our article “Potential bias of Witkoff as the main representative of the peace talks”.